Catalyzing Innovation
ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY
WASHINGTON DC, MARCH 25-29, 2019

EXPERIMENTS OF URBAN LAND SUPPLY AND DEVELOPMENT: INDIA

APARNA SONI and **TRIVENI PRASAD NANDA**

RICS School of Built Environment, India
ar.planneraparnasoni@gmail.com

Paper prepared for presentation at the

"2019 WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY"
The World Bank - Washington DC, March 25-29, 2019

Abstract

In India, approximating a business-as-usual scenario, an average of 15 square kilometres of land needs to be planned and serviced for urban use every single day up to the year 2050 (WRI India, 2016). However, compulsory land acquisition and traditional planning instruments/apparatus have continually failed to achieve the entrepreneurial dreams of 'worlding cities' of India. The answer thus is found in increasing private sector participation in land assembly, planning and development, and metamorphosing public development agencies from providers to facilitators. This research throws light on a few of these innovative methods of land supply and development. This research tries to investigate urban sprawl and excessive reliance on real estate business for land development, in the garb of land supply for urbanization, the ever-increasing role of parastatals morphing into pseudo developing authorities by involving private planning consulting firms leading to privatization of development planning with a meagre public consultation/participation.

Key Words:

Development authorities, Land assembly, private purchase, privatization, real estate and townships

We acknowledge the valuable inputs from Mr. Sanjith Kasal, student MBA CPM, RICS SBE towards this research work.

Introduction

Land, as one of the most coveted, and as a result, one of the most treasured finite resources, has been the centre of conflicts since mankind took to social constructs from evolutionary infancy. From historic kingdoms to the Greek ideals of the rule of demos, land ownership has been the constant reason and product of intense political and theological drama played over multiple millennia in recorded history. After centuries of feudal practices, global trade and exchange of ideas through the print medium gave rise to popular movements of self-governance in Europe. Over the later decades of the eighteenth century, when the seeds of mass democracy were being planted in the socio-political discourse, republican forms of government started to take shape in the Spanish colonies of South Americas. Only in the twentieth century, however, modern democracy established itself as the de facto structure of governance, giving legitimate voice and agency to the people. The affairs in the Indian subcontinent were not isolated from the rest of the world and thus followed similar lines of evolution when it came to political economy and, by association, land ownership and distribution. From Adam Smith's previous accumulation to Marx's primitive accumulation, the precept of land expropriation fuelling capitalist ambitions has been at the heart of every philosophical and scientific inquiry of economics aimed at understanding, or rather creating the proverbial 'Wealth of Nations'. As posited by Marx, the state has always been complicit of primitive accumulation of capital. From colonial times, British companies amassed wealth through extractive industries like mines and non-extractive ones like the tea estates and coffee plantations. Also being built were large scale infrastructure projects, viz. the railways and several seaports, all with the patronage of the Crown. The land acquisition legislation of 1894 was a balancing act by the British where they tried to address such problems that they had not faced in other colonies such as the North Americas and the Caribbean islands where either the native population was summarily excluded from the economic standpoint or the population itself was introduced to the land by the colonizers. The British government promulgated the legislation in order to avoid the political dilemma where they could not risk multiple peasant uprisings while unscrupulously expropriating land from them and simultaneously flooding the Indian markets with the finished products from their industrial hubs. This state-sponsored version of primitive accumulation was one of the precursors to the much-critiqued phase of Nehruvian nation-building which used a heady mix of uber-capitalist and prevalent socialist ideals. Since India, as a unified territory, was still an abstract concept, the newly elected government post-independence used the archaic legislation, albeit, with regular modifications, to create a wholly state-owned and operated economy replete with flourishing industries in steel, heavy engineering, banking, and energy. However, the post-liberalization period of the Indian markets is when the real challenges to the industrial land policy began to show up.

The opening of the economy of India resulted in a flourish of external capital which saw a huge opportunity not only in terms of a captive domestic market but also as a supplier of cheap industrial land and labour, emblematic of the developments elsewhere in the world at the times. This phenomenon, coined as accumulation by dispossession as theorized by Marxist geographer David Harvey in his multiple works [refer to (Raman, 2016), (Levien, Regimes of Dispossession: From Steel Towns to Special Economic Zones, 2013) and (Levien, The land question: special economic zones and the political economy of dispossession in India, 2012)]. Since the late 90s, the Indian economy has seen unparalleled growth owing to the relaxation of bureaucratic norms which plagued the industry and created roadblocks to any enterprising domestic as well as foreign investor. But, in the process of paving the way for capital infusion in the economy, the central and several state governments started taking liberty with the expropriation regulations. Almost all the states created parastatals to cater to the land supply facilitation for the mushrooming industries. With time, the capacities and responsibilities of these parastatals have grown many folds. Today, urban India's population constitutes approximately 32 percent of the national population and the resulting urban activities having accrued nearly 60 percent of the country's gross domestic product. This in concert with liberalization, privatization and globalization (LPG) era of 1991 have resulted in a noticeable shift in the structure of the Indian economy (MGI, 2013). Boundaries of cities are growing faster than the expanding coverage of services and public transit connectivity.

In continuation, early 2000s saw international conventions/round tables discussing urbanization in the global south especially hypothesizing 'Indian Urbanization' as an opportunity for economic growth and a threat to rising poverty, exclusions and economic disparities. India was to become the world's most populace country. Research on Indian urbanization gained traction worldwide. There were widespread deliberations in anticipation of the path India treads to shape its coming urbanization. Noteworthy were the path-breaking McKenzie Global institute reports on India: The Growth Imperative in 2001 and not to forget, 'India's Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities and Sustaining Economic Growth 'in 2010. JNNURM reform 2005-12 was in response to the urgency created around managing Indian urbanization, where India decided to leverage urbanization for inclusive economic growth. Cities were branded as the 'Engines of economic Growth'. A lot until then had reformed in our economic and industrial policies: the SEZ Act 2005, the IT policies, under the aegis of Foreign Direct Investment policy advancements (Jenkins, Kennedy, Mukhopadhyay, & Pradhan, 2015)! In all-encompassing, the built form associated with the idea of urban India began redefining the 'Indian Urban Character'. The new India is thence building 'highways, expressways, industrial corridors, dedicated freight corridors lined with a series of Special economic zones, IT parks, Industrial parks, export processing zones, special investment regions, and integrated townships, Health cities, Eco-cities, Medi-cities, education cities, knowledge parks, to name a few; and continues to develop aero-cities/Aerotropolises, Smart cities and many more. These new forms of urbanization are essentially peripheral urban layouts sculpted out as extensions to existing cities, economically and physically restructuring the city peripheries. There exists extensive literature [Read about Urban Integrated mega-projects (Shatkin, Planning Privatopolis: Representation and contestation in the development of urban integarted Mega-Projects, 2011), Highway Urbanization (Balakrishnan, Highway Urbanization and Land Conflicts: the Challenges to Decentralization in India, 2013), bubble urbanism (Steel, Noorloos, & Christien, 2017) Entrepreneurialism and Globalism (Dannestam & Tove, 2004), (EPW-editorial, 2010) to quote a few] highlighting these greenfield urban extensions as expressions of extraverted urbanism and islands of isolation, contestations (Keivani & Mattingly, 2007), and exclusions [read (Narain & Vij, 2015)], acting as agents manifesting top-down State's entrepreneurial dreams of attracting external investment flows and real estate development (Hogan, Bunnel, & Morshidi, 2012), industrialisation (Datta, 2015), human capital and urban consumers. Devoid of local governance [read (Gururani & Kose), (Hall & Hubbard, 1996) and (Mitra S. , 2018)], these privatized models of growth are forms of speculative urbanism (Sood, Speculative Urbanism, 2017) nursing corporate urbanization (Mitra S. , 2018). The World Bank report on Leveraging Urbanization in India, released in 2015, calls it the 'hidden urban', where peripheries of metropolitans have been reported to have grown faster than the parent city. Read (Chadchan & Shankar, 2012) critically appraising the effect of LPG on urban form in India, concluding urban sprawl as an after effect.

