# Effects of Land Misallocation on Capital Allocations in India

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## Objectives

Understand misallocation in factors and financial markets

- Explore the impact of Land and Building (L&B) misallocation on access to finance:
  - Overall
  - Young entrants
  - Gender dimension

### What is Misallocation?

• Firm ranking by factor usage should reflect their relative productivity ranking and be perfectly correlated in optimum allocation.

 Duranton et al. compute Misallocation indices based on Olley-Pakes (1996)

$$M_g = -(\Phi_g - \overline{\varphi}_g) = -n \operatorname{cov}_g(s_i, \varphi_i)$$

## Why misallocation in L&B Important for Access to Finance?

- Access to finance is critical for entrepreneurship/growth/firm productivity/extent of formality
- Lack of collateral constrains access to external finance
- Land is the strongest form of collateral: highest shares of firms using this & the amount that can be lent against this
- Poor allocation in the collateral inputs is likely going to distort access to finance.

### Duranton et al. Earlier results

#### Within Indian districts:

• Factor misallocation, esp. L&B, distorts output allocation: Unit SD of misallocation of land and buildings is associated with about 0.40 sd of valued added misallocation with a factor share of 0.13

- Misallocation is costly: Unit SD in factor misallocation represents
  15% of output per worker
- Benefits of reducing misallocation in L&B: Unit SD improvement is as if land supply would increase by 5 times

## Average Misallocation Metrics

	1989	1994	2000	2005	2010				
A. Baseline misallocat	ion metrics								
Organized sector									
Financial loans	-0.165	-0.111	-0.075	-0.094	0.054				
Land and building	-0.124	-0.095	-0.068	-0.114	-0.027				
Labor	-0.100	-0.081	-0.075	-0.086	-0.018				
B. Misallocation metrics without the Industry Aggregation step									
Organized sector									
Financial loans	-0.260	-0.164	-0.099	-0.140	-0.013				
Land and building	-0.215	-0.169	-0.113	-0.209	-0.092				
Labor	-0.155	-0.091	-0.090	-0.163	-0.043				
C. Misallocation metrics using OLS TFP									
Organized sector									
Financial loans	-0.114	-0.117	-0.024	-0.009	0.055				
Land and building	-0.069	-0.111	-0.037	-0.070	-0.029				
Labor	0.014	-0.016	0.004	-0.016	0.063				

### Misallocation Trends

 Misallocation in access to finance increased over time visà-vis land and buildings: Multiplicative effect?

 Gap between misallocation in output and access to external finance also widened

 Extent of misallocation in factors for combined manufacturing is lower than that in organized

### Measuring Access to Finance

Log total value of loans: district-industry level

 Intensity of loans: Total loans per total output at districtindustry level

• Misallocation in Access to Finance, à la Duranton et al.

 Sum of absolute or squared deviations between the actual loan levels of plants and their expected levels

Share of local loans accounted for by young entrants

# Access to Finance for Indian Manufacturing


 ~88% of plants in organized sector and only 8% in the unorganized sector have access to loans

 Share with external loans is increasing in the organized but declining in the unorganized sector


Large urban-rural disparities: rural locations lagging behind

 Large regional disparities in access to finance: leading Vs lagging states

### Access to Finance: Across Sectors



#### Access to Finance: Gender Dimension



## Methodology: Impact of factor Misallocation

Evaluate the effect of misallocation on access to finance

$$Y_d = \beta_0 + \sum_f \beta_f M_{d,f} + \eta_{dk} + \eta_{sy} + \eta_{ky} + e$$

## **Total Loans**

	Panel estimation with district-industry, state-year and industry-year FE									
		Using district		Using state-	Adding	Using	Misallocation	Misallocation		
	Baseline	covariates	Dropping	industry-year	employment	balanced	without industry	using OLS TFP		
	estimation	instead of FE	weights	FE	control	panel	aggregation step	metric		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
			A. Using	land and labor n	nisallocation in o	organized sect	or			
Land misallocation index	-0.083	-0.063	-0.081+	-0.081	-0.053+	-0.066	-0.062	-0.071		
	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.073)	(0.052)	(0.049)		
Labor misallocation index	0.113+	0.051	0.109+	0.108	0.047+	0.076	0.161++	0.189+++		
	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.077)	(0.026)	(0.104)	(0.064)	(0.062)		
Log employment in					1.055+++					
district-industry-year					(0.020)					
Observations	14053	14053	14053	14053	14053	6439	14053	14053		
Adjusted R-squared	0.629	0.314	0.631	0.629	0.817	0.611	0.629	0.630		
		1	B. Using land	and labor misall	ocation in total r	nanufacturing	sector			
Land misallocation index	0.013	-0.041	0.007	0.005	-0.058+	-0.041	-0.051	-0.013		
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.033)	(0.070)	(0.054)	(0.058)		
Labor misallocation index	-0.045	-0.069	-0.054	-0.039	0.014	0.032	0.240+++	0.244+++		
	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.031)	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.063)		
Log employment in					1.057+++					
district-industry-year					(0.020)					
Observations	14053	14053	14053	14053	14053	6439	14053	14053		
Adjusted R-squared	0.628	0.314	0.630	0.628	0.817	0.610	0.631	0.632		

