Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

 
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Session Overview
Location: Mezzanine
2nd floor
Date: Sunday, 25/June/2023
SA 8:00-9:30SA4 - SM1: Service operations 1
Location: Mezzanine
SB 10:00-11:30SB4 - SM2: Matching algorithm in service operations 1
Location: Mezzanine
 

Dynamic matching with driver compensation guarantees in crowdsourced delivery

Aliaa Alnaggar1, Fatma Gzara2, James H. Bookbinder2

1Toronto Metropolitan University, Canada; 2University of Waterloo, Canada

Crowdsourced delivery platforms offer workers complete flexibility in scheduling their own hours. However, since workers are treated as independent contractors, they do not receive minimum wage protection. Here we examine the integration of driver compensation guarantees in a platform's matching decisions. We design dynamic matching policies that guarantee a particular level of utilization or wage for active workers, while maintaining the inherent work hour flexibility of the sharing economy.



Online algorithms for matching platforms with multi-channel traffic

Scott Rodilitz1, Vahideh Manshadi2, Daniela Saban3, Akshaya Suresh2, Renyu Zhang4

1UCLA Anderson School of Management; 2Yale School of Management; 3Stanford Graduate School of Business; 4Chinese University of Hong Kong

TBD



Online bipartite matching with advice: tight robustness-consistency tradeoffs for the two-stage model

Billy Jin1, Will Ma2

1Cornell University; 2Columbia University

TBD

 
SC 13:00-14:30SC4 - SM3: Learning in service operations
Location: Mezzanine
 

Operations problems with popularity effect

Izak Duenyas, Stefanus Jasin, Zhuodong Tang

Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, United States of America

We consider the firm maximizes the total expected revenue over a finite time horizon by optimizing the assortment/pricing of each time period.

Customers make choices under MNL with popularity effect, which also considers the historical sales.

The optimal prices can be solved by concave programming.

The heuristic algorithms we propose for assortment optimization have a 1/T performance ratio in the general case, and the ratio improves to 1/ln(T) when the product's utility is constant over time.



Centralized versus decentralized pricing controls for dynamic matching platforms

Ömer Sarıtaç1, Ali Aouad1, Chiwei Yan2

1London Business School; 2University of Washington, Seattle

TBD



Social learning with polarized preferences on content platforms

Dongwook Shin1, Bharadwaj Kadiyala2

1HKUST Business School; 2David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah

TBD

 
SD 14:45-16:15SD4 - SM4: Queuing application
Location: Mezzanine
 

Service operations for justice-on-time: a data-driven queueing approach

Jeunghyun Kim1, Nitin Bakshi2, Ramandeep Randhawa3

1Korea University Business School, Korea, Republic of (South Korea); 2David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah; 3Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California

Limited resources in the judicial system can lead to costly delays and even failure to deliver justice. Using the Supreme Court of India as an exemplar for such resource-constrained settings, we apply ideas from service operations to study delay. Court dynamics constitute a case-management queue which is known to be intractable. Hence, we employ data-driven simulations and find that even small interventions can improve the system performance dramatically.



Data-driven population tracking in large service systems

Morgan Wood1, Fernando Bernstein2, Bora Keskin2, Adam Mersereau3, Serhan Ziya1

1Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599; 2Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; 3Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599

We develop asymptotically optimal policies to track queue lengths under different cost structures in a setting with inaccurate arrival and departure sensor data. We propose an idleness detection policy and explore the value of queue inspections. Our model is motivated by queue tracking implemented at a large airport.



An approximate analysis of dynamic pricing, outsourcing, and scheduling policies for a multiclass make-to-stock queue in the heavy traffic regime

Nasser Barjesteh1, Baris Ata2

1University of Toronto; 2University of Chicago Booth School of Business

TBD

 
SE 16:30-18:00SE4 - SM5: Matching and optimization
Location: Mezzanine
 

Stable matching with adaptive priorities

Federico Bobbio1, Margarida Carvalho1, Ignacio Rios2, Alfredo Torrico3

1University of Montreal, Canada; 2The University of Texas at Dallas; 3Cornell University

We introduce the problem of finding a student-optimal stable matching under adaptive priorities, i.e., when priorities depend on the assignment of other agents. We show that the problem is NP-hard, provide math-programming formulations for the problem, and introduce several heuristics to preprocess the instances and solve them. Finally, using both synthetic and real data from Chile, we show that clearinghouses can significantly improve students' welfare when considering dynamic priorities.



Matchmaking strategies for maximizing player engagement in video games

Xiao Lei1, Mingliu Chen2, Adam Elmachtoub2

1Unviersity of Hong Kong; 2Columbia University

TBD



Activated benders decomposition for day-ahead itinerary planning in paratransit

Kayla Cummings1, Alexandre Jacquillat1, Vikrant Vaze2

1MIT; 2Dartmouth College

This research optimizes driver shifts and itineraries for paratransit operators, considering uncertainties like cancellations and no-shows. The SIPPAR model, using a shareability network representation and a two-stage stochastic optimization approach, reduces operating costs and improves robustness. The algorithm outperforms benchmarks in real-world instances, providing faster computational times and higher-quality solutions.