Today, urban India's population constitutes approximately 32 percent of the national population and the resulting urban activities having accrued nearly 60 percent of the country's gross domestic product. By 2050, India's urban population is expected to grow more than double to 814 million from 373 million in 2010 and its urban land cover is expected to increase by over five times. Approximating a business-as-usual scenario, an average of 15 square kilometres of land needs to be planned and serviced for urban use every single day up to the year 2050 (WRI India, 2016). However, traditional planning instruments have been found to be a failure to catch up pace with the changing development dynamics. Indian 'worlding cities' are under tremendous competitive pressures to globalize. Notably, these newer forms of urbanization are land intensive ideas of growth **(** (Ong, 2011), (Goldman, 2011) , (Bedi & Tillin, 2015)**.**

However, the contestations, inefficiency and abuse of the use of compulsory land acquisitions in India are not a new mention [read (Chakravorty, 2016), (Banerjee & Banik, 2018) for comprehensive information and illustrative cases, (Balakrishnan, Land-based Financing for Infrastructure: What is New about India's Land Conflicts?, 2014), Refer (IDFC, 2009) and the CII-KPMG 'Ease of doing business in India' report 2014, (Sathe, Land Acquisition and Beyond: The Farmers' Perspective, 2017), (Johnson & Chakravarty, 2013), (Sathe, Land Acquisition: Need a Shift in Discourse, 2016) and (Singh, 2012)]. The archaic colonial Act of 1894 was long accused of corrupt, lengthy and exclusionary processes, abuse of power and violence by state authorities, in-appropriate, exploitative & manipulative compensations with no provisions of rehabilitation and resettlement. There was felt a strong need of a more humane, transparent and efficient model of land access for public purposes. CPR Land Rights Initiative (LRI) at Delhi in their report have highlighted the magnum of litigations fought on the subject matter of land Acquisition in the Supreme Court of India. They have critically discussed the fallouts of the Land governing legislations in India. (Refer (Wahi, et al., 2017). The New LARR Act 2013, However, is a progressive act, but yet has to also align and remain relevant to the neo-liberal idea of India's growth that intends to ease the private sector's participation and access to land for prominently the development of urban infrastructure, industries (primarily non-polluting, health, tourism etc.) and housing. Although the LARR Act 2013 has increased the access of land to private sector, yet have not eased the process, the clearances and approvals and have neither been able to rationalize and moderate land prices. Indeed, the process of land expropriation has become more cost-intensive both for public development agencies and for the private sector. Nevertheless, cities have to increasingly provide for to continue chasing their entrepreneurial dreams where cities compete with one another to target economic growth.

Surrendering to fiscal and technical capacity deficiencies, the public development agencies have found answers in increasing private sector participation (Mitra S. , 2016) and metamorphosing themselves from provisioning roles to facilitators. There has been a remarkable diversification of portfolios of the public development agencies. They have been experimenting to accommodate and ease private sector participation in land assembly, planning and development. This research throws light on a few of these innovations. Though these may not be termed as 'New' but they can be defined as experiments. The scale of application of these experiments, supporting policy modifications, structural changes in administration are no less to define a fast approaching shift in land development models in India. There is an increasing degree of reliance of these experiments on leveraging real estate on Greenfields. This research subjectively comments on the speculated dependency on real estate development to ensure thriving urbanization. In the absence of a coherent and conclusive land utilization policy or a regulating body governing the same, land supply and assembly have come under the ambit of the plethora of organizations, both affiliated to the state and otherwise. Resisting from commenting on the constitutional validity of the assembly mechanisms, this research tries to delve into the efficacy of each mechanism in the particular geospatial context of the area.

Experiments in Industrial Land Supply and Development

The SEZ Act of 2005 was India's weapon of choice in the fight with China and other fast industrializing economics vying for FDI. Unlike China, where the state develops these Special Economic Zones, India left the development and control of these 'hyper liberalized economic enclaves (M. Levien)' to the private occupiers who have to create the required infrastructure to sustain themselves (except for civic utilities like water supply, sewerage network, and electricity). Up until the promulgation of the RFCTLARR Act in 2013, the state used the 'public purpose' clause in the prevalent land acquisition act with impunity where 'public purpose' meant any economic activity which adds more value than agriculture (which in the case of India's traditionally cultivated lands, is almost any activity).

By introducing the National manufacturing policy (2011), the Central Government in India opened its doors to FDI, thereby delivering on the promise of improving the 'ease of doing business' environment for the country. The NMP has now, thus, enabled the industrial development authorities of the states to create land supply through methods which transcend the political and administrative labyrinth of the traditional methods of private land purchase or acquisition. A few successful examples of these state-sponsored land assembly programs include the industrial parks falling under the aegis of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (RIICO) and several 'ultra-mega projects' and their integrated townships in various states like Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The modus operandi for land supply of these bodies is common across the country, which sees de-notification of agricultural land to industrial and the eventual infrastructure infusion required to sustain these medium to large scale industries.

In the contest for investment and capital expansion between states, it is a common sight to see the state governments entering into MOUs with potential investors to provide land for their investments (Sood, 2015). A glaring example of this is the parched state of Rajasthan, who, despite the clear lack of natural resources has swiftly become one of the most industrialized states in the country. State government of Rajasthan amasses its industrial land through Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation, also known as RIICO. Michael Levien's analysis of RIICO's data showed a doubling of land acquisition over the 1990s from previous decades of its existence. In the immediate future RIICO is expected to acquire land at a pace unheard of to fuel the growing industrial demand. RIICO is emblematic of the trend that has seen Industrial Development Corporations (IDCs) of most of the states morph into the urban development authorities whose job is to supply land for public/private housing and other activities. This is largely due to the shift in the mandates of these IDCs who now have to not only acquire land for industrial purposes but to procure land for private purposes other than 'public purpose' (as mandated by land acquisition legislations). Above and beyond, Rajasthan has promulgated two policies to facilitate industrialization in the state, namely, Development of Integrated Industrial Parks (IIPs) and Industrial Model Towns (IMTs), in addition to the SEZ Act which is a federal legislation. IIPs are supposed to be joint venture projects with equity participation by RIICO procured through the conventional routes of BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) or BOOM (Build-Own-Operate-Maintain). As per the IIP policy, units located in the IIPs (majority privately owned) will have the same concession status as the industrial units located in state owned-operated RIICO industrial areas. IIPs can be developed within a radius of 5 Kilometres, which was earlier restricted to 10 Kilometres. Leveraging the locational and administrative stability of the RIICO industrial areas, these IIPs are supposed to be supplied land through a 'transparent mechanism' by the state. In fact, to facilitate the same, Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules, 1959 have been amended as well[i]. Under the amended rules, there is a provision for automatic conversion of land up to 5 hectares which will come into force if the land is not converted within 30 days of application, with the land records being modified and updated within 7 days.

