Harvesting votes: The electoral effects of the Italian land reform

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World Bank Land Conference

16 May 2024

Motivation

▶ Objective of many redistribution policies: lasting political support

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▶ In poor agrarian societies politicians often redistribute land

   ▶ Revolutionary governments: France (1790s), Russia (1920s), China (1940s)

   ▶ Democracies: Italy (1950), Chile (1970), South Africa (1990s), . . .

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  ▶ Do these policies generate political gains?

  ▶ Do these gains persist?

  ▶ Why?

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  ▶ Do these gains persist?

  ▶ Why?

▶ We study the **Italian Land Reform** (1951)

# Identification: panel spatial-RDD

Results in one slide

Effect of reform on **DC** vote share

Results in one slide

Effect of reform on **DC** vote share

► Clientelistic practices and patronage are plausible mechanisms for persistence

Literature Review

1. Electoral effects of redistribution policies

▶ Bechtel and Hainmueller, (2011), Manacorda et al., (2011), and Zucco Jr (2013)

▶ Short-term electoral effects of land reforms: de Janvry et al. (2014), Larreguy et al. (2018), Gonzalez (2013)

2. Land ownership and clientelistic systems

▶ Baland and Robinson (2008), Anderson et al. (2015), Larreguy et al. (2018)

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▶ Short-term electoral effects of land reforms: de Janvry et al. (2014), Larreguy et al. (2018), Gonzalez (2013)

▶ Focus on persistence of electoral effects (and its end)

2. Land ownership and clientelistic systems

▶ Baland and Robinson (2008), Anderson et al. (2015), Larreguy et al. (2018)

▶ Land reform appears to have strengthened clientelistic brokers

Outline

Background and empirical strategy

Electoral results over 50 years

Mechanisms
1. Gratitude
2. Clientelistic practices
3. Migration
4. Growth and development
5. Economic Conservatism

Outline

The 1950 land reform

▶ **Who**? Christian Democrat (**DC**) government

▶ **When**? Law: 1951; Implementation: early 1950s

▶ **Where**? Large estates in each reform zone   ▸ map
  ▶ Expropriation determined by size and efficiency   ▸ table

▶ **Why?** Redistributive and efficiency goals   ▸ details

Plus, anti-communist goal:

"The reform, the way in which it has been conceived and implemented has, and intends to have, an explicitly anti-communist function"

(Rossi-Doria 1951)

The 1950 land reform

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Plus, anti-communist goal:

"In the reform areas, the Scudo Crociato [the DC symbol: red cross on white shield] *shines while the hammer and sickle rust"*

(Fanfani 1956)

Border manipulation: North vs South

► Exhibit A: proposed land reform (technical)

Proposed (April 1950)

Reform area:
■ North
■ South
■ Sicily and Sardinia
  Not affected

Border manipulation: North vs South

▶ Exhibit A: proposed land reform (technical)

Proposed (April 1950)

Reform area:
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0   100
Km

Actual (February 1951)

Reform area:
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■ South
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Km

Border manipulation: North vs South

► Exhibit A: proposed land reform (technical)

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
► South: land occupations, landowners' lobby (Calasso 1952; Piazza 1974) ► Quotes
► North: DC politicians complain to Segni for *absence* of manipulation

► De Gasperi   ► DC Siena   ► Replies

► Sample map

Regression discontinuity

$$y_{ir} = \quad \alpha \cdot d_i + \quad \gamma \cdot d_i \times T_i +$$

$$\beta \cdot T_i + \eta_r + u_{ir}$$

i: town; r: reform area

▶ $T_i = 1$ if town i is in reform area
▶ d_i: distance to reform area border

Regression discontinuity
+ difference-in-differences

$$y_{irt} = \sum_t \alpha_t \cdot d_i + \sum_t \gamma_t \cdot d_i \times T_i +$$

$$\sum_t \beta_t \cdot T_i + \eta_{rt} + \eta_i + u_{irt}$$

t: year; i: town; r: reform area

▶ $T_i = 1$ if town i is in reform area

▶ d_i: distance to reform area border

▶ Periods: $t = \underbrace{1946, 1948,}_{Pre} \underbrace{1953, 1958, \ldots, 1992}_{Post}$

▶ Bandwidths: $d_i \in [10, 50]$ Km

Identification assumptions

At the border:

1. Parallel trends

2. No contemporary differential shock

▶ We also show balance of observables at border
  (though not necessary for identification)

Covariate balance at the border

| | Preferred Bandwidth < $25km$ (N=490) | | | Alternative Bandwidths | | | | | |
| | | | | < $10km$ (N=222) | | | < $50km$ (N=863) | | |
	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]
A: Balance Land Distribution 1948									
Share of Expropriable Estates 1948	0.013	0.002	[0.010]	0.014	-0.037	[0.024]	0.011	-0.010	[0.010]
B: Balance Vote Shares 1946 & 1948									
Christian Democrats (DC) 1946	0.310	-0.025	[0.025]	0.295	-0.012	[0.040]	0.330	-0.010	[0.022]
Christian Democrats (DC) 1948	0.431	-0.028	[0.028]	0.411	0.019	[0.042]	0.454	-0.015	[0.024]
Communists (PC) 1946	0.243	0.021	[0.031]	0.259	0.002	[0.052]	0.235	0.009	[0.026]
Communists (PC) 1948	0.408	0.035	[0.034]	0.425	-0.010	[0.053]	0.387	0.019	[0.029]
C: Balance Geography and Census 1951									
Distance from the Coast	44.12	0.969	[2.761]	37.04	5.531	[4.282]	49.64	-4.571**	[2.269]
Distance from Rome	184.3	13.63	[13.03]	165.1	-2.344	[20.90]	226.2	10.02	[10.43]
Slope	1.530	-0.020	[0.167]	1.345	0.226	[0.236]	1.575	-0.116	[0.143]
Elevation	225.4	27.67	[30.28]	203.3	27.26	[42.02]	224.9	29.30	[24.82]
Wheat Suitability	4.432	-0.046	[0.054]	4.506	-0.009	[0.085]	4.378	-0.009	[0.043]
Maize Suitability	6.193	-0.187	[0.138]	6.107	0.026	[0.223]	6.392	-0.177	[0.112]
Malaria (1932)	0.497	0.029	[0.088]	0.529	-0.113	[0.150]	0.372	0.016	[0.072]
Log Population	8.360	-0.226	[0.161]	8.438	-0.449*	[0.240]	8.454	-0.065	[0.144]
Share Active Population	0.530	-0.009	[0.013]	0.540	-0.022	[0.018]	0.523	-0.003	[0.010]
Share Agricultural Workers	0.645	0.005	[0.034]	0.669	0.025	[0.049]	0.627	0.030	[0.027]
Share Manufacturing Workers	0.144	0.019	[0.021]	0.122	-0.013	[0.029]	0.155	-0.002	[0.016]
Share Public Sector Workers	0.052	-0.010	[0.007]	0.055	-0.011	[0.008]	0.049	-0.008	[0.005]

