# Who gains from individual property rights? Evidence from the allotment of Mapuche reservations

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UC Santa Barbara

World Bank Land Conference

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Indigenous people in Brazil shed tears of joy as the Supreme Court enshrines their land rights



# Individual property rights

How should land rights be structured to benefit indigenous communities?



Communal title to reservation

# Individual rights & development in indigenous lands

 Individual land rights are often considered a foundation for economic development (Besley, 1995; De Soto, 2003)

- Limitations to the exercise of individual rights might have hampered economic development in indigenous territories:
  - Akee (2009) finds restrictions to collateralization have limited land development in Aguas Caliente reservation in the USA
  - Dippel et al. (2020) find that fractionation of interest has reduced land development in not-allotted reservations in the USA
- Why were individual rights restricted in the first place? Why are they maintained?

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...the division of communitarian land has always entailed its loss. Prof. Alejandro Lipschutz La Comunidad Indígena en América y en Chile. Su Pasado Histórico y sus Perspectivas (1956, p. 121)

#### Dispossession in indigenous lands

#### Allotment may expose indigenous communities to disposession:

- Households in an alloted reservation were "much less likely to own a home after allotment occurred" (Akee, 2020)
- Increase in incomes from land allotment was due to immigration, "not by improvements in indigenous households' income or on-reserve employment" (Aragón and Kessler, 2020)
- Indigenous families were defrauded of their lands, representing an "obvious injury to justice" (Informe Comisión Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato, 2003)
- However, no study has assessed the trade-off between productivity gains and greater exposure to dispossession.

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What long-term impacts did the transition from collective to individual land rights have on Mapuche reservations' economic development and the socioeconomic status of their descendants?

- 1. Did individual rights reduce Mapuche ownership?
- 2. Did individual rights improve socioeconomic and environmental conditions in **reservations**?
- 3. Did individual rights improve the socioeconomic status of descendants?

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
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# NATURAL EXPERIMENT: A Century of Change in Mapuche Property Rights

# A century of change in Mapuche reservations' property rights

#### 1884-1929: Forced settlement

June 1930: *Courts of Indians* opened July 1931: Nueva Imperial court closed 1943-1946: Restrictions on sales lifted 1952-1979: Allotments frozen 1979-1989: Massive allotment Result: Spatial discontinuity




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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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# **IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY**

# Identification strategy Allotment



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$$Private_r = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Victoria_r + f(lon_r, lat_r) + \mathbf{X}_r \Theta + \eta_r, \tag{1}$$


$$y_{ir} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Private_r + g(lon_r, lat_r) + \mathbf{X_r} \mathbf{\Lambda} + \varepsilon_{ir}, \qquad (2)$$

#### where:

- >  $y_i$ : dependent variable observation *i* of reservation *r*,
- $\blacktriangleright$  *Victoria*<sub>r</sub>: 1 if reservation r assigned to Victoria in 1930, 0 otherwise,
- ▶ *Private<sub>r</sub>*: 1 if reservation *r* allotted before 1979, 0 otherwise,
- $f(lon_r, lat_r), g(lon_r, lat_r)$ : flexible functions of location of reservation r,
- $X_r$ : additional controls for reservation r,
- ▶  $\eta_r, \varepsilon_{ir}$ ,: zero-mean disturbances (potentially correlated)


#### Identification strategy

#### Exposure to dispossession



#### Identification strategy

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Formal definition

1950



#### Data

# Assembling data on Mapuche since forced settlement

#### Reservations: Reservation titles (AGAI)

Historical judicial boundaries (INE)

Timing of division (AGAI)

1992 Census (INE)

1999 property registry (CIREN)

Sales of allotted parcels (AGAI)

Descendants: 2021 voting registry (SERVEL)

2017 Census (INE)

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
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Art. 37 del Decreto N°4111, de 12 de Junio de 1931.-DECRETO.-Apruébase la sentencia de fecha 23 de Setiembre de 1944 expedida por el Juzgado de Indios de Victoria, en virtud de la cual se divide la Comunidad Indígena encabezada por don José Pinolevi,cuyos rerrenos se individualizan en el plano N°151.-Tómese razón,registrese,

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
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INSCRIPCIONES EN EL CONSERVADOR DE BIENES RAYCES DE COLLIPULLI DE LAS HIJUELA RESULTANTES DE LA DIVISION DE LA COMMUNDAD.-