One of largest integrated projects falling under RIICO, the Mahindra World City (MWC) is spread over 3000 acres, of which 2000 acres was privately owned farmland and the rest was state owned common grazing land. Except for the 1000 acres of grazing land, which was transferred without any compensation to the dependent farmers, the remainder 2000 acres was acquired by the government by giving the land owners a developed plot one-fourth the size of the original lost parcel of land. Procured on a 99-year long lease[ii], MWC can further sell 99 year leases to other corporates to set up shop inside the premises. 40 percent of the total 3000 acres, i.e. 1200 acres is reserved for residential purposes. Although the MWC lies within the confines of the Jaipur Municipal Corporation, neighbouring areas not inside the JNN (Jaipur Nagar Nigam) boundaries saw immediate speculative buying by wealthy land traders after the notification of the SEZ. Another facet of the speculation was seen in the land transactions that eventually happened in the parcels allotted to the displaced farm owners.

Since 1994, RIICO, which had been tasked with acquiring and governing land for industrial purpose only, has been involved in other 'non-industries' such as hospitality, recreation (amusement parks/water parks, golf courses) and real estate (like golf estates and other land intensive projects). Taking the route of SEZ creation since the late 1990s many of the private investors and applicants were enticed with the 50 percent (initially pegged at a mere 35 percent) of land parcel which could be used for other asset classes (many a times housing was the obvious choice as it entailed the most value per square feet of land). Thus, the state, through SEZs, pivoted from the regime of expropriation for industrial development to being a facilitator of real estate development by dispossession en masse.

One of the prime examples displaying delegation of administrative control to a SPV is the case of the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor Development Corporation (DMICDC). Tasked with an unprecedented mandate of creating and maintaining the eponymous Delhi-Mumbai Industrial corridor (Adjoining area along the National Highway 8, joining the two metropolitan cities), DMICDC dons multiple hats, that of a development authority and discharges duties of an ULB for the greenfield Dholera Smart City, land aggregator for the Jewar International Airport (Noida) and developer of MRTS projects in two of its eight envisaged investment regions (IRs). The SPV utilizes a hybrid model of acquisition and land pooling for projects in Dholera, whereas it facilitates land acquisition for the upcoming Jewar International Airport as part of the recently delineated Dadri Noida Ghaziabad Investment Region (DNGIR). Along with soliciting private investment for these regions, DMICDC is the legatee of sovereign soft loans (Japan in this case) to create a conducive industrial ecosystem for both Indian as well foreign entities.

Exceeding the scale of DMICDC's pseudo governmental intervention, a rather novel concept has come up, that of petrochemical investment regions planned as a captive hinterland for a downstream seaport, three declared regions being around Dahej (Gujarat), Paradip (Odisha), and Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh) ports. These investment regions are heralded as the new frontiers of FDI receptacles and potential regional economic drivers. But, as expected, in the absence of a clear roadmap for land supply, none of the three IRs have taken flight.

Alternatives in residential land supply - In proxy to the state

Representing another facet of land assembly methods, Individual State's Town Planning Acts have innovated various township development policies under them. The states of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh (to name a few) have a notified integrated township policy. These integrated townships are generally urban extensions to mega cities. However, each policy has its own minimum contiguous land area requirements and incentives/subsidies extended. There is no standardization or benchmarking amongst various policies. Projects qualifying, are essentially using private purchase for land aggregation. Spatial plans are also to be prepared by the private development entity, only sanctioned by competent authorities (generally a development authority-of an urban centre /metropolitan region). Most of the times, these private players have tie-ups with brands/corporates even before land aggregation begins, for which a genre of themed (mixing land uses) integrated townships are increasingly seen.

The Curious case of 'Hi-tech townships' of Uttar Pradesh, India

The State of Uttar Pradesh in 2003, introduced an ambitious 'Hi-tech Township' policy. The policy concedes the financial limitations of the development authorities and corporations, and thus aligns itself to the State Urban Housing Policy 1995, where boosting private investment in housing sector is the underlined objective; however, housing in this policy is not being seen in isolation, but is being reasoned to depend on the growth of industries like Information Technology, health and Tourism. In evidence, the land use distribution proposed by the 2003 policy allows 35-40% developed land to be reserved for residential and 4 to 6% (revised to 8-10% in 2007) each for commercial and pollution free industrial purposes; however, interestingly and importantly either can be allowed to increase up to 30%. This effectively converts a housing township into an industrial township, essentially harnessing the economic benefits of the Information Technology and provide for marketable estates/properties.

The policy understands 'hi-tech townships' as greenfield world class liveable cities, self-contained and sustainable privatized housing enclaves with a minimum land area of 1500 acres, and a minimum value investment of 750 crores INR, to be completed in 5 years; ambitiously enough, since its inception, there has been no upper (maximum) land limit to a Hi-Tech township. It essentially provides for State facilitated private assembly of contiguous land in the peripheries of the fast growing metropolitans of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The basic model of land assembly and development is based on the proposition of the state adopting the role of a facilitator from that of a provider, wherein as per the policy, a private developer company (DC) or a consortium, expresses interest in developing a hi-Tech township as per policy norms/rules to the concerned competent authority. A competent authority here is a Development Authority (of regulated area, development area or a special development area) constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 or the Uttar Pradesh Housing and Development Board constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Housing and Development Board Act, 1965. The DC submits the township proposal to the competent authority. The competent authority licenses the DC for the development of the proposed township. DC is selected on the basis of its financial capacity, technical capability, experience and design concept with project pre-feasibility report. The proposals sent by various DCs are scrutinized by a State High Level Committee with assistance from the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC), especially instituted for this purpose. Once licensed, the land area identified for development is notified for acquisition by the competent authority under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Section 4 or U.P. Housing and Development Board Act 1965, section 28. Notification of land here essentially means sealing any land transfers further by the land owners, except to the licensed DC. 10% land acquisition cost of the entire project area is initially deposited by the DC with the competent authority. Though the land is notified under the land acquisition Act, the developer is first promoted to assemble land through private purchase. For the remaining land the policy provides for the DC to negotiate the acquisition compensation with the land owners in the presence of the collector as per 'Karar Niyamavali' (providing for negotiated land acquisition with the land owners, where after negotiation the collector decides the land value). If there further remains any non-negotiable land in holdouts the state facilitates by acquiring the remaining land under eminent domain as per LA Act 1894, to ensure contiguity of land (but only to a maximum of 25% of the total project area). The cost of land is to be borne by the private DC/consortium. The land acquired by state under Karar Niyamavali and via LA Act 1894 or U.P. Housing and Development Board Act 1965, section 28 are transferred to the DC on a 90 years lease. Any disputes over acquisition and compensations arising in the future are a financial responsibility of the DC/consortium. Simultaneously, an MOU is signed between the competent authority and the DC/consortium and a detailed layout plan and detailed project report are submitted, where the area of 1500 acres is phased out in three phases to be executed in 5 years.

