Conference Agenda

Abstract

In 2020, the Federal Communications Commission restructured the 900 MHz band to permit broadband deployment, providing improved spectrum capacity for electric utilities and transportation companies seeking private wireless networks for critical infrastructure operations.¹ In February 2026, the FCC unanimously expanded this broadband allocation to the full 10 MHz of the 900 MHz spectrum, enabling higher-capacity private Long Term Evolution networks for utilities, railroads, and other critical infrastructure services seeking secure, dedicated connectivity independent of commercial cellular carriers.²

FCC regulations governing this restructured band require prospective broadband applicants to hold licenses for more than 50% of the total amount of licensed 900 MHz spectrum in the relevant county before obtaining broadband authorization.³ Additionally, applicants must demonstrate they have acquired, relocated, or can protect 90% or more of incumbent narrowband licensees in the broadband segment within the county and 70 miles of its boundary.⁴ These incumbent clearing requirements effectively require that any entity seeking to be eligible for a 900 MHz broadband license must first acquire a majority of existing legacy licenses in a county, a process requiring material capital, negotiations with dispersed license holders, and potentially lengthy negotiation with existing holders.

Anterix, Inc., a spectrum infrastructure company that leases licensed spectrum to utilities for private wireless networks, is the largest holder of licenses in the 900 MHz broadband segment nationwide.⁵ Anterix holds three to six megahertz of 900 MHz spectrum in 90.8% of 49 major trading areas across the United States.⁶

Research Question. This paper asks whether the FCC's 900 MHz license eligibility framework serves the public interest by reducing costs for utilities seeking spectrum access, or whether it produces harmful market concentration by enabling supracompetitive pricing passed through to licensee customers.

Methodology. Drawing on Anterix's SEC filings (Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K from fiscal years 2016-2026), FCC orders and records, and secondary sources including spectrum policy scholarship, this paper examines how the FCC's broadband license eligibility requirements produced substantial market concentration in one company with respect to 900 MHz spectrum allocation.⁷

Disciplinary Approach. The Article integrates telecommunications and administrative law, and economics.

Analysis. First, the Article contrasts whether market concentration in 900 MHz reduces transaction costs for utilities because a single provider eliminates the need to negotiate with multiple regional license holders or whether it eliminates price competition, potentially enabling supracompetitive pricing. Second, the Article evaluates whether licensees have alternatives, including Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) at 3.5 GHz, which offers shared access without incumbent clearing requirements, and unlicensed spectrum.⁸ It considers whether alternative spectrum bands offer different propagation characteristics than licensed 900 MHz, assessing whether the band's unique technical characteristics insulate Anterix from substitution pressure. Lastly, the paper evaluates alternative regulatory frameworks, including: (a) mandatory disclosure of spectrum leasing terms to enable rate monitoring; (b) reservation of spectrum capacity for research institutions, nonprofits, or community organizations unable to compete with commercial providers; (c) rate review authority allowing the FCC to examine pricing upon complaint; and (d) public auction for broadband licenses rather than market-based acquisition.⁹

Novelty and Relevance. This Article presents the first systematic empirical analysis of market concentration in 900 MHz. The research is timely: the February 2026 expansion to 10 MHz intensifies concentration dynamics, and the Supreme Court's 2024 abrogation of Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo raises new questions about agency frameworks that vest exclusive control of public spectrum in pre-positioned private actors.¹⁰

Expected Conclusions. The paper advances three principal findings. First, the FCC's 50% aggregation threshold and 90% incumbent clearing requirement, though facially neutral, enabled pre-positioned market participants (Anterix) to satisfy these thresholds. This finding extends spectrum policy theory by demonstrating how administrative rules can produce monopoly effects despite market-based frameworks. Second, Anterix's SEC filings do not clearly establish whether this concentration harms or benefits customers because customer contracts are private and cannot be determined from available data. Third, the paper determines that effective monopoly power warrants new oversight mechanisms the current regulatory structure does not provide. The paper proposes (a) mandatory disclosure of spectrum leasing terms to enable regulatory monitoring; (b) spectrum reservation for research, nonprofit, and community organizations; and (c) rate review authority allowing FCC examination of pricing upon complaint.