Conference Agenda
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 22nd July 2026, 07:14:45pm CEST
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Daily Overview |
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AP 14: Imperfect Competition and Asset Prices
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ID: 1402
Data, Markups, and Asset Prices 1University of Toronto, Canada; 2University of Oxford; 3University of Warwick; 4University of Manchester This paper studies the implications of data technology for firm dynamics and asset prices. We develop a heterogeneous firm model in which firms optimally hire data scientists to learn about unobserved consumer preferences. Data enhances firms’ demand forecasting accuracy, enabling them to charge higher markups. Firms that are constrained in expanding production capacity have stronger incentives to hire data scientists. This results in countercyclical data scientist hiring, which amplifies firms’ exposure to aggregate risk via the operating leverage channel. Using a novel dataset that tracks firms’ employment of data scientists, we document three key empirical findings that support the model’s main mechanisms: firms with a higher share of data scientists exhibit larger markups, higher information quality, and higher stock returns.
ID: 410
Moral Hazard and Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets Columbia Business School, United States of America When financial intermediaries invest on behalf of clients, they exert effort that clients cannot contract on and compete when trading assets. I develop a model in which the resulting moral hazard and degree of competition interact through market clearing, so that the incentive contracts clients offer intermediaries depend on how many intermediaries compete. I show that greater competition can tighten incentive constraints and reduce welfare. Pricing patterns in proprietary Canadian equity data are consistent with both frictions, and, read through the lens of the model, suggest a welfare loss from greater competition. This calls for coordinating competition and conduct regulation.
ID: 1886
Granular Markups and Inflation Surge: The Role of Managerial Incentives 1University of Minnesota, United States of America; 2Indiana University; 3University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; 4NBER & CEPR We develop a novel methodology to estimate firm-specific markup premiums using highly granular product-level data that controls for common shocks, isolating the premium as a residual. We validate this measure by comparing it to existing accounting-based estimates and by showing that it exhibits expected correlations with firm size and market share. Unlike traditional approaches, our method can be applied to both public and private firms, enabling an analysis of how financial structure and managerial incentives influence pricing decisions. We find that financial structure matters: public firms systematically increase markups following an IPO. Moreover, during the 2021--2022 inflation surge, publicly listed firms expanded their margins by capitalizing on inflationary pressures---especially among firms with high retail ownership, large early-pandemic stock declines, and strong equity-based pay incentives.
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