The above 2003 policy faced a series of amendments since it was repeatedly challenged in court for various reasons. One ubiquitous challenge was to ensure that the DC assumes clear and complete possession of the land parcels before beginning to sell, allot and pre-book/launch the project. There were several cases reported where, land was not in possession and third party rights were created. Thus the amendments to the policy in 2006. The DC/consortium had to submit to the competent authority for approval of detailed layout plans, detailed project report and signing of the development agreement, only after purchase of 60% land in each phase, which effectively is 300 acres for every 500 acres phase. Moreover, the amendment restricted one DC/consortium to at the maximum develop 2 hi-tech township projects in one planning area and simultaneously a maximum of 3 in the entire State of Uttar Pradesh. This single clause lead to a rise in the demand of allowing expansion of sanctioned township areas. Thus the 2007 amendments importantly introduced the concept of expansion of township in phases, where the explanation provided in the policy was 'to harness multiplier effect of the parent township[iii]'. The policy for every addition of 1500 acres land area beyond the first 1500 acres, proposes one additional phase.

This amendment paved the way to re-imagining the size of these townships. The 2013 revision of the policy increased the phases up to 7 where area under development could be 7500 acres and above.

The policy offers and has over time reasoned a series of exceptions, exemptions and incentives to be imparted to the private sector. No Stamp duty has to be paid for the first 1500 acres of land acquired. 10% acquisition charges are waved off. Exemption from all municipal taxes. Granted expeditious exception to The UP zamindari abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950, section 154[iv]and also provides for active support of the state for acquiring Gram Samaj land, land in scheduled areas and forest areas, where the collector has to acquire this land in a maximum of 60 days (R&R has been proposed for tribal population since the 2008 policy version). There are no EDC and IDC payable, however license fees, DPR inspection charges and Connectivity charges for trunk infrastructure are charged on actual cost basis. EIA is as per law. Landuse conversion charges, A to NA conversion is payable.

By the very structure of it, this land assembly model can neither be called a purely land acquisition model nor a purely private purchase model. As the policy also allows a development consortium, the possibilities of a DC to privately pool land with land owners to form a consortium must not be neglected. In principle, it is perhaps convenient to call it a hybrid model of land assembly.

Parallel to the above, the state in 2005 promulgated the Integrated Township Policy (ITP) 2005, a sister policy for development of Greenfield private housing enclaves smaller than 'Hi-Tech Townships' but no less labels- self-contained, World class, etcetera. The policy saw more than 8 revisions between 2005-2008, while the latest one being in 2014. Essentially the land assembly and development model is the same in spirit as the Hi-tech township policy. The developer company/consortium must own a minimum of 25% of the total proposed license area for grant of development license, for each project. In its early days the policy provide for state support in acquisition of 25% of licensed land; however, the 2014 policy requires 100% land assembly through private purchase. The important development here is that the DC is shown the route of private land pooling forming joint ventures with land owners. Minimum 60% land has to be assembled for development agreement and detailed layout plan sanctioning. Stamp duty towards land transfers, freehold charges, license fees, city development charges is payable. No NA conversion charges payable outside master plan areas. The landuse distribution in the 2014 policy aligns itself to the State Urban Housing and Habitat policy of 2014 and allows for 12% mixed use allowing a maximum of 30% as saleable commercial real estate component alongside a maximum of 40% residential.

Noticeable is the relaxation of minimum area required for an integrated township in U.P reduced from 100 acres in 2005 to mere 25 acres in 2014 revision; where the maximum area but remained restricted to 500 acres. Further, the policy allows reduction and one-time expansion of license area up to 100% of the originally approved area (effectively to a maximum of 1000 acres), provided the DC assembles 60% of licensed area and the expansion area is contiguous to the originally approved area.

In 2014, the State of Uttar Pradesh released its State Urban Housing and habitat Policy (SUHHP) 2014. The policy accepts that the above two policies discussed could not supply for the affordable housing needs; and that they must be looked at as providing for mid-segment and high-end housing markets. In continuation, the housing policy harps on the challenges faced by various development authorities and boards around State land acquisition and dedicatedly discusses ‘land pooling - partnering with land owners’ as an ‘easy’ and progressive alternative to state land acquisition, taking reference to the Gujarat and Maharashtra Town Planning schemes. The Land pooling scheme provides for a minimum land size of 10 acres (4 hectares) with minimum 10% land reserved for open spaces, minimum 35% for roads, parking, public/semi-public uses. The scheme also talks about allotment of alternative developed/serviced land plot to land owners pooling land, where mixed use (residential and commercial) shall be allowed and no development charges shall be payable against such land plots allotted. The policy further provides for all development authorities, the UP housing board and all government and semi-government bodies to assemble land through negotiated private purchase directly from the land owners.

The Land Supply Model and Land Speculation

Essentially now tracing the propositions of the Hitech-Townships Policy and Integrated Township Policy and their avatars since 2003 to 2015 together, both provide for private land purchase for Real estate commercial, non-polluting industrial and residential development. A private entity has access to private land assembly with State facilitation and incentives from 25acres land sizes to as large as 7500 acres and even more. Effectively, the national land expropriation tool has been undermined, while the policy route has been very conveniently used and is available to appropriate land. The SUHHP 2014 further lowers down the 25 acre land size to 10 acres through the land pooling route. To manage anything lesser, negotiated private purchase is also possible. In conclusion, State land acquisition seems to have been left only as a tool to fill ‘gaps’. Even before the LARR 2013 Act could make any meaningful change, the land assembly policy-scape in Uttar Pradesh, had already commodified land.

Prominently, by the very simple provision of these township schemes allowing expansion in phases and treating every expansion as a separate project, land around licensed townships is prone to speculation and many a times appropriated by the parent developer itself to reserve land for possibilities of future expansion. Moreover, land owners around licensed townships are financially enticed into the real estate development and begin to appreciate their lands as a commodity and not just production. This further distorts the local land markets, never to return to its original. Especially when these licensed townships fail to materialise in reality, the license may be withdrawn, cancelled or stalled, but land remains appropriated forever. Various examples can be found all over the country where private corporations sometimes in collaboration with IDCs have left the land markets high and dry after years of speculation following spurts of land appropriation by private purchase and bonafide land acquisition. Speculation is prompt around townships areas already licenced and notified but development agreement not signed or DPRs not approved. The notified lands here remain locked while lands around them begin being ventured. Not to forget is that these markets being talked of are rural, in the thick of highly productive agricultural lands.

