Many pharmaceutical drugs have multiple indications, for which they offer a varying degree of benefit for patients. Yet, in the current US pricing system, the price of the drug is the same regardless of the indication for which it is prescribed. We use a modeling approach to analyze how indication-based pricing compares to uniform pricing for the manufacturer’s profit and investment incentives, the patients’ access to the drug and benefit, and the payer’s coverage incentives and objective.

We propose and analyze a budget-neutral incentive scheme that Organ Procurement Organizations could utilize to increase donor hospital's (DH's) proportion of timely referrals and thereby increase the number of potential donors. We find that, depending on the DH's cost of effort required to increase the proportion of timely referrals, the proposed contract could increase the percentage of family authorizations from a single DH by 1.3%.

Although available evidence suggests that home hemodialysis(HHD) may achieve similar clinical outcomes to in-center hemodialysis and are less resource intensive for patients with end-stage renal disease, they have been used less in the US than in other developed nations. We design two incentive plans in a bi-level game structure consisting of a payer and providers to obtain equilibrium. We show these incentive plans can improve the HHD rate and increase ESRD beneficiaries' quality of life.