All regressions include reform area fixed effects.

Additional balance   South

Covariate balance at the border

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All regressions include reform area fixed effects.

Parallel pre-trends at the border

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A: Pre-Trends Vote Shares 1948-46									
Christian Democrats (DC)	0.122	-0.003	[0.015]	0.116	0.031	[0.024]	0.123	-0.005	[0.012]
Communists (PC)	0.165	0.014	[0.019]	0.166	-0.012	[0.033]	0.152	0.010	[0.016]
Socialists (PSI)	0.215	0.038	[0.028]	0.236	0.020	[0.043]	0.182	0.019	[0.023]
Social-Democrats (PSDI)	-0.145	0.001	[0.019]	-0.138	0.038	[0.032]	-0.147	0.004	[0.016]
Republicans (PRI)	-0.025	-0.010	[0.009]	-0.028	0.004	[0.020]	-0.023	-0.010	[0.008]
Liberals (PLI)	-0.013	-0.001	[0.007]	-0.009	-0.011	[0.011]	-0.013	0.004	[0.006]
B: Pre-Trends Census 1951-36									
Log Population	0.075	-0.021	[0.023]	0.097	-0.030	[0.030]	0.065	0.008	[0.017]
Log Workers	0.053	-0.024	[0.031]	0.081	-0.083*	[0.049]	0.038	0.012	[0.025]
Share Active Population	0.080	-0.006	[0.013]	0.083	-0.028	[0.021]	0.077	0.001	[0.010]
Share Agricultural Workers	-0.068	-0.016	[0.015]	-0.067	-0.016	[0.022]	-0.082	-0.019	[0.012]
Share Manufacturing Workers	-0.026	0.011	[0.010]	-0.025	0.003	[0.014]	-0.023	0.018**	[0.008]
Share Public Sector Workers	0.025	-0.005	[0.004]	0.028	-0.004	[0.007]	0.024	-0.002	[0.004]

All regressions include reform area fixed effects.

▶ South

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Contemporaneous policies

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	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]
Malaria eradication (1947-52)	0.50	0.029	[0.094]	0.53	-0.113	[0.153]	0.37	0.016	[0.074]
log Marshall Plan funds per capita (1948-52)	4.74	-0.205	[1.130]	3.75	0.092	[1.617]	5.85	0.040	[11.644]
Share of workers in GATT affected sectors (1948)	0.81	0.017	[0.020]	0.81	0.008	[0.028]	0.81	0.020	[0.016]
Piano Casa dummy (1949)	0.03	-0.038	[0.032]	0.03	-0.030	[0.047]	0.02	-0.021	[0.026]
Piano Casa houses per 10'000 inhabitants (1949)	0.99	-1.633	[1.259]	1.09	-2.096	[2.145]	0.91	-1.077	[0.991]
Cassa del Mezzogiorno dummy (1950)	0.02	0.020	[0.025]	0.00	0.000	-	0.04	-0.002	[0.029]
log firms in ECSC affected sectors (1951)	2.43	-0.179	[0.231]	2.57	-0.500	[0.361]	2.57	0.072	[0.200]
Share of workers in ECSC affected sectors (1951)	0.03	0.003	[0.017]	0.03	-0.030	[0.026]	0.03	0.013	[0.012]

All regressions include reform area fixed effects.

Outline

Graphical evidence
Change in vote shares **after** the reform

Christian Democrats

Change DC votes 1946/48 to 1953/92

Bandwidth: 32 Km. Bins: 4 Km.

Communists

Change PCI votes 1946/48 to 1953/92

▸ First stage   ▸ Pre-trends

Effect of the reform on DC

Christian Democrats

Christian Democrats

95% confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered by town.

▶ PCI

▶ Favoritism and gratitude

▶ Favoritism   ▶ Gratitude

Voting with the Christian Democrats

Referendum to repeal divorce bill: 1974

DC supports repeal of divorce law

Voting with the Christian Democrats

Referendum to repeal divorce bill: 1974

Effect of reform on:
DC votes ⊢———⊣ Divorce referendum ⊢———⊣

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regression includes distance inside and distance outside times decade as well as town and reform area times decade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▶ Different bandwidths

Robustness

- Polynomial in latitude and longitude   `2D polynomial`

- Spillovers   `spillovers`

- IV (April 1950 proposed reform)   `IV`

- Quantifications   `persuasion rate`

- Specifications   `bandwidth` `province FEs` `polynomial` `log DC share` `all`

- Sample restrictions   `no provinces` `drop segments`

- 1919-1924 elections   `pre-fascism`

- Inference   `placebo` `Conley s.e.`

- McCrary   `test` `simulations`

Outline

Gratitude

► Plausible explanation, but gratitude may be short-lived: effects fade over time in towns where initial recipients were old

