We study compensation in markets for expert advice. We document how a large class of client-facing professionals (lawyers, financial advisors, real estate agents) have employee forgivable loans — compensation advances structured as debt that employers can accelerate upon underperformance and separation. Analyzing millions of regulatory filings from the US securities industry, we illustrate how financial advisors routinely borrow 3-4 times their annual income, in ways that are entirely undisclosed to customers and credit bureaus, then spend the loan proceeds to lever up. Loans default, becoming the largest source of financial advisor delinquencies, and are conflicted, as advisors fund the resulting liquidity demands by defrauding their clients. Using a regression discontinuity design, we estimate that up to a third of all misconduct at large securities firms after the financial crisis is attributable to forgivable loans. We discuss reasons why firms may design compensation that incentivizes misconduct.