Conference Agenda

Space enabled technologies increasingly operate as core communications and information infrastructure. Satellites support broadband connectivity, positioning and timing services, remote sensing, defense communications, logistics, and a growing range of digitally mediated services. Yet widely cited estimates of the space economy remain poorly suited to the policy questions that matter most for communications and Internet governance. Many rely on proprietary classifications, revenue tallies, or partial industry lists that identify firms labeled as “space” but do not measure how space based capabilities propagate through the broader production network. As a result, conventional estimates can understate both the economic significance of space activity and the sectors most exposed to its disruption. This paper develops a transparent and reproducible framework for measuring the U.S. space economy using public national accounts data and input output linkages.

The empirical framework begins with a deliberately narrow definition of the core space sector based on Bureau of Economic Analysis detail codes for guided missile and space vehicle manufacturing, propulsion units and parts for space vehicles and guided missiles, and satellite related telecommunications services. We combine these industries with benchmark input output total requirements tables and real gross output by industry to decompose the space economy into direct core output and indirect production generated elsewhere in the economy. We also conduct parallel exercises using real value added, which aligns more closely with GDP concepts and reduces concerns about double counting intermediate transactions.

The results show that indirect activity exceeds direct activity in every benchmark year and grows faster over time. Under the conservative core definition, direct output rises from just under $60 billion in 2007 to roughly $75 to $80 billion by 2017, while the associated indirect component rises from about $80 to $85 billion to roughly $120 to $125 billion. By 2017, the ratio of indirect to direct activity reaches about 1.6, indicating that the majority of the measured footprint associated with space activity occurs outside the core industries themselves. Much of its importance derives from its role as embedded infrastructure inside broader production systems. This pattern is strongest in the satellite and telecommunications segment, where indirect effects dominate direct activity and drive much of the aggregate expansion in the indirect footprint over time.

The paper also identifies which noncore industries benefit most from core space demand and which are most exposed to core space supply conditions. Among upstream suppliers, the largest winners are not only narrowly aerospace specific industries, but communications and business service industries that occupy important positions in the wider production network. Wired telecommunications carriers is the leading upstream supplier in every benchmark year, rising from about $4.5 billion in 2007 to $8.1 billion in 2012 and remaining elevated at roughly $7.3 billion in 2017. On the downstream side, we introduce a Space Dependency Index that measures the share of an industry’s total requirements that trace back, directly or indirectly, to core space suppliers. Federal government defense shows the sharpest increase, reaching roughly 2.5 percent by 2017. Communications and digital service industries also display rising exposure, including wireless telecommunications carriers and internet publishing and web search portals.

To assess resilience and bottleneck risk, we also examine concentration in the upstream supplier base of each core industry using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index and top five supplier shares. Guided missile and space vehicle manufacturing shows relatively stable concentration over time. Propulsion units and parts displays a marked decline in concentration, consistent with supplier diversification. The satellite and telecommunications segment shows declining HHI alongside a persistently high top five supplier share, suggesting broader diversification outside the largest suppliers but continued reliance on a small set of dominant upstream inputs. For communications and Internet policy, this distinction matters because the relevant challenge is often not the absolute size of the sector but whether critical capabilities depend on narrow and potentially fragile supplier networks.

Finally, we extend the accounting framework forward to 2030 using an input output consistent projection protocol based on shrinkage pooled growth estimates, deterministic scenario wedges, and Monte Carlo uncertainty bands. Under the baseline scenario, the total footprint of the conservative core space sector reaches roughly $350 billion by 2030, consisting of approximately $115 to $120 billion in direct activity and $230 to $240 billion in indirect activity. The low and high scenarios imply total footprints of roughly $310 to $315 billion and $390 to $400 billion, respectively. Across all scenarios, indirect effects remain the dominant component, accounting for roughly two thirds of the total.