	DC vote share	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment × 1950s	0.031***	0.036***
	[0.011]	[0.010]
Treatment × 1960s	0.031**	0.040***
	[0.012]	[0.011]
Treatment × 1970s	0.052***	0.060***
	[0.013]	[0.012]
Treatment × 1980s	0.078***	0.090***
	[0.015]	[0.013]
Old population in 1951 × Treatment × 1950s	0.005	-0.001
	[0.015]	[0.013]
Old population in 1951 × Treatment × 1960s	0.001	-0.008
	[0.017]	[0.015]
Old population in 1951 × Treatment × 1970s	-0.013	-0.024
	[0.018]	[0.017]
Old population in 1951 × Treatment × 1980s	-0.040*	-0.053***
	[0.021]	[0.019]

Outline

Land reforms and clientelism

► The land reform included elements that limited benefits for recipients:
  ► Discretionary allocation of land
  ► Restrictions to sales
  ► **Access to inputs and health insurance** via political brokers (farmers' associations)
► **Discretionarity** and **conditionality** are well-known ingredients of clientelistic systems (Hicken, 2011)
► Political brokers may have facilitated a system of repeated exchange between voters and politicians.
  ► Long-term effects compound direct effects of redistribution with the indirect effects of intermediating channels (e.g., clientelistic practices induced by the reform).

Brokers' networks (*Coldiretti*)

▶ Beneficiaries had to join cooperatives: most chose *Coldiretti*

▶ *Coldiretti* acted as political broker for DC

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▶ We measure *Coldiretti* with data from *Casse Mutue*

Brokers' networks (*Coldiretti*)
Casse Mutue's elections (1955-70)

Casse Mutue: Coldiretti votes per capita
Distance

Casse Mutue: Coldiretti votes per capita
Latitude-Longitude

► Back of the envelope: Farmers who received land through the reform were 52% more likely to support the political brokers of the land reform party than pre-existing farm owners.

► Votes per capita   ► Why not shares?

Brokers' networks (*Coldiretti*)
Casse Mutue's budget (1965) – revenues

A. *Casse Mutue*: revenues per capita
Distance

B. *Casse Mutue*: revenues per capita
Latitude-Longitude

Brokers' networks (*Coldiretti*)
Casse Mutue's budget (1965) – expenditure

C. *Casse Mutue*: expenditure per capita
Distance

D. *Casse Mutue*: expenditure per capita
Latitude-Longitude

Patronage

A. Patronage
Distance

B. Patronage
Latitude-Longitude

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regression include town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▶ Bandwidths

Some (weak) suggestive evidence: more ▶ Pork barrel in treated towns

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End of exchange

► 1946-1993: DC governments rule Italy *uninterruptedly*

► 1992-1993: Major corruption scandals ("Mani Pulite")

► 1993-1995: DC splits in many parties (Segni, PPI, CCD, CDU)

► 1994: Berlusconi's party wins elections, DC loses access to power

$\Rightarrow$ from 1994 on, DC can no longer sustain political exchange

End of exchange
Post-1992 elections

Dependent variable is DC vote share. After 1992 DC is: PPI + Patto Segni (1994); PPI + Dini + CCD\CDU (1996); Margherita + CCD\CDU (2001). Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regressions control for town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

Outline

Selective migration
## Effect of reform on electors and DC votes

Effect of reform on log electors

Effect of reform on log **DC** votes

Election year

Overtime treated towns experience net out-migration. However:

▶ effect on voting is *immediate*, *persistent* and *stable*

▶ effect on migration grows over time

▶ *Absolute* number of Christian Democrats votes increases in 1953 (1958).

Selective migration

Effect of reform on population composition

| | Share workers in | | | Share population aged | | | |
	agriculture	manufacturing	Share males	0-19	20-44	45-64	>64
Treatment × 1961	-0.025	0.006	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.004
	[0.019]	[0.009]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Treatment × 1971	-0.030	0.005	-0.003	-0.001	0.002	0.005	0.005
	[0.025]	[0.016]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.005]
Treatment × 1981	-0.011	-0.010	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	0.001	0.010
	[0.029]	[0.020]	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.009]
Treatment × 1991	0.008	-0.027	-0.004	-0.002	-0.009	0.002	0.012
	[0.032]	[0.021]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.010]
Treatment × 2001	0.008	-0.019	-0.004	-0.006	-0.013	0.003	0.016
	[0.033]	[0.021]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.011]
Mean Y Control Group	0.30	0.23	0.50	0.25	0.33	0.23	0.14
Observations	2939	2939	2940	2940	2940	2940	2940

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regressions include distance inside and distance outside times year as well as town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

back

Outline

Ownership society?
Effect of reform on share of houses owned

Sample: towns in north. All regressions include town and reform area times year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by town.

▶ Back

Sectoral Employment

	Share workers in			Share population aged			
	agriculture	manufacturing	Share males	0-19	20-44	45-64	>64
Treatment × 1961	-0.025	0.006	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.004
	[0.019]	[0.009]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Treatment × 1971	-0.030	0.005	-0.003	-0.001	0.002	0.005	0.005
	[0.025]	[0.016]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.005]
Treatment × 1981	-0.011	-0.010	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	0.001	0.010
	[0.029]	[0.020]	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.009]
Treatment × 1991	0.008	-0.027	-0.004	-0.002	-0.009	0.002	0.012
	[0.032]	[0.021]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.010]
Treatment × 2001	0.008	-0.019	-0.004	-0.006	-0.013	0.003	0.016
	[0.033]	[0.021]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.011]
Mean Y Control Group	0.30	0.23	0.50	0.25	0.33	0.23	0.14
Observations	2939	2939	2940	2940	2940	2940	2940

No effect on sectoral employment, though results may depend on empirical strategies (Albertus (2023), Bianchi-Vimercati et al. (2022))

