We study how the organization of information production---and its response to economic and technological forces---affects informational efficiency, credit allocation, and borrower risk. Using U.S. administrative data linking mortgage applications to loan officers and subsequent loan performance, we show that underwriting facilitated by officers located close to the borrower increases approval rates without worsening ex-post performance or processing speed, but is not always deployed where it is most valuable, because lenders allocate loan-officer labor elastically with respect to local wages. These gains are especially large for observably riskier borrowers. We develop and estimate a model that combines a core information-production problem over latent borrower risk, an endogenous choice over local versus remote underwriting, and equilibrium in mortgage and labor markets. We find substantial baseline credit rationing---up to 15 percent in high-risk segments---with local officers eliminating roughly half of it while also reducing excessively risky approvals. A technology shock that raises the processing productivity of remote officers induces lenders to substitute away from local screening, lowering informational efficiency, increasing excessively risky approvals and expected defaults, and tightening rationing for marginal borrowers despite only modest reductions in interest rates.