Conference Agenda

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Session Overview
Session
04-10: Games & Experimental Economics
Time:
Tuesday, 20/Mar/2018:
3:45pm - 5:15pm

Session Chair: Tobias Vorlaufer, University of Marburg, Germany
Location: MC 10-100

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Presentations

Political Trust, Risk Preferences, and Land-Taking Compensation: Evidence from Survey Experiments in China

Meina Cai1, Pengfei Liu1, Hui Wang2

1University of Connecticut, United States of America; 2Zhejiang University, P.R. China

Land acquisition becomes a touchstone for protests and conflict during China's urbanization, driving local governments to diversify land-taking compensation from solely one-time cash payments to multiple payments, notably, in the form of pension insurance and yearly dividends. To what extent do farmers support the new compensation schemes? This study establishes the importance of political trust and risk preferences on individual decision-making. Political distrust induces farmers to choose traditional one-time cash payments over multiple cash payments. Both risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals prefer one-time cash payments to yearly dividends. The findings are developed using two choice experiments: We elicit individual compensation decision-making by asking farmers to state their preferences over hypothetical alternative compensation instruments; We elicit risk preferences using a lottery-choice experiment with varying probability of winning real monetary rewards. The findings are important to understanding to what extent the government efforts in innovative compensation designs are effective at quelling rural anger.

04-10-Cai-617_paper.pdf
04-10-Cai-617_ppt.pdf


Introducing and Terminating External Incentives: A Field Experimental Study of Forest Conservation as a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma

Nils Christian Hoenow, Michael Kirk

University of Marburg, Germany

The aim of this study is to analyze whether external institutional incentives have a lasting effect on conservation that persists even after incentives are terminated. We set up a forestry-framed common-pool resource game in Namibia and introduced positive(reward) and negative(fee) incentives that aimed to increase cooperation. The participants in the game were small-scale farmers and they had to make decisions about either clearing new fields in the forest or staying on their old ones, which resembles decisions they make in real life. The game was played over several periods and the incentives were ceased after some time to test for persisting effects in a post-incentive period. Results show that increases in cooperation persist after termination of negative incentives. After termination of positive incentives, cooperation decreased, albeit not significantly. We also find that cooperation increased over time in a control group that had never received additional incentives.

04-10-Hoenow-671_paper.pdf
04-10-Hoenow-671_ppt.pptx


System Dynamics model for preventing land expropriation conflict

Lu Zhang1, Shukui Tan2, Qiaowen Lin3

1huazhong university of science and tecnhongy, China, People's Republic of; 2huazhong university of science and tecnhongy, China, People's Republic of; 3huazhong university of science and tecnhongy, China, People's Republic of

Land expropriation conflict (LEC) shall be such a gradual procedure from land expropriation risk, to the contradiction in land expropriation and then the LEC. The prevention on LEC shall also be such a complex system problem, in this study it depends on entropy principle to interpret the cutting process of the energy in LEC, and construct the system dynamics model for preventive measures of LEC. Then it analyzes the evolution and prevention process of LEC by taking Wuhan as example. The studies shown that, the prevention on LEC shall be the process with the interaction between positive entropy and negative entropy, such preventive system meets the dissipation structure characteristics. When the negative entropy input was quite low and it cannot inhibit the increase of positive entropy, the probability of land expropriation shall increase accordingly.

04-10-Zhang-288.docx


Political Instability and Perceptions of Land Tenure and Governance in Zambia

Ben Ewing

The Cloudburst Group, United States of America

On August 11th, 2016 the incumbent president of Zambia, Edgar Lungu, was re-elected amid allegations of electoral fraud from his primary opponent Hakainde Hichilema. Rising tensions in Zambia and a series of events (including a motorcade confrontation and market fire) led to Hichilema’s arrest and later President Lungu’s invocation of emergency powers on July 3rd, 2017. This paper explores the effects of the political instability on perceptions of land tenure security and governance in Zambia. Specifically, this paper asks if individuals holding geographically contrarian political views exhibit lower tenure security than their peers. This is accomplished by analyzing a large-N household survey collected for the impact evaluation of U.S. Agency for International Development’s Tenure and Global Climate Change Zambia program in combination with by polling-station level election results published by the Electoral Commission of Zambia.

04-10-Ewing-942_paper.pdf
04-10-Ewing-942_ppt.pptx


 
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