Firms

	Distance		Latitude-Longitude	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Plants p.c.	Workers/plant	Plants p.c.	Workers/plant
Treatment × 1961	-0.001	0.311	-0.002	-0.019
	[0.003]	[0.245]	[0.003]	[0.195]
Treatment × 1971	-0.001	-0.056	-0.001	-0.642***
	[0.003]	[0.276]	[0.004]	[0.248]
Treatment × 1981	0.001	-0.267	-0.002	-0.622**
	[0.004]	[0.337]	[0.004]	[0.270]
Treatment × 1991	-0.001	-0.349	-0.006	-0.717***
	[0.004]	[0.309]	[0.004]	[0.256]
Mean Y Control Group	0.04	2.95	0.04	2.95
Number of Towns	490	490	490	490
Observations	2443	2443	2443	2443

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. All regressions include distance
inside and distance outside times decade as well as town and reform area times
decade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

Outline

Votes for right-wing parties after 1992

- ▶ Does the reform create a class of economically conservative small owners? Not really
  - ▶ No effect on wealth (housing)
  - ▶ Effect on *Family* policies (divorce)
  - ▶ No effect on other center-right parties (Berlusconi's Forza Italia) after 1992

Figure D.17: The impact of the reform on Forza Italia/center-right vote share after 1992.

Conclusion

This paper:

▶ studies the electoral impact of the 1950 land reform

▶ finds strong and persistent impact on voting

Why?

▶ strengthening of grassroots organizations

▶ repeated exchange DC-voters

APPENDIX

Reform areas

Reform area:
- ■ North
- ■ South
- ■ Sicily and Sardinia
- ☐ Not affected

▸ Back

Expropriation table

Percentuali di scorporo
riferite agli scaglioni di reddito imponibile

SCAGLIONI DI REDDITO IMPONIBILE TOTALE Lire	Imponibile medio per Ha. Lire									
	1000 e oltre	900	800	700	600	500	400	300	200	100 e meno
Fino a 30.000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Da oltre 30.000 a 60.000	—	—	—	—	—	0	15	30	55	70
» 60.000 a 100.000	—	.	—	—	0	10	30	60	70	85
» 100.000 a 200.000	35	40	47	55	60	65	70	75	84	90
» 200.000 a 300.000	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	87	95
» 300.000 a 400.000	52	57	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95
» 400.000 a 500.000	60	64	66	71	76	80	85	90	95	95
» 500.000 a 600.000	64	70	76	78	80	85	90	95	95	95
» 600.000 a 700.000	68	74	79	82	85	90	95	95	95	95
» 700.000 a 800.000	72	78	82	85	90	95	95	95	95	95
» 800.000 a 900.000	76	82	86	90	93	95	95	95	95	95
» 900.000 a 1.000.000	82	86	90	93	95	95	95	95	95	95
» 1.000.000 a 1.200.000	90	92	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95
Oltre 1.200.000	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95

The 1950 land reform

What?

▶ Expropriation of land (completed by 1953)

    ▶ Compensation: based on 1946 land tax value

    ▶ Paid with 25-year government bonds, yielding 5% yearly

▶ Beneficiaries (avg. 20 for each estate)

    ▶ Pay over 30 years, at 3.5% interest

    ▶ Could not sell the land before redeeming it

    ▶ Farm workers (47%), tenants (36%), small owners (9%), others (8%)

▶ Beneficiaries/requests ratio

    ▶ North/Center: 60-70%

    ▶ South: 25%

Quotes on border definition

► On. De Caro on Northern Italy (1952):

"To know why they have included in the reform areas [...] lands where it was attained an admirable progress such as in the towns of Ravenna, Chioggia, Cavarzere (VE), Argentaro, Copparo, Formigiana, Porto Maggiore, Massa Fiscaglia, Iolanda di Savoia (FE), Loreo, Rosolino, Corbola, Taglio di Po, Ariano Polesine (RO) [...] and in the so-called Maremme Laziali and Toscane [...this is] against the spirit of the law."

► On. Calasso on Soutern Italy (1952):

"The law came, but Salento was excluded from the reform area. For this reason in the Fall of 1950 more than 3000 rural day laborers moved from Copertino, Nardi, Veglie, Carmiano, Salice, Montironi, etc. and came back to the lands of the Arneo." [...] With the fight of the farmers we managed to get the inclusion [of Salento in the reform area]"

De Gasperi on inclusion of towns

DC Siena on exclusion of towns

DEMOCRAZIA CRISTIANA
COMITATO PROVINCIALE DI SIENA

Siena, 2 Febbraio 1951

La Giunta Provvisoria del Commissariato Provinciale di Siena, venuta a conoscenza che la legge Stralcio sulla Riforma Fondiaria, approvata recentemente dal Consiglio dei Ministri, comprende i soli tre Comuni della nostra Provincia di Abbadia S.Salvatore, Castiglion d'Orcia, Piancastagnaio, limitando così il precedente programma già annunziato, preparato e propagandato anche sulla stampa, secondo il quale la zona di applicazione della legge stessa si estendeva a undici Comuni di questa Provincia;

che questa limitazione, non si sa da quale motivo determinata, può far ritenere che sia dovuta a particolari influenze di elementi interessati, si da produrre una sfavorevolissima impressione sui lavoratori e braccianti agricoli che continueranno a nutrire sospetti e diffidenza verso il nostro Partito e con gravi ripercussioni politiche nella nostra Provincia dominata dal bolscevismo organizzato a sfruttare episodi di questo genere, ciò premesso

E L E V A

la sua vibrata protesta per le decisioni assunte dal Consiglio dei Ministri e declina ogni responsabilità per le conseguenze di carattere politico che potranno derivare dai fatti sopra denunciati.

Segni replies

2) MAREMMA - La delimitazione fatta - per le ricordate ragioni di ordine finanziario - è più ristretta di quel che si sarebbe dovuto largamente fare. Non si sono compresi i territori estensivi della provincia di Siena, di gran parte della campagna romana, di alcune parti di Pisa, Livorno, Latina, Frosinone, appunto per tali considerazioni.

Roma, / febbraio 1951

Carissimo Presidente,

ho avuto la lettera che mi hai inviato, letta quella inviata a Ruini, e, dal punto di vista tecnico, la risposta è qui allegata (stesa da Bandini, sentiti altri tecnici).