HIJUELA Nº 1 de 3,71 hectáreas de terreno adjudicada a don Juan Ancapi Gomes, ingorita a fo 185 v. Nº 181, año 1984.-Transferida a fs 37 Nº 31, año 1984.-

HIJUELA Nº 2 de 3.71 h<sub>o</sub>ctareas de terreno adjudicada a don <sup>H</sup>anuel Ancapi Gones, inscrita a fe 210 Nº 200, año 1938.-Sin transforencia.-

HIJUELA Nº 3 de 17,81 hectáreas de terreno adjudicada a doña Catalina Ancapi Gomez, inscrita a fs 170 Nº 165, año 1938. Sin transferencia.-

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
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
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# RESULTS

# First stage






# Results Validation of assumptions

Dep. var.	Elevation	Slope (std)	% Erodible	Tempera- ture	Precipita- tion	Year settled	Hectares
Victoria (low congestion)	15.29	0.39	-0.06	0.29	3.22	0.64	63.26
<b>c</b> ,	(12.89)	(0.51)	(0.07)	(0.45)	(4.30)	(2.64)	(34.05)*
Mean high congestion	125.07	3.40	0.35	11.87	103.20	1903.06	150.42
Reserva- tions	1,567	1,567	1,567	1,567	1,567	1,567	1,567

# Validation of assumptions (continued)

Dep. var.	Persons settled	Pop. Density	> 1 Lineage	Frac. Index	Partition	Amended	Max Wives
Victoria (low congestion)	6.87	-1.80	-0.05	-0.02	0.10	0.01	0.01
<b>o</b> ,	(5.66)	(1.15)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Mean high congestion	33.70	24.81	0.66	0.37	0.14	0.15	0.16
Reserva- tions	1,567	1,567	1,558	1,558	1,558	1,558	1,558

# 1. Did individual rights reduce Mapuche ownership?



# 1. Did individual rights reduce Mapuche ownership?

Dep. var. % land		Individual		Coll	ective		
	Ma-	Not-	Unknown	Ma-	Not-	No Info	Predicted
	puche	Mapuche	UTIKITOWIT	puche	Mapuche		Mapuche
Private	-26.75	13.79	1.51	-2.28	0.93	12.79	-17.98
	(4.50)***	(2.94)***	(1.70)	(1.59)	(2.36)	(7.35)*	(3.72)***
$\overline{Y}$ collective	81.28	5.82	2.42	0.85	0.98	8.66	90.26
Reserva- tions	1543	1543	1543	1543	1543	1543	1543



### Results Labor market 1992

Dep. Var.		Wage worker	
Sample	All	Mapuche	Not- Mapuche
Allotted $\leq$ 1952	15.13	8.86	9.85
	(4.05)***	(3.00)***	(9.93)
Mean allotted > 1952	11.29	9.57	21.64
Reservations	1,414	1,371	1,168

Statistical significance reported next to standard errors: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

Land consolidation
Livestock & overgrazing

2. Did they improve socioeconomic conditions in reservations?

Dep. var.	Wealth Score (1992)										
	All	Mapuche	Not-Mapuche								
Private	44.76	23.77	44.97								
	(11.88)***	(15.17)	(26.37)*								
$\overline{Y}$ collective	-15.29	-27.68	49.92								
Reservations	1,414	1,371	1,168								

Statistical significance reported next to standard errors: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

Land consolidation Livestock & overgrazing

# 3. Did they improve the socioeconomic status of descendants?

Dep. var.	Avg. Schooling Head of
-	Households (2021)
Private	-0.48
	(0.80)
$\overline{Y}$ collective	10.25
Observations	8,763
Reservations	273

# 3. Did they improve the socioeconomic status of descendants?

Dep. var.	Avg.	Schooling He	ad of Hous	seholds in Ce	nsus Block	Group
Estimator	-	OLS			2SLS	
Exposure	-1.45	-1.48	-0.94	-6.18	-3.63	-1.57
	(0.95)	(0.65)**	(1.02)	(1.81)***	(1.90)*	(4.94)
Allotment Year		0.08			0.08	
		(0.04)**			(0.05)	
Private			2.66			-0.26
			(1.90)			(2.11)
$\overline{Y}$ not exposed	9.77	9.77	10.22	9.77	9.77	10.22
Reservations	48	48	273	48	48	273
Observations	1,596	1,596	8,763	1,596	1,596	8,763
F-stat				14.5	13.4	20.1/193.8

### The allotment of collective reservations into individual properties:

- Reduced Mapuche ownership
- Improved average socioeconomic conditions in reservations
- Had lasting, negative impacts on descendants from reservations with weaker protections against disposession

#### Further research needed to assess:

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### Reduced Mapuche ownership

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- Impacts of individual property rights with restrictions on their transfer outside of indigenous communities

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# Thank you!