An urban sprawl only to reap economic benefits in the garb of providing for sustainable urbanization

Let us try and appreciate the scale and size of 'urbanization' these township policies bring with them. The policy is fundamentally designed to concentrate real estate development in the vicinity of larger metropolitans and class I towns and fast growing cities of Uttar Pradesh (to name a few - Lucknow, Kanpur, Ghaziabad, Agra, Bareilly, Moradabad, Saharanpur, except NOIDA and Greater Noida), which may accentuate the already lopsided urbanization pattern in the state[v] . The Hi-tech townships at minimum are a 1500 acre site, with a proposed gross density of 150 to 200 persons per hectare[vi]. The policy document assumes 25000 population threshold for every 300 acre phase-wise development considering it a self-contained neighbourhood. Making conservative assumptions, a 1500 acre township is about a minimum of 0.9 lakh to a 1.25 lakh population. Apparently, one smallest size full grown township essentially is a Tier- I urban centre (As per census of India classification of urban settlements). The policy though restricts the number of projects per DC but has no mention of any capping on the total number of Hi-Tech townships in the State or in the peripheries of a development planning boundary. The decision is left upon the State High Level Committee to decide. Surprisingly, these are city sized urban extensions, but have no State Urbanization policy to synchronise with. If the decision lies with the local competent authority of the parent city, there is merit in licensing townships in synchronisation with planning periods of the master plans. On the contrary, the 2006 edition of the Hi-tech Township policy explicitly mentions that "it is a rare possibility to find a land parcel larger than 1500 acres within the master plan urbanizable area and development area boundaries, therefore, development plans/ master plans shall be made to accommodate these city extensions". For the National Capital region, there is just a brief mention of adherence to the NCR regional plan. Disagreement here is, these private real estate development enclaves are carved out of the rural landscapes and sanctioned as and how applications are received, while Master plans are designed sporadically to accommodate these urban additions.

Taking Lucknow, the capital city of Uttar Pradesh as an example; the city at present is having 350 sq.km municipal area with 28.17 lakh people[vii]. One Hi-tech township is almost 4.5 % population and 1.5% municipal area. Remember, these estimates are conservative and the townships sanctioned are multiple and larger in sizes to extract the policy to its maximum. The Government of Uttar Pradesh approved a master plan in February 1992 to remain effective until 2001. However, Master Plan 2021 did not begin in time and the plan for 2021 was prepared and approved only in 2005. The development area was 60800 ha. (With urbanizable area as 41380 ha). Meanwhile, the Hi-Tech township policy was already enforced and between 2005- 2015, three DCs (Ansal P &I limited[viii], M/s Garv Buildtech and Sahara India Commercial Corporation) were licensed to develop 8014.03 acres of land (approximately 3243 hectares). These urban extensions are neither on the municipal map and nor on the planning boundary map, denying all principles of compact urban planning. Assuming a density of 200 persons per hectare (as proposed in the policy), these townships meant almost 4.5 to 6.5 lakhs of people in these new city extensions. The COI 2011 Lucknow metropolitan area population was 2902920 with Municipal area boundary as 350sq.km. Effectively these townships in total were 9% of city size inserting 22% population outside the municipal boundary. Consequently or by compulsion or maybe purposefully, master plans was to adapt to the above and include various other State level developmental projects, and the development area was further revised to include additional 160 villages in 2009. Master plan 2021 (which never came into force) states the reason of expansion of planning boundary as accommodating the new hi-tech townships[ix]. In fact, The MOUs signed in 2005 with the developers conveniently promised that if the land parcels identified fell outside the development area of the master plan (see Figure 1and Figure 2), the planning boundaries shall be revised. The development area thus saw an increase of almost 39179 Ha. In 2014, 16 more villages were added to the development area. While master plan 2021 kept seeing amendments, it was finally decided in 2014 that the Master plan 2021 be replaced by Master Plan 2031. In effect, real estate development is superseding and is enjoying its preponderant influence on the statutory planning processes.

To add, these urban extensions are State licensed, but privately designed and privately governed enclaves [read more on privatisation of planning referring to (Shatkin, The City and the Bottom Line: Urban Megaprojects and the Privatization of Planning in Southeast Asia, 2008)], only to be surrounded by rural land and Panchayati Raj institutions, where the parent city's Urban Local Body has no jurisdiction until the completion and possession of the massive township. These townships are outgrowths to the municipal area but its people enjoy no municipal rights. Each township has its own conceptual plan, a broad layout plan, a landuse plan, infrastructure and services development plan prepared by a private consultant. There are no guidelines, rules other than the building byelaws, available to enable preparation of 'liveable' and 'world class' townships. There aren't any provisions, tools, mandates to ensure participatory and inclusive plan preparation. Categorically, these townships are not meant for the local populace; so who and why to inform, consult or partners with! Townships, until the DCs exit are remain under the facilities management by the private sector, The DC maintains the various services of the Hi-Tech Township, for which it has the right to collect maintenance expenditure from the allottees as per the provisions of approved DPR. During this period the Urban Local Body is not entitled to collection of house tax, water tax and sewerage tax, et-cetera from the residents or users of the Hi-Tech Township. However, as municipal boundaries expand, the services may be handed over to the Local Body for maintenance with the consent of the residents of the Hi-Tech Township. For the development of trunk infrastructure and city level services like electric sub-station, police-station, fire station, post-office, telephone exchange etcetera, land is provided to the DCs with no cost and constructed as per norms. Effectively, the residents though are a part of the urban fabric, but are yet devoid of their municipal rights and political rights at the urban local level, where they do not enjoy voting rights for municipal elections. Essentially no elected body is accountable to these residents at the local level.

Besides the above, the louder point of debate maybe to observe the very purpose of these townships. Are they really addressing urbanization needs or a part of the entrepreneurial dream of the competitive State? To quote the policy document 2007, the objectives of the Hi-Tech Township policy are:

- *To produce competitive and financially viable hi-tech marketable estate with an attractive environment for high quality living, working and recreation.*
- *To encourage high technology and knowledge-based industries, tourism and provide facilities for business organizations engaged in modern technologies.*
- *To facilitate and create an enabling environment for attracting maximum private investment in housing and infrastructure development.*
- *To support and enable private investment in other sectors of the State economy.*

The objectives as read above, do not underscore the 'need' aspects of housing as much it does on the marketability, infrastructural standards, privatization and creation of an enabling environment and other qualitative aspects of housing stock generation.

The projected housing shortage at the beginning of 12th State Five Year Plan (2012-17) had been estimated at 5.46 lac dwelling units and about 13.20 lac households were expected to be added by the end of 12th Plan as per the population projections. The 2012 to 2017 Five Year Plan for the State of Uttar Pradesh had targeted 3 lakh houses to be delivered by the two hi-tech and Integrated Township policies, which was 54% of the total housing targets. This clearly indicates the dependence of the State machinery for provisioning of housing demand, through private purchase of land for Real estate development. The SUHHP, 2014 states the target of stock generation as 3.5 lakhs dwelling units until 2017 from the 8192.54 acres of land assembled until 2014 and 1.5 lakhs DUs from the 3254 acres of and assembled by the Integrated townships across U.P. In fact 20% of the stock to be delivered was mandatorily EWS/LIG to be cross subsidised. However, most townships planned this segment of housing on land parcels, which were not under possession and awaiting assembly. In point of fact, the government had to cancel various licenses, DPRs were not submitted in time, 60% land aggregation through private purchase posed challenges, and not to forget, several developers withdrew their projects under these policies for financial crisis. As illustrated in the Table 1 below, only two DCs namely Ansal P &I limited and M/s Garv Buildtech acquired 3072.45 (38% of originally approved land) acres of land whereas only Ansal P&I started development work.