Non vi è dubbio che i territori di cui parla la lettera sono suscettibili di trasformazione fondiaria o agraria e ricadono nella legge; sulla zona del Delta (Coppero,Jolanda di Savoia ecc.) sono ora iniziati a cura e spese dello Stato, opere pubbliche di irrigazione, che importano una trasformazione sostanziale; ancor più influente e decisiva è l'opera di appoderamento da fare, che riguarda tutti i territori del Delta inseriti nel comprensorio delimitato dal Comitato dei Ministri e anche oltre il comprensorio.

Tutto questo comprensorio è inoltre percorso dal Po di Volano e dal Po Morto di Primaro, diventato oggi canale di irrigazione, e quindi geograficamente fa parte del Delta Padano, che è anche più esteso, in quanto vi sono compresi altri comuni della provincia di Ferrara e di Rovigo, e qualche tratto della Bassa Modenese, non contenuti nel comprensorio stralcio.

Covariate balance at the border

	Preferred Bandwidth < 25 km (N=490)			Alternative Bandwidths < 10 km (N=222)			< 50 km (N=863)		
	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]
A: Share of 1948 estates worth:									
> 200, 000 lira	0.001	-0.000	[0.001]	0.001	-0.002	[0.002]	0.001	-0.001	[0.001]
> 100, 000 lira	0.004	-0.001	[0.002]	0.004	-0.007	[0.005]	0.003	-0.003	[0.002]
> 40, 000 lira	0.013	0.001	[0.006]	0.014	-0.021	[0.015]	0.011	-0.005	[0.006]
> 20, 000 lira	0.028	0.002	[0.010]	0.029	-0.037	[0.024]	0.025	-0.010	[0.010]
B: Balance Mayor Elections 1946									
DC	0.230	-0.018	[0.105]	0.231	0.052	[0.147]	0.272	0.028	[0.085]
PCI (alone)	0.063	0.001	[0.065]	0.029	0.070	[0.103]	0.066	-0.044	[0.046]
PCI (with allies)	0.663	0.075	[0.107]	0.692	0.288**	[0.141]	0.660	0.082	[0.087]
PRI	0.063	0.005	[0.086]	0.048	0.088	[0.154]	0.064	0.045	[0.060]
C: Balance Vote Shares Other Parties 1946 & 1948									
Socialists (PSI) 1946	0.194	-0.003	[0.019]	0.189	-0.029	[0.030]	0.205	0.000	[0.016]
Socialists (PSI) 1948	0.408	0.035	[0.034]	0.425	-0.010	[0.053]	0.387	0.019	[0.029]
Social-Democrats (PSDI) 1946	0.194	-0.003	[0.019]	0.189	-0.029	[0.030]	0.205	0.000	[0.016]
Social-Democrats (PSDI) 1948	0.049	-0.003	[0.008]	0.051	0.009	[0.015]	0.058	0.005	[0.006]
Republicans (PRI) 1946	0.066	-0.011	[0.016]	0.074	-0.034	[0.028]	0.058	-0.012	[0.013]
Republicans (PRI) 1948	0.041	-0.021*	[0.012]	0.046	-0.030*	[0.017]	0.035	-0.022**	[0.009]
Liberals (PLI) 1946	0.026	0.001	[0.007]	0.025	0.010	[0.011]	0.026	-0.004	[0.005]
Liberals (PLI) 1948	0.013	0.000	[0.005]	0.016	-0.000	[0.007]	0.013	0.000	[0.004]
Post-Fascists (MSI) 1948	0.019	-0.001	[0.003]	0.015	-0.000	[0.005]	0.016	-0.005*	[0.003]

All regressions include reform area fixed effects.

Covariate balance at the border: South

| | Preferred Bandwidth < 25 km (N=1169) | | | Alternative Bandwidths | | | | | |
| | | | | < 10 km (N=561) | | | < 50 km (N=1788) | | |
	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]
A: Balance Land Distribution 1948									
Share of Expropriable Estates 1948	0.001	0.004***	[0.001]	0.001	0.003	[0.002]	0.001	0.003*	[0.001]
B: Balance Vote Shares 1946 & 1948									
Christian Democrats (DC) 1946	0.350	-0.036*	[0.020]	0.329	-0.036	[0.032]	0.351	-0.036**	[0.016]
Christian Democrats (DC) 1948	0.534	-0.061***	[0.018]	0.517	-0.056*	[0.029]	0.542	-0.061***	[0.014]
Communists (PC) 1946	0.058	0.039**	[0.017]	0.064	0.040	[0.027]	0.053	0.056***	[0.014]
Communists (PC) 1948	0.169	0.073***	[0.020]	0.176	0.093***	[0.034]	0.159	0.093***	[0.017]
C: Balance Geography and Census 1951									
Distance from the Coast	25.71	1.085	[2.294]	24.88	-0.777	[3.450]	27.53	2.298	[1.968]
Distance from Rome	307.4	-10.49	[10.04]	335.7	9.162	[16.68]	275.9	-17.75**	[8.298]
Slope	3.121	-0.322*	[0.184]	2.673	-0.184	[0.293]	3.381	-0385***	[0.149]
Elevation	446.2	-15.95	[36.71]	416.1	-3.596	[55.86]	482.9	4.453	[31.52]
Wheat Suitability	4.052	0.021	[0.045]	4.029	0.087	[0.066]	4.050	-0.009	[0.041]
Maize Suitability	3.669	0.088	[0.099]	3.488	0.200	[0.140]	3.846	0.033	[0.087]
Malaria (1932)	0.546	-0.000	[0.051]	0.576	0.071	[0.086]	0.508	0.016	[0.044]
Log Population	8.231	0.386***	[0.109]	8.245	0.166	[0.178]	8.161	0.393***	[0.090]
Share Active Population	0.564	-0.001	[0.013]	0.570	0.029	[0.020]	0.558	-0.010	[0.010]
Share Agricultural Workers	0.690	0.016	[0.022]	0.685	0.017	[0.035]	0.691	0.013	[0.019]
Share Manufacturing Workers	0.118	-0.029***	[0.010]	0.121	-0.030*	[0.017]	0.112	-0.034***	[0.008]
Share Public Sector Workers	0.040	0.006	[0.004]	0.039	0.008	[0.007]	0.041	0.005	[0.004]

All regressions include reform area fixed effects.

