By analyzing economic incentives, we show that reducing the number of stop signs at crossroads (e.g., from four to three) leads to a self-enforcing equilibrium with significant benefits. This simpler mechanism saves fuel gas, reduces time and infrastructure costs, lowers carbon emissions, and decreases police expenses. The new approach generates substantial economic gains compared to the traditional practice of erecting one stop sign in each direction.

Competition and market composition impact corporate adoption of green technologies. Cooperative markets with both green and non-green goods see increased green investment with reduced production costs. In competitive markets without green products, cost reductions facilitate green product introduction. Policy-making can leverage these findings for effective green production cost reductions.

We consider market and technological equilibria in Cournot competition with linear and isoelastic demand between firms heterogeneous in operational and environmental efficiency. We examine possibilities and limitations of incentivizing “green” technology choice with environmental/”carbon” taxes. The resultant equilibria and the impact of taxation qualitatively differ with demand function.