## **Loan Intensity**

	Panel estimation with district-industry, state-year and industry-year FE									
	Baseline estimation	Using district covariates instead of FE	Dropping weights	Using state- industry-year FE	Adding employment control	Using balanced panel	Misallocation without industry aggregation step	Misallocation using OLS TFP metric		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
			A. Using 1	and and labor mi	sallocation in or	ganized secto	r			
Land misallocation index	-0.014 (0.026)	0.005 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.016 (0.026)	0.014 (0.028)	0.027 (0.029)	0.029 (0.028)		
Labor misallocation index	0.028 (0.028)	0.012 (0.022)	0.028 (0.029)	0.022 (0.031)	0.034 (0.027)	0.008 (0.029)	0.035 (0.031)	0.028 (0.030)		
Log employment in district-industry-year					-0.090+++ (0.020)					
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14053 0.274	14053 0.061	14053 0.291	14053 0.274	14053 0.280	6439 0.232	14053 0.275	14053 0.275		
		В	. Using land a	and labor misallo	cation in total m	anufacturing	sector			
Land misallocation index	-0.005 (0.031)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.005 (0.032)	-0.006 (0.031)	0.001 (0.031)	-0.025 (0.029)	0.014 (0.035)	0.029 (0.030)		
Labor misallocation index	0.032 (0.029)	0.044++ (0.020)	0.032 (0.030)	0.034 (0.029)	0.027 (0.028)	0.063++ (0.026)	0.049 (0.036)	0.027 (0.030)		
Log employment in district-industry-year					-0.089+++ (0.020)					
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14053 0.274	14053 0.062	14053 0.291	14053 0.274	14053 0.279	6439 0.233	14053 0.275	14053 0.275		

### Misallocation in Loans

	Panel estimation with district-industry, state-year and industry-year FE									
	Baseline estimation	Using district covariates instead of FE	Dropping weights	Using state- industry-year FE	Adding employment control	Using balanced panel	Misallocation without industry aggregation step	Misallocation using OLS TFP metric		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
			A. Using 1	and and labor mi	isallocation in or	ganized secto	r			
Land misallocation index	0.389+++ (0.049)	0.376+++ (0.036)	0.371+++ (0.049)	0.389+++ (0.051)	0.389+++ (0.049)	0.451+++ (0.048)	0.476+++ (0.053)	0.476+++ (0.051)		
Labor misallocation index	0.266+++ (0.065)	0.265+++ (0.050)	0.288+++ (0.064)	0.266+++ (0.067)	0.266+++ (0.065)	0.229+++ (0.068)	0.298+++ (0.053)	0.304+++ (0.052)		
Log employment in district-industry-year					-0.004 (0.014)					
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14839 0.429	14839 0.410	14839 0.444	14839 0.429	14839 0.429	6546 0.437	14839 0.542	14839 0.546		
		В	3. Using land a	and labor misallo	cation in total m	anufacturing	sector			
Land misallocation index	0.293+++ (0.064)	0.247 <del>+++</del> (0.044)	0.290+++ (0.064)	0.294+++ (0.065)	0.293+++ (0.064)	0.344+++ (0.068)	0.398+++ (0.074)	0.417+++ (0.063)		
Labor misallocation index	-0.057 (0.059)	-0.055 (0.039)	-0.053 (0.059)	-0.060 (0.061)	-0.057 (0.059)	-0.050 (0.064)	0.126+ (0.069)	0.102 (0.062)		
Log employment in district-industry-year					0.001 (0.015)					
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14839 0.217	14839 0.171	14839 0.234	14839 0.217	14839 0.217	6546 0.215	14839 0.344	14839 0.375		

### **Absolute Deviation**

			Panel est	imation with distr	rict-industry, sta	te-year and in	dustry-year FE				
	Baseline estimation	Using district covariates instead of FE	Dropping weights	Using state- industry-year FE	Adding employment control	Using balanced panel	Misallocation without industry aggregation step	Misallocation using OLS TFP metric	Using average deviation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
			A.	Using land and l	abor misallocati	ion in organize	d sector				
Land misallocation index	0.038++ (0.019)	0.036++ (0.015)	0.036+ (0.019)	0.037+ (0.020)	0.045+++ (0.016)	0.041+ (0.024)	0.055++ (0.022)	0.049++ (0.022)	0.037++ (0.018)		
Labor misallocation index	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.041++ (0.017)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.021)	-0.029+ (0.017)	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.010 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.020)		
Log employment in district-industry-year					0.224+++ (0.011)						
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14839 0.259	14839 0.097	14839 0.270	14839 0.259	14839 0.318	6546 0.224	14839 0.259	14839 0.259	14839 0.147		
	B. Using land and labor misallocation in total manufacturing sector										
Land misallocation index	0.049++ (0.025)	0.044++ (0.019)	0.047+ (0.024)	0.045+ (0.026)	0.034 (0.022)	0.057 <del>++</del> (0.027)	0.062++ (0.024)	0.044+ (0.023)	0.032 (0.026)		
Labor misallocation index	-0.034 (0.023)	-0.057 <del>+++</del> (0.018)	-0.039+ (0.023)	-0.032 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.025)	0.025 (0.025)	0.051++ (0.023)	-0.020 (0.021)		
Log employment in district-industry-year					0.223+++ (0.011)						
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14839 0.259	14839 0.098	14839 0.270	14839 0.259	14839 0.317	6546 0.225	14839 0.261	14839 0.262	14839 0.146		