Sample: towns in Fùcino, Opera Combattenti, Puglia, Lucania and Sila.

Parallel pre-trends at the border: South

| | Preferred Bandwidth < 25km (N=1169) | | | Alternative Bandwidths | | | | | |
| | | | | < 10km (N=561) | | | < 50km (N=1788) | | |
	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]	Control mean	β	[s.e]
A: Pre-Trends Vote Shares 1948-46									
Christian Democrats (DC)	0.185	-0.024	[0.018]	0.187	-0.019	[0.030]	0.191	-0.025*	[0.015]
Communists (PC)	0.111	0.035**	[0.015]	0.112	0.053**	[0.023]	0.106	0.036***	[0.013]
B: Pre-Trends Census 1951-36									
Log Population	0.125	0.058***	[0.013]	0.131	0.041*	[0.022]	0.112	0.045***	[0.011]
Log Workers	0.171	0.100***	[0.026]	0.191	0.096**	[0.043]	0.138	0.072***	[0.022]
Share Active Population	0.138	0.020*	[0.011]	0.145	0.034*	[0.018]	0.126	0.010	[0.009]
Share Agricultural Workers	-0.039	0.010	[0.012]	-0.040	0.011	[0.020]	-0.054	-0.003	[0.010]
Share Manufacturing Workers	-0.051	-0.010	[0.008]	-0.055	-0.013	[0.013]	-0.043	-0.006	[0.006]
Share Public Sector Workers	0.016	0.000	[0.003]	0.014	-0.002	[0.005]	0.017	-0.002	[0.003]

All regressions include reform area fixed effects. Bandwidth: 25 Km.

Sample: towns in Fùcino, Opera Combattenti, Puglia, Lucania and Sila.

▶ Back

Parallel pre-trends at the border: South

1946-1948 changes in vote shares

Christian Demacrats

Communists

Sample: towns in Fùcino, Opera Combattenti, Puglia, Lucania and Sila.
Bandwidth: 32 Km. Bins: 4 Km.

▸ Back

"First Stage"
Land ownership in 1961

Share of farms managed by owner (1961)

Share of land managed by owner (1961)

95% confidence intervals. Heteroschedasticity robust standard errors.

► Results are robust when controlling for baseline (1929)

► Back

Graphical evidence

Change in vote shares **before** the reform

Change DC votes 1946 to 1948

Change PCI votes 1946 to 1948

Bandwidth: 32 Km. Bins: 4 Km.

▶ Back

Favoritism in land allocation

"Si precisa altresì che è elemento turbolento e facinoroso"

"*Notice also that he is a troublesome and violent individual*" • Back

Gratitude and Reciprocity

"Amici contadini, [. . .] lí nelle cabine [. . . elettorali] dobbiamo dimostrare la nostra riconoscenza, la nostra gratitudine, la nostra fedeltá al partito della democrazia"

"My fellow farmers, [. . .] at the polling stations we have to show our **reciprocity**, our **gratitude** and our loyalty to [DC]"

Antonio Sorgenti (leader of land beneficiary association), 1955

Robustness: different bandwidths
Referendum to repeal divorce bill: 1974

C. Divorce referendum
Distance

D. Divorce referendum
Latitude-Longitude

Spillovers

Are treated towns *rewarding* or are control towns *punishing*?

▶ 10% of land goes to farmers from other towns ⇒ downward bias

▶ Potential anger in control towns ⇒ upward bias

No perfect answer; we propose 4 tests:

1. Test resentment using land invasions after the reform
2. Let effect depend on geographical exposure to reform
3. Let effect depend on number of potential beneficiaries
4. Exclude towns on border ("donut RD")

Spillovers

Difference-in-difference with heterogeneity

$$
\begin{aligned}
y_{irt} &= \alpha \cdot \mathsf{Post}_t \cdot T_i + \beta \cdot \mathsf{Post}_t \cdot T_i \times X_i + \\
&+ \gamma \cdot \mathsf{Post}_t \cdot X_i + \eta_i + \eta_{rt} + u_{irt}
\end{aligned}
$$

Heterogeneity (X_i) with respect to:

1. Share of workers employed in agriculture (potential beneficiaries)
2. Share of town bordering with reform area

▸ Back

Spillovers

Geographical exposure to reform: examples

Low exposure town

Example: San Martino di Venezze (RO)

High exposure town

Example: Cancellara (PZ)

Spillovers

Difference-in-difference with heterogeneity

	Land Invasions	Christian Democrats	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.097		
	[0.083]		
Treatment × Post		-0.004	0.030*
		[0.021]	[0.015]
Share agricultural workers × Post		0.021	
		[0.016]	
Share agricultural workers × Treatment × Post		0.051	
		[0.036]	
Share of town limit on reform border × Post			0.013
			[0.026]
Share of town limit on reform border × Treatment × Post			-0.017
			[0.050]
Mean Y Control	0.06	0.36	0.31
Number of Towns	490	482	155
Observations	490	1925	620

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Elections: 1946-1958. Regressions include town and year × reform area fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

Spillovers
Donut RD

Christian Democrats vote share

	Distance				Latitude-Longitude			
	(1) All	(2) Donut: 1.5 km	(3) Donut: 2 km	(4) Donut: 2.5 km	(5) All	(6) Donut: 1.5 km	(7) Donut: 2 km	(8) Donut: 2.5 km
Treatment × 1950s	0.041***	0.033***	0.031**	0.038***	0.017**	0.011	0.010	0.012
	[0.013]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]
Treatment × 1960s	0.037**	0.032**	0.029**	0.034**	0.025**	0.020**	0.021**	0.023**
	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.010]
Treatment × 1970s	0.047***	0.046***	0.043**	0.042**	0.031***	0.029***	0.030***	0.028**
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Treatment × 1980s	0.048***	0.052***	0.050***	0.053***	0.035***	0.035***	0.037***	0.037***
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.013]
Mean Y Control Group	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
Number of Towns	490	471	461	444	490	471	461	444
Observations	5838	5615	5495	5291	5838	5615	5495	5291

