Conference Agenda

Satellite megaconstellations are rapidly transforming low Earth orbit into a densely occupied communications environment, promising substantial social benefits such as improved connectivity for rural and underserved communities while simultaneously creating new governance challenges as orbital congestion increases, including interference affecting both other satellite systems and highly sensitive passive scientific instruments such as radio astronomy and atmospheric sensing (Borlaff et al., 2025). As deployments scale, these conflicts increasingly arise not from isolated transmitters but from the overlapping and cumulative emissions of many independently operated satellites sharing nearby spectral bands and orbital regions. Technical analyses of constellation networks show that spectral efficiency and interference outcomes depend critically on satellite density and spatial configuration, reinforcing the importance of aggregate signal conditions in dense low Earth orbit environments (Ozturk et al., 2024).

This paper considers overlapping spectrum rights as a central governance challenge in this environment. Modern spectrum institutions largely treat spectrum access as a set of parcels defined by transmitter parameters across frequency, geography, and time (Hazlett, Porter, & Smith, 2011). Such parcelized rights work well when interference can be traced to identifiable transmitters and disputes can be resolved through bilateral coordination among a limited number of actors. Megaconstellations create a different institutional environment. Satellite operators can coordinate transmissions within their own constellations, but interference increasingly arises across constellations operated by independent providers. In such settings, overlapping rights can generate congestion externalities analogous to the coordination problems identified in the broader literature on the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller, 1998).

These conditions create two related coordination problems. The first concerns coexistence among satellite operators themselves. Within a constellation, interference can often be managed through internal coordination mechanisms such as beam shaping, power control, or transmission scheduling. Across constellations, however, independently operated systems jointly shape the interference environment, generating coordination problems that cannot easily be resolved through bilateral negotiation alone. The second concerns coexistence between active communications systems and passive scientific users such as radio astronomy and atmospheric sensing. These instruments rely on extremely sensitive receivers and may be affected by the cumulative emissions of many satellites operating across nearby bands. Although these challenges differ technically and institutionally, both involve managing aggregate interference generated by many independent transmitters, a problem recent work characterizes as a property-rights mismatch in which institutional definitions of spectrum rights fail to align with the technological scale of interference interactions (Weiss et al., 2021; Krishnamurthy, Lazanski, & Murtazashvili, 2025).

To analyze these governance challenges, we develop a model of orbital spectrum use in which multiple satellite operators jointly determine the interference environment experienced by receivers. The framework incorporates constellation geometry, orbital motion, and transmission behavior to estimate the aggregate power-flux density experienced at scientific receivers as satellites pass through their field of view. Operators derive value from transmission but incur costs when mitigating interference through power reductions, beam steering, temporal coordination, frequency shifts, or temporary transmission pauses. Because each operator internalizes only a portion of the interference burden imposed on shared receivers, the model identifies a congestion externality that intensifies as the number and density of constellations increase.

The model is then used to evaluate how alternative spectrum governance regimes perform when interference is cumulative across constellations. The analysis compares four institutional approaches. The first is the status quo transmitter-licensing regime, in which operators have no general obligation to coordinate beyond existing regulatory procedures. The second introduces a requirement that operators coordinate interference management across constellations even while rights remain defined primarily in transmitter terms. The third defines acceptable interference environments for protected receivers through aggregate interference or power-flux-density limits. The fourth draws on the concept of Spectrum Usage Rights (SUR), first proposed by Webb (2009), which defines licenses in terms of permissible interference levels rather than transmitter characteristics. Recent work on “evolved” Spectrum Usage Rights further develops this approach and explores how interference-based licensing could support more flexible spectrum management in modern wireless environments (Webb, Medeisis, & Minervini, 2024; Medeisis et al., 2025). These approaches also align with broader discussions of flexible spectrum institutions and technological neutrality in spectrum policy (Cave & Webb, 2020).

By modeling interference as a cumulative outcome of many independently operated transmitters, this approach clarifies how different institutional arrangements allocate responsibility for managing aggregate interference across satellite operators. The framework also allows consideration of complementary coordination mechanisms, including incentive-based approaches that reward cooperative interference management among commercial operators and scientific users. These insights inform policy debates over how spectrum institutions should evolve to manage megaconstellations while protecting scientific observation and preserving orbital spectrum.