MSOM 2023
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management Conference
June 24 - 26, 2023 | Montréal, Canada
Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Session Overview | |
Location: Mezzanine 2nd floor |
Date: Sunday, 25/June/2023 | |
SA 8:00-9:30 | SA4 - SM1: Service operations 1 Location: Mezzanine |
SB 10:00-11:30 | SB4 - SM2: Matching algorithm in service operations 1 Location: Mezzanine |
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Dynamic matching with driver compensation guarantees in crowdsourced delivery 1Toronto Metropolitan University, Canada; 2University of Waterloo, Canada Crowdsourced delivery platforms offer workers complete flexibility in scheduling their own hours. However, since workers are treated as independent contractors, they do not receive minimum wage protection. Here we examine the integration of driver compensation guarantees in a platform's matching decisions. We design dynamic matching policies that guarantee a particular level of utilization or wage for active workers, while maintaining the inherent work hour flexibility of the sharing economy. Online algorithms for matching platforms with multi-channel traffic 1UCLA Anderson School of Management; 2Yale School of Management; 3Stanford Graduate School of Business; 4Chinese University of Hong Kong TBD Online bipartite matching with advice: tight robustness-consistency tradeoffs for the two-stage model 1Cornell University; 2Columbia University TBD |
SC 13:00-14:30 | SC4 - SM3: Learning in service operations Location: Mezzanine |
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Operations problems with popularity effect Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, United States of America We consider the firm maximizes the total expected revenue over a finite time horizon by optimizing the assortment/pricing of each time period. Customers make choices under MNL with popularity effect, which also considers the historical sales. The optimal prices can be solved by concave programming. The heuristic algorithms we propose for assortment optimization have a 1/T performance ratio in the general case, and the ratio improves to 1/ln(T) when the product's utility is constant over time. Centralized versus decentralized pricing controls for dynamic matching platforms 1London Business School; 2University of Washington, Seattle TBD Social learning with polarized preferences on content platforms 1HKUST Business School; 2David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah TBD |
SD 14:45-16:15 | SD4 - SM4: Queuing application Location: Mezzanine |
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Service operations for justice-on-time: a data-driven queueing approach 1Korea University Business School, Korea, Republic of (South Korea); 2David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah; 3Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California Limited resources in the judicial system can lead to costly delays and even failure to deliver justice. Using the Supreme Court of India as an exemplar for such resource-constrained settings, we apply ideas from service operations to study delay. Court dynamics constitute a case-management queue which is known to be intractable. Hence, we employ data-driven simulations and find that even small interventions can improve the system performance dramatically. Data-driven population tracking in large service systems 1Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599; 2Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; 3Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599 We develop asymptotically optimal policies to track queue lengths under different cost structures in a setting with inaccurate arrival and departure sensor data. We propose an idleness detection policy and explore the value of queue inspections. Our model is motivated by queue tracking implemented at a large airport. An approximate analysis of dynamic pricing, outsourcing, and scheduling policies for a multiclass make-to-stock queue in the heavy traffic regime 1University of Toronto; 2University of Chicago Booth School of Business TBD |
SE 16:30-18:00 | SE4 - SM5: Matching and optimization Location: Mezzanine |
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Stable matching with adaptive priorities 1University of Montreal, Canada; 2The University of Texas at Dallas; 3Cornell University We introduce the problem of finding a student-optimal stable matching under adaptive priorities, i.e., when priorities depend on the assignment of other agents. We show that the problem is NP-hard, provide math-programming formulations for the problem, and introduce several heuristics to preprocess the instances and solve them. Finally, using both synthetic and real data from Chile, we show that clearinghouses can significantly improve students' welfare when considering dynamic priorities. Matchmaking strategies for maximizing player engagement in video games 1Unviersity of Hong Kong; 2Columbia University TBD Activated benders decomposition for day-ahead itinerary planning in paratransit 1MIT; 2Dartmouth College This research optimizes driver shifts and itineraries for paratransit operators, considering uncertainties like cancellations and no-shows. The SIPPAR model, using a shareability network representation and a two-stage stochastic optimization approach, reduces operating costs and improves robustness. The algorithm outperforms benchmarks in real-world instances, providing faster computational times and higher-quality solutions. |
Date: Monday, 26/June/2023 | |
MA 8:00-9:30 | MA4 - SM6: Innovative service operations Location: Mezzanine |