▸ Back

IV: April 1950 proposed land reform
Reduced form

Christian Democrats vote share

	Distance			Latitude-Longitude		
	(1) $< 25km$	(2) $< 10km$	(3) $< 50km$	(4) $< 25km$	(5) $< 10km$	(6) $< 50km$
Treatment × 1950s	0.045***	0.045***	0.040***	0.023***	0.027***	0.022***
	[0.010]	[0.015]	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.006]
Treatment × 1960s	0.043***	0.051***	0.040***	0.034***	0.034***	0.037***
	[0.012]	[0.016]	[0.011]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.008]
Treatment × 1970s	0.054***	0.058***	0.047***	0.043***	0.045***	0.044***
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.008]
Treatment × 1980s	0.054***	0.042**	0.056***	0.044***	0.045***	0.041***
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.009]
Mean Y Control Group	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.36	0.34	0.38
Number of Towns	490	222	863	490	222	863
Observations	5818	2651	10153	5838	2651	10233

Sample: towns in north. All regressions include town and reform area times decade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▸ Back

# IV: April 1950 proposed land reform
Instrumental variables

Christian Democrats vote share

	Distance			Latitude-Longitude		
	(1) $<25km$	(2) $<10km$	(3) $<50km$	(4) $<25km$	(5) $<10km$	(6) $<50km$
Treatment $\times$ 1950s	0.073***	0.075**	0.063***	0.022*	0.039***	0.024**
	[0.019]	[0.032]	[0.015]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.010]
Treatment $\times$ 1960s	0.065***	0.075**	0.063***	0.034**	0.049***	0.042***
	[0.022]	[0.037]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.012]
Treatment $\times$ 1970s	0.081***	0.081**	0.075***	0.043***	0.063***	0.055***
	[0.023]	[0.036]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.012]
Treatment $\times$ 1980s	0.084***	0.054	0.088***	0.036**	0.061***	0.052***
	[0.025]	[0.039]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.014]
Mean Y Control Group	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.36	0.34	0.38
Number of Towns	490	222	863	490	222	863
Observations	5818	2651	10153	5838	2651	10233
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat	228.375	41.907	738.703	1710.686	748.321	3846.934

Sample: towns in north. All regressions include town and reform area times decade
fixed effects. Treatment and distances to the January 1951 land reform are
instrumented with treatment and distances to the April 1950 proposal. Standard
errors clustered by town.

Quantifications

Disclaimer: heroic assumptions.

Elasticity of voting to redistribution in average town:

▶ Electoral impact: $+4\% \times 6500$ voters $\sim +260 \; (+195)$ for DC

▶ Net beneficiaries: $(244$ households - 7 landowners$) \times 3 = 711$

$\Rightarrow +0.37 \; (+0.27)$ **votes for each additional net beneficiary**.

Persuasion Rate (Della Vigna and Gentzkow, 2010)

▶ Beneficiaries voting DC of those *who would not do so otherwise*

▶ Persuasion rate: $\frac{dc^T - dc^C}{b^T - b^C} \frac{1}{1 - dc^0} = \frac{0.04}{0.11} \frac{1}{1 - 0.43} = \mathbf{0.64} \;\; (\mathbf{0.48})$

Robustness: different bandwidths

Effect of reform on **DC** vote share

	$\leq 25km$	$\leq 10km$	$\leq 50km$
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment $\times$ 1950s	0.041^{***}	0.045^{*}	0.031^{***}
	[0.013]	[0.024]	[0.011]
Treatment $\times$ 1960s	0.037^{**}	0.053^{*}	0.028^{**}
	[0.016]	[0.027]	[0.013]
Treatment $\times$ 1970s	0.047^{***}	0.061^{**}	0.038^{***}
	[0.016]	[0.025]	[0.013]
Treatment $\times$ 1980s	0.045^{**}	0.043	0.039^{***}
	[0.018]	[0.028]	[0.015]
Mean Y Control Group	0.36	0.34	0.39
Observations	5346	2428	9366

Sample: towns in north. All regressions include town and reform area times decade fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by town.

Robustness: province fixed effects

Reform area:
- ■ North
- ■ South
- ■ Sicily and Sardinia
- ☐ Not affected

Back

Robust: Multidimensional RD $f(lat, lon)$

Effect of reform on **DC** vote share

$$y_{irt} = \sum_t \beta_t T_i + \sum_t \sum_r [\alpha_{rt}\text{lat}_i + \gamma_{rt}\text{lat}_i^2 + \sigma_{rt}\text{lat}_i \times \text{lon}_i + \delta_{rt}\text{lon}_i + \theta_{rt}\text{lon}_i^2] + \eta_i + \eta_{rt} + u_{irt}$$

95% confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered by town.

Robustness: 2nd order polynomial

Effect of reform on **DC** vote share

Election year

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regression includes 2nd order polynomial in distance interacted with election year and the treatment variable. It also includes town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▸ Back

Robustness: functional form

Effect of reform on $\log$ **DC** vote share

Election year

Dependent variable: log share of DC votes. Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regression includes town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

Back

Robustness: alternative specs.