Between the years 2009-15, almost eight integrated township projects were granted licenses around Lucknow metropolitan area. Out of 8 only 5 (Eldeco City Pvt Ltd, Viraj Construction Pvt Ltd, Emmar MGF, Omaxe Pvt Ltd and ANS Construction Pvt Ltd.) executed Development Agreements with the Lucknow Development Authority by 2015. Against the license of 1,501.41 acres, the developers purchased land measuring 965.72 acres and furthermore failed to complete the development in any of the projects within the scheduled period of five years from the date of development agreement[x]. As per the CAG report referenced above, out of the 11 selected developers for Hi-T tech/Integrated Township (2003-2015), only six developers executed development agreements and five developers started executing the project.

Continuing Innovations by Convenience

In the State of Punjab, the Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) has extensively been using alternatives to assemble land for the development of an altogether new Greenfield city the 'New Chandigarh' in the Mullanpur area spread across 15,000 acres (6000 ha)[xi,] as an extension and progressive investment alternative to the heritage city Chandigarh. There are three layouts namely

Medi city, Eco-city and Education city where ‘a specially drafted land pooling policy for Punjab State’ is being used for land assembly. 400 acres for the Eco-City Phase –I, a plotted residential Ultra-modern township, has already been pooled, while another 450 acres in Phase –II is under process. 350 acres are to being assembled for the Medi-city and 1700 acres for the Education city. The developed plots here are allotted/auctioned on lease to private developers/promoters with development rights. The Department of Housing and Urban Development, Government of Punjab in 2013 formulated the Land Pooling policy for the State. This policy can be used for land assembly by all development authorities, with a special mention of the Punjab Urban Development Authority (PUDA) and the department of Industries in the State of Punjab. Fundamentally, the land pooling scheme provides for ‘land for land’ to participating land owners. The scheme’s pull factor is the return allotment through a draw of a ‘developed’ residential and a developed ‘commercial’ plot as consideration. For every half an acre of land pooled, the land owner is entitled to 500 sq. yard of residential and 60 sq. yard of commercial plot in the project development area. Land pooled below sizes of 0.5 acre do not receive the commercial component whereas larger land sizes pooled are entitled to proportionately more than one number of developed plots. The land pooling package also contains subsistence allowances in addition to the land plots. The policy extraordinarily legitimizes the assistance of ‘Estate Agents registered under the provision of the PAPR Act, 1995’ as land aggregators to help liaise with land owners. Important to note is that individual urban development bodies are provided with the flexibility to modify the policy as suits the project. Presently, a 2018 modification of the policy is being used for aero-city expansion project.

In Punjab a private promoter can obtain a license to build a residential colony under The Punjab Apartment and Property Regulation Act (PAPRA), 1995. There are no minimum area requirements in the Act, but only require to qualify minimum investment values for each project. The promoter assembles land by private negotiations, prepares spatial layout plans, to be sanctioned by development authorities/competent authority. Here infrastructure is also the sole responsibility of the promoter. The 662 Ha (licensed area) township by Omaxe group in New Chandigarh Local planning Area of GMADA, to be developed in A to F phases is an exemplary case to illustrate. It is a mixed use development, as approved in the Master plan, first approved in 2008 in the Mullanpur area (now called as New Chandigarh). Its land is partly assembled under the PAPRA 1995 and partly licensed under the Mega Housing Policy. Punjab Urban development Authority (PUDA) instituted as per the state town Planning Act had formulated dedicated guidelines in 2006, of developing Mega Project and Super Mega Projects, aligned with the vision of the State industrial policy of 2003. The scheme provides for lands to be assembled by private purchase, and a special Screening Committee especially constituted at the State level assess each proposal and the State Empowered Committee if approves, grants permissions. These ‘Mega housing projects’ have to have a minimum fixed capital investment while land area requirements are left to the discretion of the special screening committee. However, at the time of application, at least 50% of the land area of the project must be under the ownership of the promoter. The State facilitates the process by acquiring left over, ‘hold outs’ land through the land acquisition act of the State and hands over the land to the private developer/promoter/colonizer.

The State of Punjab also allows ‘Land Owners Become Partners in Development’. Formulated in 2013, the policy essentially allows for land owner to assume the role of a private developer. Specifically crafted for development of urban estates and exclusive commercial projects, the policy provides for individual land owners and the development authority (PUDA or respective Special development Authority) sign an agreement, where the land owners transfer the development, use and transfer rights of land to the DA. Land owners are allowed to develop the real estate and sell it as per agreement with the development authority. One prominent precondition is contiguity of pooled land. The DA takes possession of the land for development execution, while the cost of development including Change in Land Use, External Development Charges, Social Infrastructure Funds, and License/Permission Fees are to be borne by the land owners. Sale prices are fixed by both the parties in consultation. The receipts are amassed in a project specific account maintained by the DA. The receipts and profits from the sales are shared in the ratio 80:20 by the land owner and the development authority. One of the endeavors to the formulation of the policy is to “avoid complicacies of land acquisition”[xii]. There have been several efforts in the past to ‘ease’ the process of state acquisition. The department of Revenue, Government of Punjab in 2006, as a provision for land acquisition under the LA 1894 proposed the District level Committee to include an additional “no litigation premium” to the determined market value of land in case of compulsory acquisition @ 10% of the value negotiated and finalised. This was to encourage better compliance and cut delay on land acquisition due to Court interventions. As recently as 2018 a special ‘Negotiated land acquisition’ method was prescribed in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The Notification dated 25/1/2018 from the Estate Branch, Finance Department of Chandigarh Administration prescribed the Policy for ‘Land Acquisition through Negotiation’. The policy is in response to the lengthy and time consuming SIA & SIMP, R& R and Consent processes mandatory as per the LARR 2013 Act. This policy is presented as an answer to the project delays and cost escalations otherwise affecting projects after the enforcement of the LARRA 2013. However, it is for now, only providing land for State departments/undertakings. The land requiring body along with the land records of the land area identified for acquisition approaches the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO), Chandigarh. Upon no encumbrances found, the consent of the land owners is obtained upon the rates (inclusive of the multiplier factor and solatium) and total value of land. If the owner and the LAO do not come to terms, the District Price Fixation Committee fixes the land rate and a 10% “no litigation premium” is added to the land rate. Rehabilitation and resettlement is not compulsory for Land acquired through negotiation as per the policy. However, the land owner is waived off stamp duty and registration charges on purchase of any developed land parcel in Chandigarh U.T. with the compensation money, within two years of the grant of compensation.

Alongside privatizing land assembly & development, the whole public function of urban planning is also increasingly privatizing. It is no more limited to large scale mega industrial/infrastructural projects; but as evident in the Lucknow Hi-Tech Township development, has trickled deep into housing provisioning. In 2007, the GMADA appointed Singapore based private consultants Jurong Consultants Private Ltd. to prepare a comprehensive integrated master plan for the new township of Mullanpur.[xiii] The proposed landuse plan 2008- 2031 was successfully prepared in 2008. Punjab Regional & Town Planning & Development Board meeting held on 28-5-2014 renamed the new township of Mullanpur as ‘New Chandigarh’[xiv]. In 2015, Department of Town & Country Planning, Punjab PUDA appointed AECOM India Pvt. Ltd. for making of the detailed New Chandigarh masterplan. This master plan does not change the basic structure proposed, but additionally provides detailed sector layout plans. The layouts thus prepared, had to accommodate several pre-approved residential, commercial/estate already approved (please see figure 3). Though this paper is not further dichotomising this preferential behaviour, yet noticeable is the fact that even when the first master plan came into effect only in 2008, the google earth imagery itself indicates land appropriation even before!

