Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

 
 
Session Overview
Session
ME3 - RM10: Assortment and fairness
Time:
Monday, 26/June/2023:
ME 16:30-18:00

Location: International II

3rd floor

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Presentations

Optimal assortment design with fairness constraints

Wentao Lu, Ozge Sahin, Ruxian Wang

Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, United States of America

We consider the problem of optimal assortment design for a platform by imposing fairness constraints that guarantees exposures of all products to consumers. We show that optimal solution can be found in polynomial time and the algorithm is easy to implement in practice. We investigate the welfare change of imposing the fairness constraints and find that it is possible to achieve a win-win-win solution where the platform, sellers, and consumers are all better off.



Online fair allocation of perishable resources

Chamsi Hssaine, Sean Sinclair, Siddhartha Banerjee

TBD

Problem: Allocating perishable resources online with non-linear utilities and complementarities. Methodology/Results: An algorithm achieves optimal envy-efficiency Pareto frontier by adapting to perishing order predictions and desired envy bounds. Numerical performance is demonstrated using data from a food bank. Managerial Implications: Accurate perishing predictions are crucial for fairness in practical non-profit settings.



Marketplace Assortment Design

Myeonghun Lee1, Hakjin Chung1, Hyun-Soo Ahn2

1College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST); 2Ross School of Business, University of Michigan

We study the marketplace platform's problem that decides the assortment of sellers and how much fee to apply to each seller. In our model, each seller has its own outside option, which depends on customer traffic and product preference. The seller's compensation is determined based on the competition with the other joining sellers. We characterize the platform's optimal fee and assortment decisions and further study how the different fee contracts affect the optimal assortment.



 
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