## DC vote share

	Distance						
	(1) Baseline	(2) No prov. seats	(3) Dist^2	(4) Ref. area	(5) Elec. dist. FEs	(6) Segment FEs	(7) Prov. FE
Treatment $\times$ 1950s	0.041***	0.041***	0.048**	0.042***	0.038***	0.031**	0.033**
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.024]	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.015]
Treatment $\times$ 1960s	0.037**	0.036**	0.061**	0.040**	0.039**	0.029**	0.036**
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.027]	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Treatment $\times$ 1970s	0.047***	0.047***	0.064**	0.051***	0.052***	0.036**	0.046***
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.025]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Treatment $\times$ 1980s	0.048***	0.048***	0.047*	0.052***	0.051***	0.036**	0.045**
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.028]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]
Mean Y Control Group	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
Observations	5838	5718	5838	5838	5838	5838	5838

	Latitude-Longitude						
	(1) Baseline	(2) No prov. seats	(3) Linear	(4) No ref. area	(5) Elec. dist. FEs	(6) Segment FEs	(7) Prov. FE
Treatment $\times$ 1950s	0.017**	0.018**	0.029***	0.020***	0.018**	0.020**	0.033**
	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.015]
Treatment $\times$ 1960s	0.025**	0.026***	0.039***	0.030***	0.028***	0.029***	0.036**
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.016]
Treatment $\times$ 1970s	0.031***	0.032***	0.055***	0.041***	0.036***	0.029**	0.046***
	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.016]
Treatment $\times$ 1980s	0.035***	0.035***	0.067***	0.048***	0.039***	0.037***	0.045**
	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.018]
Mean Y Control Group	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
Observations	5838	5718	5838	5838	5838	5838	5838

Robustness: exclude provincial seats

Effect of reform on **DC** vote share

Election year

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north excluding towns that are provincial seats.
Regression includes town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▸ Back

Robustness: drop segments along border

# Robustness: drop segments along border

Pre-fascism elections

Christian Democrats

Christian Democrats (pre-1948)

Effect of reform on:
Italian Popular Party
Christian Democrats

Regression includes town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

Robustness: placebo

Exercise: re-estimate effect after moving the border

Coefficients

t-statistics

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. All regression include distance inside and distance outside times post 1950 as well as town and reform area times year fixed effects.

	DC (1)	revenues p.c. (2)	*Casse Mutue* expenditure p.c. (3)	*Casse Mutue* votes p.c. (4)	*Coldiretti* votes p.c. (5)	Public Sct. Employment (6)
Panel A: Distance						
Treatment × Post	0.044	120.716	119.382	0.014	0.011	0.009
Cluster: town	[0.015]***	[55.278]**	[49.953]**	[0.006]**	[0.005]**	[0.005]
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 5 km	[0.015]***	[55.019]**	[50.298]**	[0.006]**	[0.005]**	[0.005]
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 10 km	[0.015]***	[55.947]**	[51.289]**	[0.006]**	[0.005]**	[0.006]
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 25 km	[0.017]***	[57.933]**	[52.866]**	[0.007]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 50 km	[0.019]**	[54.394]**	[53.396]**	[0.007]**	[0.005]**	[0.007]
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 100 km	[0.021]**	[47.554]**	[50.035]**	[0.007]**	[0.005]**	[0.007]
Panel B: Latitude-Longitude						
Treatment × Post	0.028	118.237	95.466	0.007	0.006	0.016
Cluster: town	[0.009]***	[38.874]***	[35.648]***	[0.004]*	[0.003]**	[0.004]***
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 5 km	[0.009]***	[38.447]***	[35.645]***	[0.004]	[0.003]*	[0.004]***
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 10 km	[0.009]***	[39.504]***	[36.380]***	[0.004]	[0.003]*	[0.004]***
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 25 km	[0.008]***	[41.321]***	[38.885]***	[0.005]	[0.003]*	[0.005]***
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 50 km	[0.007]***	[41.922]***	[40.870]**	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.006]***
Conley s.e.: cutoff = 100 km	[0.006]***	[37.453]***	[36.784]***	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.006]**
Mean Y Control Group	0.36	437.79	316.00	0.03	0.02	0.05
Observations	5838	488	488	1451	1419	2939

Back

Continuity of the running variable

McCrary test

Distance from border

McCrary t-stat: -2.07.

Conjecture: jump of the density is mechanical

(simulations) (Back)

Density test: conjecture

Jump: **mechanical effect** of "convexity" of reform areas

Density test: simulations

A. Placebo borders

Move border in and out by n towns.

map

B. Placebo reform areas

Randomly allocate reform areas (keeping area fixed).

Back

Agricultural labor share

1. Public transfers

Our mechanism emphasizes the role of:

▶ *local* Members of Parliament

▶ **not** of local politicians aligned with the government

<div align="right">(cf. Brollo and Nannicini 2012)</div>

In our context:

▶ small towns: mayors & local officials often not aligned

▶ towns in our sample: many *non*-DC mayors

▶ Italian local MPs: known to promote their constituencies

<div align="right">(Fanfani: Arezzo; Berlusconi: Molise; D'Alema: Gallipoli)</div>

<div align="right">▶ Back</div>

1. Public transfers

Effect on transfers, by Mayor's affiliation

Why not using share of votes for *Coldiretti*?

Example of *Casse Mutue* elections: town of Premilcuore (Forlí)

1. Brokers' networks (*Coldiretti*)
Casse Mutue's elections (1955-70)

Casse Mutue: votes per capita — Distance

Casse Mutue: votes per capita — Latitude-Longitude

Sample: towns in north. All regressions include reform area fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▶ Back

Patronage

C. Patronage (1961-91)
Distance

D. Patronage (1961-91)
Latitude-Longitude

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regression include town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▸ Back

Pork barrel

A. Public transfers per capita
Distance

B. Public transfers per capita
Latitude-Longitude

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regression include town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▸ Mayors   ▸ Back

Robustness: drop segments along border

Christian Democrats

Communists

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regressions include town and reform area times year fixed effects. Each coefficient is estimated after dropping towns that are close to one of the 10 segments on the previous map. Standard errors clustered by town.

Back

Turnout

Effect of reform on voters' turnout

Election year

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regressions include town and reform area times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

▸ Back

Robustness: province fixed effects

Effect of reform on **DC** vote share

Election year

Sample: 25 Km from the reform border in the north. Regression includes town and *province*
times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by town.

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Fictional reform areas around Maremma

Effect of the reform on PCI

Communists

Communists

95% confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered by town.

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