At some instances townships are also being used as an alternative to non-performing land uses[xv]. The latest industrial policy of Maharashtra facilitates developers of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to de-notify land and set up Integrated Industrial Areas (IIAs) and allow development of townships, including residential buildings. The Maharashtra Industrial Policy of 2013-18 provides for The ‘Exit Policy’ to leverage land under de-notified or withdrawn SEZs in the state for development of Integrated Industrial Areas. These IIAs are essentially townships where landuse distribution allows for 60% land under industrial area and the rest under other uses. This distribution was lately revised to an 80-20 ratio by the 2018 Maharashtra Industrial Policy. The minimum area requirements remain 40 hectares (100 acres). IIAs on lands acquired by MIDC/CIDCO or assembled by private purchase/Joint Venture are to be governed by and follow development control regulations laid down by MIDC and CIDCO respectively. These IIAs in 2018 policy have been equated as equals to the Special Township Projects (now called as the Integrated Township projects ITPs) executed under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, in the identified Regional planning areas. These are essentially townships of minimum 40 Ha of greenfield rural land, assembled through purely private purchase, that are allowed residential use to be mixed with Economic activities like Market, Multiplex, Mall, Information Technology & Information Technology enabled Services (IT & ITeS) office spaces, Recreational Centres, Trade & Commerce, Higher Education, Specialty Hospitals, spaces for Non-polluting Industries, Service Industries, Entertainment, Tourism industry. The Master plans for ITPs are prepared by the promoter/private developer and approved by the collector/district revenue administration, in consultation with the respective regional planning body. Though this paper has not attempted to critically appraise the two schemes, nevertheless at a glance, the two seen together appear to be dissolving the implicit difference between industrial townships and residential townships. They seem to be increasingly interchangeably used lately. The commonality between them is the primacy of private sector in supplying and developing land alongside the Real estate component providing for the globalised image of an urban lifestyle, with multiplexes, malls etcetera.

Pertinent Points to Ponder

In all the examples discussed above, we observe three major actors An Individual as a land owner, The State and a Private entity (PE) as land requiring bodies. We observe that the private entity is increasingly assuming greater agency. The State is facilitating the process through evolving legislations and regulatory framework and partnering with the State and a land owner, majorly facilitating the land assembly processes, allowing the PE or the Land owners to take the planning and development. Land pooling is traditionally a partnership model between State and land owners, however, there are various policy handles being innovated to allow the Private entity and the land owners partner, with State facilitation. These supporting legislations however enjoy little or no longevity, are intermittent and have none at all or weak defence mechanism against power abuse, corruption and political influence.

Point to be interestingly noted is the rising enablement of land owner to become a private developer. Other than the above discussed, private land pooling models are several in India. The Magarpatta Township being one of the most celebrated. The Delhi Land Pooling Policy 2013 and 2018 formats both provide for an equal stature to the individual land owner. This had essentially transformed the understanding of land for a farmer in a rural part of India. Land is no more only for production, but is a commodity and tradable. This has far reaching effects on rural economy. Land commodifies and becomes susceptible to speculation and appropriation.

There is an ever-increasing role of parastatals morphing into pseudo developing authorities by involving private planning consulting firms for preparation of urban spatial plans, leading to privatization of development planning with a meagre public consultation/participation. The over-reliance on real estate to solve the financial issues of cities is pushing the state into a situation where private interests and short-term gratification are weighing over the greater public good. As mandated by the Draft National Land Utilization Policy, there is a need to strategize utilization of land and its management so that the land use changes are not detrimental to the sustainable development of India.[xvi]

There is little doubt in these experimental models of land assembly and development being ‘for profit’ tools contributing to a win-win for both the State and the private sector in the short term to serve corporate/performance targets. But owing to the rising bankruptcy cases and litigations around private sector operations in India, there are serious concerns to be raised around the resilience of these newer forms of urban growth to an array of risks; Volatility of these mega projects (Goldman, 2011 , p. 243)! As illustrated, these developments are fragmented urban extensions, undermining and bypassing traditional planning processes and adding to the urban sprawl. Repeatedly if not always, they are devoid of local governance structures, spaces of citizen expression and political participation or representation at the urban local level. Is this urbanization or industrialisation at all endorsed as Sustainable development?

Even if one considers these land assembly models as alternatives sought to tackle and win over acquisition challenges in India, yet their continuing forms/formats cannot be justified post 2013. The latest Land Acquisition regulation the LARR 2013, has probably in spirit addressed all issues around state expropriation. Moreover, most states have re-interpreted and enforced a morphed avatar of the central Act, further maligning the efforts that had gone in to the making of the parent legislation. Parallel pieces of legislations continue to flow in. In such a situation, States have retained their autonomy and power in the subject matter ‘Land’, and there has been no standardisation of land supply, assembly or expropriation in the country.

To conclude, new forms of land assembly are moulding newer models of urbanization in India.

The Way Forward

The above research has various definitive tangents to explore and demonstrate the discussed above further. Speculative forms of governance being one of the most obvious. The role of judiciary, citizen activism and governance response are inescapable. Mapping urban sprawl attributable to these newer models of land supply can also contribute to spatial studies around land appropriation and add to the body of knowledge of land economics. The planning discipline in India has to design systemic response and progressively adapt to absorb these forces. There is a need to revisit the planning framework/apparatus in India. Last but not the least, the faculty of law needs to assess the legislative quality of the new regulatory framework, especially the temporal but several experimental policies. The need is to gauge the consistency of policy objectives and decode the degree of Policy transparency, accountability and responsiveness and resilience to risks [read (Lombard & Rakodi, 2016, p. 2692)}. For all intents and purposes, establishing policy accountability.

List of Tables and figures:

Table 1: Hi-tech townships LDA, licensed and sanctioned

Developer Company/Consortium	Area licensed in acres	Land assembled in acres
Ansal P &I limited	3530.03	2521.52
M/s Garv Buildtech	2700	550.93
Sahara India Corporation	1784	Development agreement not executed

Source: 1The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Economic Sector-Non-Public Sector Undertakings) Government of Uttar Pradesh Report No. 6 of the year 2015 for the year ended 31 March 2015.

Figure 1Location of Golf City Hi-tech Township Lucknow, outside city municipal limits



Source: 2 Created by Author. Base map sourced from the revised City development Plan Lucknow, 2015, available at https://lmc.up.nic.in/CDP.aspx accessed on 26/2/2019

Figure 2 Location of various private investment townships lying outside the municipal boundaries



Source: 3 Map sourced from the revised City development Plan Lucknow, 2015, available at [https://lmc.up.nic.in/CDP.aspx accessed on 26/2/2019](https://lmc.up.nic.in/CDP.aspx)

Figure 3Existing Approved estates/layouts in New Chandigarh LPA until 2015



Source: 4Clipped by the author from The New Chandigarh LPA Masterplan 2031

References

Balakrishnan, S. (2013). Highway Urbanization and Land Conflicts: the Challenges to Decentralization in India. Pacific Affairs, 86(4), 785-811. doi:10.5509/2013864785

Balakrishnan, S. (2014). Land-based Financing for Infrastructure: What is New about India's Land Conflicts? Conference on the Political Economy of Contemporary India.