 
Date: Monday, 26/June/2023
MA 8:00-9:30MA4 - SM6: Innovative service operations
Location: Mezzanine
 

On information disclosure in an observable shared waiting room

Yanting Li, Ricky Roet-Green

Simon Business School, University of Rochester, United States of America

We study a service system where customers with different service demands arrive at a facility with a shared waiting room. We assume two types of customers and two servers. Types differ by their service demand: type 1 seeks service from server 1, and type 2 seeks service from server 2. Customers cannot distinguish between the types, and make their decision whether to join based on the total number of customers in the shared waiting room, without observing the state of the servers.



"Uber" your cooking: the sharing-economy operations of a ghost-kitchen platform

Junyu Cao1, Feihong Hu1, Wei Qi2,3

1University of Texas at Austin, United States of America; 2Tsinghua University, China; 3Mcgill University, Canada

We study ghost kitchen platforms, which consist of delivery-only restaurants that serve limited number of dishes. We develop a new model of multi-dash queueing system at the platform’s position. In the multi-dash queueing system, an order splits into a random number of sub-orders and is assigned to different home chefs. Our study identifies conditions under which the ghost kitchen platform can be more profitable than traditional food delivery platforms.



Potty parity: process flexibility via unisex restroom

Setareh Farajollahzadeh, Ming Hu

University of Toronto

TBD

 
MB 10:00-11:30MB4 - SM7: Platform and market operations
Location: Mezzanine
 

Redesigning VolunteerMatch’s search algorithm: toward more equitable access to volunteers

Vahideh Manshadi1, Ken Moon2, Scott Rodilitz3, Daniela Saban4, Akshaya Suresh1

1Yale School of Management; 2Wharton School of Business; 3UCLA Anderson School of Management; 4Stanford Graduate School of Business

To increase equity on their platform, we re-designed the search algorithm on VolunteerMatch (VM), the largest online platform for connecting volunteers and nonprofits. The implementation of our algorithm in Dallas led to a 10.2% increase in the number of different volunteer opportunities that receive a sign-up each week without reducing the total number of sign-ups: a Pareto improvement for VM. A similar effect nationwide would lead to 800 more opportunities with at least one sign-up each week.



Mergers between on-demand service platforms: The impact on consumer surplus and labor welfare

Xiaogang Lin1, Tao Lu2, Xin Wang3

1Guangdong University of Technology; 2University of Connecticut; 3Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

We build a game-theoretical model to analyze the impact of a merger between two platforms on consumer surplus and labor welfare. While a merger reduces competition, the merged platform can pool customers and agents together and improve matching between them; moreover, the merger can amplify the cross-side network effect and thus moderate the merged firm's pricing power. Under a sufficiently strong cross-side network effect, a merger can make merging firms, customers, and agents all better off.



Fairness regulation of prices in competitive markets

Zongsen Yang1, Xingyu Fu2, Pin Gao1, Ying-Ju Chen2

1Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; 2Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

TBD

 
MC 13:00-14:30MC4 - SM8: Ride-hailing platforms
Location: Mezzanine
 

Price-waiting trade-offs in ride-hailing platforms

Aikaterini Giannoutsou, Andrew Daw

University of Southern California, United States of America

We present a model for studying a ride-hailing platform that is faced with price and delay sensitive riders and drivers, and is considering offering two different service classes which are differentiated in prices and delays. We explore the “price of two sides”, show that the preferences of drivers impact the delays the riders experience and demonstrate that achieving the “full optimum" of price differentiation may not be feasible or optimal for a platform in all market conditions.



Shared-ride efficiency of ride-hailing platforms

Terry Taylor

UC Berkeley, United States of America

Ride-hailing platforms offering shared rides devote effort to reducing improving shared-ride efficiency: reducing the trip-lengthening detours that accommodate fellow customers' divergent transportation needs. Contrary to naive intuition, we show: greater customer sensitivity to shared-ride delay and greater labor cost can reduce the value of improving shared-ride efficiency; and an increase in shared-ride efficiency can prompt a platform to add individual-ride service.



Matching technology and competition in ride-hailing marketplaces

Kaitlin Daniels1, Danko Turcic2

1Washington University in St. Louis; 2University of California, Riverside

TBD

 
MD 14:45-16:15MD4 - SM9: Experiment on platforms
Location: Mezzanine
 

Service rate differentiation for homogeneous impatient customers

Allen Wu, Wei You

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

TBD



Experimenting under stochastic congestion

Shuangning Li1, Ramesh Johari2, Kuang Xu2, Stefan Wager2

1Harvard University; 2Stanford University

TBD

 
ME 16:30-18:00ME4 - SM10: Service operations 2
Location: Mezzanine
 

Oligopolistic competition in online marketplaces: equilibrium analysis and system coordination

Xinyi ZHOU, Lijian LU, Guillermo GALLEGO

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong S.A.R. (China)

This paper investigates the roles of selling format in a two-sided marketplace with many sellers selling substitutable products on a common retailing platform. We show that a contribution-based scheme (CBS), whereby the payment for each seller is based on her contribution, leads to a stable, efficient, and `win-win' outcome for all firms in the entire marketplace. Our findings could provide useful guidance on the design of strategic partnership between firms in a two-sided marketplace.



Overbooking with bumping-sensitive demand

Rowena Gan1, Noah Gans2, Gerry Tsoukalas3

1Southern Methodist University; 2The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; 3Questrom School of Business, Boston University

TBD

 

 
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