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
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


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
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#### Back


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### Exposure to dispossession



$$\begin{split} S_{rt} &= \lambda_j + \sum_{k=0}^T \delta_k \mathbf{1}(t - Allott_r = k) + \rho No \; Res_t + \psi No \; Res_t * Allott_r + \epsilon_{rt}, \\ I_r &= \sum_{k=0}^T \mathbf{1} \left( Allott_r + k \in [1943, 1946] \right) \hat{\delta}_k, \\ Exp_r &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 I_r + \alpha_2 Allot_r + \mathbf{X_r} \Theta + \eta_{ir}, \\ y_{ir} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \hat{Exp}_r + \beta_2 Allot_r + \mathbf{X_r} \Lambda + \varepsilon_{ir}, \end{split}$$

where:

- >  $S_{rt}$ : % of r's alloted parcels sold for the first time in year t,
- $Allott_r$ : Year reservation r was allotted,
- $\blacktriangleright$  *Exp<sub>r</sub>*: Fraction of *r*'s alloted parcels sold between 1943 and 1946,
- $X_r$ : additional controls for reservation r,
- ▶  $\eta_r, \varepsilon_{ir}$ ,: zero-mean disturbances (potentially correlated)

Appendix First stage

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Dep. Var.		Allotted by:							
	1952	1978	1993						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					
Victoria (low congestion)	62.56	61.77	-0.09	-27.16					
	(8.56)***	(8.22)***	(0.24)	(3.70)***					
Mean high congestion	14.43	16.60	99.53	1977					
Reservations	1,550	1,550	1,550	1,546					


### Appendix Land control, 1999-2018

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Sample	All		Мар	uche	Not-Mapuche	
Dep. var.	# owners	Avg. land	# owners	Avg. land	# owners	Avg. land
Private	-12.87	1.70	-15.58	0.48	3.12	5.67
	(2.64)***	(0.86)**	(2.50)***	(0.93)	(0.83)***	(2.23)**
$\overline{Y}$ collective	27.16	5.25	26.04	5.27	2.75	4.58
Reservations	1337	1337	1304	1304	684	684

# Mapuche ownership: Robustness tests

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#### 1999-2018 Hectares - Mapuche predicted

# Livestock density in 1974 and land cover in erodible lands in 1999

#### Back

Dep.var	1974 Livestock	1999 Land Cover in Erodible Land (%)					
	Density	Grassland	Cropland	Forest	Shrubland		
Private	-0.34	-21.00	2.01	20.45	-1.24		
	(0.08)***	(5.02)***	(1.39)	(4.43)***	(0.90)		
$\overline{Y}$ collective	0.74	60.39	0.94	36.42	1.62		
Reservations	558	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345		

### Land consolidation, 1974 and ${\sim}1999$

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Dep. var.	1974 Land Users			1999-2013 Land Owners			
	Log house- holds	Log avg. land used	Avg. % use land out	Log Owners	Log avg. land owned	Avg. % land <0.5 ha	
Panel a: All h	nouseholds/C	Owners					
Private	-0.21 (0.26)	0.14 (0.20)	-4.38 (6.64)	-0.26 (0.21)	0.04 (0.12)	-2.17 (0.70)***	
$\overline{Y}$ collective	2.29	<b>1.95</b>	29.05	3.10	1.62	2.17	
Reservations	553	553	553	1,425	1,425	1,425	
Panel b: Map	ouche house	holds/Owne	ers				
Private	-0.30 (0.24)	0.06 (0.18)	-3.97 (7.08)	-0.50 (0.18)***	0.01 (0.09)	-1.86 (0.66)***	
$\overline{Y}$ collective	2.21	1.94	30.78	3.05	`1.61 <sup>´</sup>	2.09	
Reservations	535	535	535	1,379	1,379	1,379	
Panel c: Not-	Mapuche ho	ouseholds/C	)wners				
Private	0.65 (0.27)**	0.74 (0.36)**	12.83 (9.35)	0.73 (0.20)***	0.68 (0.26)***	-4.25 (1.96)**	
$\overline{Y}$ collective	0.60	1.73	18.43	0.71	1.21	4.77	
Reservations	272	272	272	874	874	874	