Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

 
 
Session Overview
Session
MB7 - TIE7: Buying, renting, and market
Time:
Monday, 26/June/2023:
MB 10:00-11:30

Location: Mont Royal II

4th floor

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Presentations

Buy now or keep renting? A modular estimation framework for renter decisions in the Rent-to-Own business

Milad Armaghan1, Metin Cakanyildirim2, Andrew Frazelle3, Divakar Rajamani4, Daniel Glasky5

1University of Texas at Dallas, United States of America; 2University of Texas at Dallas, United States of America; 3University of Texas at Dallas, United States of America; 4Center for Intelligent Supply Networks, University of Texas at Dallas, United States of America; 5Center for Intelligent Supply Networks, University of Texas at Dallas, United States of America

Rent-to-own (RTO) firms rent products in exchange for a fee and offer the already-rented products for purchase at buyout prices to their renters. Prediction of demand requires a decision model that captures the renters' decision-making process and their ownership and rental utilities. We develop a modular framework that separates utility estimation from identifying the renter's decision process. We build renter decision models, reflecting different degrees of sophistication and alertness.



Selling and renting mechatronics: digitally controlled physical goods

Xianfeng Meng, Anton Ovchinnikov, Guang Li

Queen's University, Canada

Digital goods firms routinely utilize renting models for product differentiation: one can try a free or cheap version first, then subscribe to unlock additional functionality. Recent technological advances enable physical goods firms to create products with identical hardware that are digitally controlled to allow for similar differentiation. We present a stylized model to explore when physical goods firms should adopt such differentiation instead of the traditional high- and low-end products.



Signaling competition in two-sided markets

Omar Besbes1, Yuri Fonseca1, Ilan Lobel2, Fanyin Zheng1

1Columbia University; 2New York University

Consider a platform facilitating matches in the presence of supply congestion. A key attribute of supply is how competitive it will be for demand to obtain the supply after the match. Should the platform reveal current competition levels? To answer this, we partnered with a marketplace and propose a structural model in which workers account for future competition. We conduct counterfactual analysis to study the impact of signaling competition on workers' lead purchasing decisions and revenue.



 
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