## **Squared Absolute Deviation**

			Panel esti	mation with distr	ict-industry, sta	te-year and in	dustry-year FE		
	Baseline estimation	Using district covariates instead of FE	Dropping weights	Using state- industry-year FE	Adding employment control	Using balanced panel	Misallocation without industry aggregation step	Misallocation using OLS TFP metric	Using average deviation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
			A.	Using land and l	abor misallocati	ion in organize	d sector		
Land misallocation index	0.034++ (0.017)	0.023++ (0.011)	0.031+ (0.016)	0.032+ (0.019)	0.036++ (0.017)	0.034 (0.022)	0.049++ (0.019)	0.045++ (0.019)	0.025 (0.017)
Labor misallocation index	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.029++ (0.013)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.027 (0.019)	-0.047++ (0.023)	-0.021 (0.022)	-0.017 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.020)
Log employment in district-industry-year					0.080+++ (0.012)				
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14839 0.099	14839 0.036	14839 0.108	14839 0.099	14839 0.106	6546 0.132	14839 0.099	14839 0.099	14839 0.090
			B. Usin	g land and labor	misallocation in	total manufac	turing sector		
Land misallocation index	0.041+ (0.024)	0.037++ (0.015)	0.039 (0.024)	0.040 (0.026)	0.036 (0.024)	0.049+ (0.025)	0.051++ (0.023)	0.036+ (0.022)	0.026 (0.026)
Labor misallocation index	-0.034+ (0.020)	-0.037+++ (0.013)	-0.037+ (0.020)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.023 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.021)	0.016 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.020)
Log employment in district-industry-year					0.079+++ (0.012)				
Observations Adjusted R-squared	14839 0.099	14839 0.036	14839 0.108	14839 0.099	14839 0.106	6546 0.132	14839 0.099	14839 0.099	14839 0.090

## Results for Organized Sector

#### Misallocation of L&B:

Not significantly related to the intensity of loans

 A positive and significant relationship with misallocation in access to finance in the organized sector

 do not observe evidence that start-up funding is dampened due to misallocation

#### Estimation concerns:

- Omitted Variables: Fixed effects perhaps rule this out
- Reverse Causality: Misallocation in financial markets driving land market distortions
- Liquidating high value land assets in events of shocks to resolve financing problems
  - Without access to finance, use of L&B may be inefficient
- Possible Instrument: Misallocation in the Unorganized sector
- Indian financing markets appear mostly distinct, whereas land markets do not (95% of loans but 45% of L&B assets)
- Exclusion restriction: Increase in L&B misallocation in informal sector impacts loan markets for organized sector firms through overall misallocation L&B (possibly true due to small loan shares)

## **IV** Estimations

	Baseline OLS										
	estimation with district-industry, state-	ED OI S actimation	FD IV estimation	Column 3 with log	Column 3 with log employment change						
	year, and industry-	with state-year and	with state-year and	_	control and extra IV	Column 3 using					
	year FE	industry-year FE	industry-year FE	control	lags	average deviations					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)					
		A. Absolute deviations in expected and actual loans									
Land misallocation index	0.049++ (0.025)	0.047 <del>++</del> (0.024)	0.129 (0.111)	0.159+ (0.093)	0.146++ (0.058)	0.141 (0.091)					
Labor misallocation index	-0.034 (0.023)	-0.037 (0.024)	-0.126 (0.124)	-0.089 (0.106)	-0.060 (0.065)	-0.042 (0.100)					
Log employment in district-industry-year				0.221+++ (0.013)	0.222+++ (0.012)	ļ					
Observations Overid test p-value	14852	8525	8525	8525	8525 0.823	8525					
		B.	Squared deviations in	expected and actual lo	oans						
Land misallocation index	0.041+ (0.024)	0.036 (0.025)	0.229++ (0.105)	0.239++ (0.103)	0.169++ (0.068)	0.205++ (0.097)					
Labor misallocation index	-0.034 (0.020)	-0.032 (0.022)	-0.141 (0.105)	-0.129 (0.105)	-0.045 (0.069)	-0.112 (0.096)					
Log employment in district-industry-year				0.072+++ (0.015)	0.074 <del>+++</del> (0.015)						
Observations Overid test p-value	14852	8525	8525	8525	8525 0.492	8525					

### Conclusions

Large disparities in access by sector, region, gender

 Misallocation of L&B is positively and significantly associated with access to financial loans for manufacturing firms

 Misallocation in labor inputs does not significantly impact the allocative efficiency of financial loans in the organized sector