Many multinational organizations have made dual commitments to halt deforestation and improve farmers’ livelihoods in agricultural supply chains. We propose group incentives conditional on forest protection requirements as a feasible mechanism for achieving this. We develop an analytical model, prove structural results concerning the equilibrium outcomes, and calibrate the model using data we collected from field research in Indonesia, demonstrating the effectiveness of group requirements.

We analyze competition between a sustainable firm and an unsustainable knockoff. We study open-source sharing and advertising strategies.

Sharing green tech can be profitable. Anti-knockoff ads may not be profitable, while self-promotion ads improve profits. Simultaneous use of open-source and ads can be beneficial but may harm the environment.

Firms can use open-source and ads to combat knockoffs. Governments can facilitate sustainable tech sharing through regulations.

In malaria-endemic countries, we explore optimal donor budget allocation for subsidizing antimalarial drugs in the presence of counterfeits. We develop a game-theoretic model and evaluate strategies to combat counterfeits. Our findings suggest the importance of understanding market characteristics to design effective subsidies and policies for improving access to legitimate drugs.