Conference Agenda

The rapid deployment of large Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations is transforming global communications infrastructure, enabling broadband connectivity, remote sensing, and navigation services that underpin modern digital economies. As satellite deployments scale into the thousands, however, the orbital environment is becoming increasingly complex and contested. U.S. space policy has long recognized that space is becoming “congested, contested, and competitive,” raising new challenges for the stability, security, and governance of space-based systems [1]. At the same time, analysts have warned about emerging counterspace capabilities enabled by maneuverable satellites capable of performing rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), including so-called “space stalkers” that can approach, observe, or potentially disrupt other spacecraft [2]. Open-source reporting has also described several apparent cases of satellite shadowing or inspection in orbit. Earlier reports have focused primarily on geostationary (GEO) satellites, where maneuverable spacecraft have been observed approaching or monitoring other satellites at close distances [4–6]. More recently, however, officials have reported experiments involving disruptive or adversarial satellite behavior in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), including scenarios described as “satellite dogfighting” or stealthy maneuvering between satellites [7]. These developments suggest that proximity operations are evolving beyond isolated GEO incidents and may increasingly occur in the far more densely populated LEO environment used by modern communications constellations.

Despite growing policy concern, systematic empirical analysis of satellite stalking behavior remains limited. Most existing discussions rely on isolated incidents or strategic analyses rather than large-scale measurement of orbital behavior. At the same time, satellite systems are increasingly recognized as critical infrastructure whose security and resilience have implications for communications networks, navigation services, and national security systems [3]. As commercial LEO constellations dramatically increase the number of maneuverable satellites in orbit, policymakers lack a clear understanding of how constellation density may alter the feasibility, detectability, and prevalence of proximity operations. This gap raises important questions for communications policy and space governance.

In this paper, we examine how the rapid growth of LEO satellite constellations may change the threat landscape of satellite stalking and disruptive proximity operations. To address this question, we combine empirical orbital analysis with policy evaluation. First, we analyze publicly available Two-Line Element (TLE) orbital data to identify historical patterns of satellite proximity and maneuvering behavior associated with previously reported stalking or inspection incidents. TLE data provide standardized orbital parameters that are routinely published to support space situational awareness and help satellite operators avoid potential collisions. Second, we develop simulations that replay known stalking scenarios under varying satellite density conditions to evaluate how the expansion of LEO constellations may affect the feasibility and detectability of such behavior. Finally, we assess existing policy frameworks [8,9] governing space security and satellite operations to determine whether current strategies adequately address proximity-operation risks in increasingly dense orbital environments.

The contribution of this paper is to provide a policy-oriented empirical analysis of satellite stalking behavior in the context of rapidly expanding commercial LEO constellations. Drawing on interdisciplinary perspectives from communications policy, aerospace engineering, and cybersecurity, this study combines orbital measurement analysis with policy evaluation to identify potential gaps between existing national security space strategies and the operational realities of large-scale satellite deployments. We expect the analysis to provide new empirical insight into the prevalence and characteristics of proximity operations in contemporary satellite activity. In particular, the results are expected to illustrate how increasing satellite density may expand opportunities for proximity operations while simultaneously complicating the detection and attribution of suspicious maneuvers. These findings will inform ongoing policy discussions on transparency mechanisms, monitoring capabilities, and emerging norms for responsible behavior in space, with particular attention to the governance of space-based communications infrastructure.