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On information disclosure in an observable shared waiting room Simon Business School, University of Rochester, United States of America We study a service system where customers with different service demands arrive at a facility with a shared waiting room. We assume two types of customers and two servers. Types differ by their service demand: type 1 seeks service from server 1, and type 2 seeks service from server 2. Customers cannot distinguish between the types, and make their decision whether to join based on the total number of customers in the shared waiting room, without observing the state of the servers. "Uber" your cooking: the sharing-economy operations of a ghost-kitchen platform 1University of Texas at Austin, United States of America; 2Tsinghua University, China; 3Mcgill University, Canada We study ghost kitchen platforms, which consist of delivery-only restaurants that serve limited number of dishes. We develop a new model of multi-dash queueing system at the platform’s position. In the multi-dash queueing system, an order splits into a random number of sub-orders and is assigned to different home chefs. Our study identifies conditions under which the ghost kitchen platform can be more profitable than traditional food delivery platforms. Potty parity: process flexibility via unisex restroom University of Toronto TBD |
MB 10:00-11:30 | MB4 - SM7: Platform and market operations Location: Mezzanine |
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Redesigning VolunteerMatch’s search algorithm: toward more equitable access to volunteers 1Yale School of Management; 2Wharton School of Business; 3UCLA Anderson School of Management; 4Stanford Graduate School of Business To increase equity on their platform, we re-designed the search algorithm on VolunteerMatch (VM), the largest online platform for connecting volunteers and nonprofits. The implementation of our algorithm in Dallas led to a 10.2% increase in the number of different volunteer opportunities that receive a sign-up each week without reducing the total number of sign-ups: a Pareto improvement for VM. A similar effect nationwide would lead to 800 more opportunities with at least one sign-up each week. Mergers between on-demand service platforms: The impact on consumer surplus and labor welfare 1Guangdong University of Technology; 2University of Connecticut; 3Hong Kong University of Science and Technology We build a game-theoretical model to analyze the impact of a merger between two platforms on consumer surplus and labor welfare. While a merger reduces competition, the merged platform can pool customers and agents together and improve matching between them; moreover, the merger can amplify the cross-side network effect and thus moderate the merged firm's pricing power. Under a sufficiently strong cross-side network effect, a merger can make merging firms, customers, and agents all better off. Fairness regulation of prices in competitive markets 1Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; 2Hong Kong University of Science and Technology TBD |
MC 13:00-14:30 | MC4 - SM8: Ride-hailing platforms Location: Mezzanine |
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Price-waiting trade-offs in ride-hailing platforms University of Southern California, United States of America We present a model for studying a ride-hailing platform that is faced with price and delay sensitive riders and drivers, and is considering offering two different service classes which are differentiated in prices and delays. We explore the “price of two sides”, show that the preferences of drivers impact the delays the riders experience and demonstrate that achieving the “full optimum" of price differentiation may not be feasible or optimal for a platform in all market conditions. Shared-ride efficiency of ride-hailing platforms UC Berkeley, United States of America Ride-hailing platforms offering shared rides devote effort to reducing improving shared-ride efficiency: reducing the trip-lengthening detours that accommodate fellow customers' divergent transportation needs. Contrary to naive intuition, we show: greater customer sensitivity to shared-ride delay and greater labor cost can reduce the value of improving shared-ride efficiency; and an increase in shared-ride efficiency can prompt a platform to add individual-ride service. Matching technology and competition in ride-hailing marketplaces 1Washington University in St. Louis; 2University of California, Riverside TBD |
MD 14:45-16:15 | MD4 - SM9: Experiment on platforms Location: Mezzanine |
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Service rate differentiation for homogeneous impatient customers Hong Kong University of Science and Technology TBD Experimenting under stochastic congestion 1Harvard University; 2Stanford University TBD |
ME 16:30-18:00 | ME4 - SM10: Service operations 2 Location: Mezzanine |
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Oligopolistic competition in online marketplaces: equilibrium analysis and system coordination The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong S.A.R. (China) This paper investigates the roles of selling format in a two-sided marketplace with many sellers selling substitutable products on a common retailing platform. We show that a contribution-based scheme (CBS), whereby the payment for each seller is based on her contribution, leads to a stable, efficient, and `win-win' outcome for all firms in the entire marketplace. Our findings could provide useful guidance on the design of strategic partnership between firms in a two-sided marketplace. Overbooking with bumping-sensitive demand 1Southern Methodist University; 2The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; 3Questrom School of Business, Boston University TBD |
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