Open banking policies have been introduced by many governments to foster innovation in financial services, yet evidence on their effects on competition remains limited. I construct a novel dataset of fintech app source code and exploit cross-country variation in open banking availability within the same app to identify the impact of open banking on fintechs. I find that open banking significantly boosts fintech app usage and performance, with the strongest gains for data-intensive apps, fintech startups, and during the pandemic when access to traditional banking was limited. Textual analysis of app descriptions shows that incumbent banks most exposed to open banking suffer declines in loan issuance and income but respond strategically by raising fee intensity and improving earning efficiency. The findings are consistent with theories that open banking reduces barriers to entry by weakening banks' monopoly power over consumer data.

We study the demand for safety and liquidity in the crypto ecosystem. We do so under a framework in which a representative investor allocates liquidity between stablecoin deposits in lending pools and traditional safe assets (e.g., MMF shares). Our model delivers three main predictions: (i) the stablecoin deposit premium co-moves with the Treasury premium when investors value the safety and liquidity services of stablecoins; (ii) increases in Treasury supply reduce the stablecoin deposit premium; and (iii) drops in the perceived safety and liquidity of stablecoin deposits (e.g., due to de-pegs or hacker attacks) reduce their premium. Using granular data from hundreds of DeFi pools spanning multiple protocols, tokens, and blockchains, we find evidence supporting these predictions. Investors treat stablecoin deposits as money-like instruments, whose sensitivity to stress reveals their fragility.

We study whether regulated semiliquid funds can successfully democratize private assets and improve retail investors’ risk-adjusted performance. Using interval funds, which invest in illiquid assets while offering periodic redemptions, we show retail investors face a trade-off between agency frictions and liquidity premia. Managers generate positive risk-adjusted returns in illiquid, information-insensitive markets, especially credit, but underperform in liquid, information-sensitive strategies, consistent with weak flow-based incentives. Outperformance originates from distribution yields rather than NAV appreciation and is amplified by leverage and portfolio illiquidity. Retail investors benefit from co-investing alongside sophisticated investors, whose stable capital supports illiquid exposure and improves liquidity transformation.