Conference Agenda
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 22nd July 2026, 06:03:05pm CEST
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FI 07: Monetary Policy Transmission
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ID: 1733
Monetary Policy, Insurers, and Real Estate Markets 1Bank for International Settlements, Switzerland; 2University of Iowa; 3Harvard Business School This paper uncovers a novel channel of monetary policy transmission to real estate markets through the structure of life insurers' balance sheets. We analyze the universe of U.S. life insurers, which, with \$800 billion in non-securitized mortgage loan holdings, are major non-bank suppliers of real estate credit. We find that insurers increase commercial and residential mortgage lending and lower associated rate spreads when policy rates rise, a pattern that contrasts with that of banks. Our evidence suggests that the shrinkage of duration gaps as policy rates rise enables re-allocation towards shorter-duration mortgage loans. To isolate the drivers of credit supply, we exploit cross-sectional variation in insurer characteristics, monetary policy shocks, and granular time-varying fixed effects. We provide preliminary evidence that traces the real effects of insurer lending on property prices and rents.
ID: 1669
The liquidity promise of QE 1VU Amsterdam; 2European Central Bank, Germany; 3Boston College; 4MIT This paper uses confidential portfolio holdings data to show that corporate quantitative easing (QE) operates primarily through a liquidity demand channel. By acting as a standing buyer, the central bank enhances bond liquidity, raising demand from liquidity-sensitive investors. The impact on prices crucially depends on investor heterogeneity. Mutual funds rebalance toward eligible bonds, while banks and foreign investors are net sellers. As a result, mutual funds amplify the transmission of QE to bond prices. QE mainly compresses the CDS-bond basis with limited effect on default premia. Even during balance sheet unwinding, the implicit liquidity backstop persists, muting quantitative tightening effects.
ID: 586
Market-Priced Savings, Bank Deposit Market Power, and Monetary Policy Transmission 1Danmarks Nationalbank; 2European Central Bank; 3University of Zurich Banks' deposit market power is customer-specific: depositors who hold stocks, bonds, or investment fund shares (market-priced savings, MPS) have stronger outside options and therefore more elastic deposit demand. Using Danish administrative data linking the universe of deposit accounts to each depositor's complete investment portfolio, we show that banks price this elasticity: MPS holders receive a 6.6 bps larger deposit-rate increase per 100 bps policy-rate increase than comparable non-holders at the same bank in the same year. The premium opens when depositors acquire MPS and fades when they sell these assets. Inheritances following unexpected parental deaths provide exogenous variation: heirs who inherit stocks or bonds see pass-through rise 3 to 6 pp relative to heirs inheriting cash or real estate. Higher pass-through only partially offsets MPS holders' greater elasticity: per 100 bps of tightening, they reduce deposits 2.4 pp more, and the resulting funding pressure leads high-MPS banks to cut lending.
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