Banerjee, A. N., & Banik, N. (2018). Political Economy of Resources and Infrastructure in India. Elsevier.

Bedi, H. P., & Tillin, L. (2015). Inter-state Competition, Land Conflicts and Resistance in India. Routledge, 43(2), 1-20.

Chadchan , J., & Shankar, R. (2012). An analysis of urban growth trends in the post-economic reforms period in India. IRJET, 1-14.

Chakravorty, S. (2016). Land acquisition in India: The political-economy of changing the law. Routledge, 1, 1-16.

Dannestam, & Tove. (2004). The Theories and Politics of Entrepreneurial Cities - A Theoretical Summing Up and the Next Step Forward. Lund: Lund University.

Datta, A. (2015). New urban utopias of postcolonial India: 'Entrepreneurial urbanization' in Dholera smart city, Gujarat . Dialogues in Human Geography, 5, 1-20.

EPW-editorial. (2010). Private Cities. EPW, 45(12), 1-2.

Goldman, M. (2011). Speculating on the Next World City. In A. Roy, & A. Ong (Eds.), Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and teh Art of Being Global (pp. 229-258). Blackwell Publishing Limited.

Gururani, S., & Kose, B. (n.d.). Shifting Terrain: Questions of Governance in India's Cities and their Peripheries.

Hall , T., & Hubbard, P. (1996). The entrepreneurial city: new urban politics, new urban geographies? Progress in Human Geography, 20,2, 153-174.

Hogan, T., Bunnel, T., & Morshidi, S. (2012). Asian urbanisms and the privatization of cities. Elsevier, 29(1), 1-7.

IDFC. (2009). India Infrastructure Report 2009: Land—A Critical Resource for Infrastructure. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jenkins, R., Kennedy, L., Mukhopadhyay, P., & Pradhan, K. C. (2015). Special Economic Zones in India: Interrogating the Nexus of Land, Development and Urbanization. Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 6((I)), 1-17. doi: 10.1177/0975425315585426

Johnson, C., & Chakravarty, A. (2013). Re-Thinking the Role of Compensation in Urban Land Acquisition: Empirical Evidence from South Asia. Land, 2, 278-303.

Keivani, R., & Mattingly, M. (2007). The Interface of Globalization and Peripheral Land in the Cities of the South: Implications for Urban Governance and Local Economic Development. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 31.2, 1-16.

Levien, M. (2012). The land question: special economic zones and the political economy of dispossession in India. Routledge, 1-38.

Levien, M. (2013). Regimes of Dispossession: From Steel Towns to Special Economic Zones. Developement and Change, 1-27.

Lombard, M., & Rakodi, C. (2016). Urban Land Conflict in the Global South: Towards an Analytical Framework. Urban Studies, 53(13), 2683-2699.

Mitra, S. (2016). Periurban Narratives of Land Value: From Investments to Compensation. RC21 International Conference on “The transgressive city: Comparative perspectives on governance and the possibilities of everyday life in the emerging global city”. Mexico.

Mitra, S. (2018). Roads to new Urban Futures. EPW, 52(49), 1-9.

Narain, V., & Vij, S. (2015). Where have all the commons gone? Elsevier, 1-4.

Ong, A. (2011). Worlding Cities: Asian Experiements and the Art of Being Global (1 ed.). Pondicherry, India: Blackwell Publishing Limited.

Raman, B. (2016). Reading into the Politics of Land. Economic & Political Weekly, LI(17), 76-84.

Sathe, D. (2016). Land Acquisition: Need a Shift in Discourse. Economic & Political Weekly, LI(51), 52-58.

Sathe, D. (2017). Land Acquisition and Beyond: The Farmers' Perspective. Economic & Political Weekly, LII(13), 59-65.

Shatkin, G. (2008). The City and the Bottom Line: Urban Megaprojects and the Privatization of Planning in Southeast Asia. 40, 1-21.

Shatkin, G. (2011). Planning Privatopolis: Representation and contestation in the development of urban integarted Mega-Projects. In A. Roy, & A. Ong (Eds.), Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global (pp. 77-97). Blackwell Publishing Limited.

Singh, R. (2012). Inefficiency and Abuse of Compulsory Land Acquisition. EPW, 47(19), 1-8.

Sood, A. (2015). Industrial townships and the policy facilitation of corporate urbanisation in India. Urban Studies, 1-20.

Sood, A. (2017). Speculative Urbanism. In Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Urban and Regional Studies (pp. 1-4). London.

Steel, G., Noorloos, F. v., & Christien, K. (2017). The urban land debate in the global South: New avenues for research. Geoforum, 83, 133–141.

Wahi, N., Bhatia , A., Shukla , P., Gandhi , D., Jain, S., & Chauhan, U. (2017). Land Acquisition in India: A Review of Supreme Court Cases from 1950 to 2016. New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research.

End Notes:

---

[i] http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/state/rajasthan/pstrj03a.htm
[ii] Rajasthan Special Economic Zones Act, 2015
[iii] As per GI-Tech Township Policy 2007
[iv] Exemption to Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, Section 154. Restriction on transfer by a *bhumidhar* (land owner).-(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer by sale or gift, any land other than tea gardens to any person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift, become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by his family will in the aggregate, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) in Uttar Pradesh.
[v] (refer to the UP urbanization profile on the Town and Country Planning Department, U.P. http://uptownplanning.gov.in/page/en/urbanization-in-uttar-pradesh accessed at 24/2/2019)
[vi] As mentioned in the Terms of Reference for the Hi-tech township policy 2007 available @ http://www.environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/FormB/TOR/PFR/07_Dec_2018_160906087R8UP5CPZCompleteReportOmaxeAllahabad.pdf
[vii] Sourced from Lucknow City development Plan (revised) available at https://lmc.up.nic.in/CDP.aspx accessed on 26/2/2019
[viii] Ansals API, Sushant Gold City Lucknow is a 3530 acre Hi-Tech township, expandable up to 6000 acres.
[ix] A copy of the Lucknow Master Plan 2031 downloadable @ http://www.ldaonline.in/doc/LDA/welcome/homepage/DOWNLOADS/46/MasterPlan2031.pdf;jsessionid=1C38C46EAB45B802407953B5CFBFD8CB accessed on 18th February 2019.
[x] Source: The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Economic Sector-Non-Public Sector Undertakings) Government of Uttar Pradesh Report No. 6 of the year 2015 for the year ended 31 March 2015
[xi] http://gmada.gov.in/category/new-chandigarh/about/
[xii] Government of Punjab, Department of Housing and Urban development notification dated 19th June, 2013, accessed at
[xiii] http://gmada.gov.in/category/new-chandigarh/about/
[xiv] http://gmada.gov.in/category/new-chandigarh/about/
[xv] Out of 45,635.63 ha of land notified in the country for SEZ purposes, operations commenced in only 28,488.49 ha of land'. It also added that '5402.22 ha of land was de-notified and diverted for commercial purposes in several cases. (Banerjee & Banik, 2018, p. 3)
[xvi] Accessed from the Draft National Land Utilization Policy- a framework for land use planning & management, July 2013 by the Department of Land Resources (Ministry of Rural Development; Government of India) accessed @https://smartnet.niua.org/sites/default/files/resources/draft_national_land_utilisation_policy_july_2013.pdf