This paper studies the relationship between the growth in private capital markets, the decline in public market listings, and the rise in economic inequalities over the last two decades in the US. We do so by exploiting novel data sources and the expansion in 2009-2010 of an exemption from capital gains tax for investments in startup companies, which made it more attractive for hight-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) to invest in them. Using difference-in-differences techniques, we first show that the expansion of the tax exemption explains 40% of the overall growth in US HNWIs’ investments in early-stage companies between 2008 and 2019. We then document that HNWIs’ early-stage investments increased the probability that companies qualified for the tax exemption stayed private by 6.6% on average in the post-reform period. Finally, we estimate that capital gains from early-stage investments account for 15% and 6%, respectively, of the overall growth in the top 1% shares of taxable income and wealth since the onset of the global financial crisis.

Student loan forgiveness has been proposed as a means to alleviate soaring student loan burdens. This paper uses administrative credit bureau data to study the distributional, consumption, borrowing, and employment effects of the largest event of student loan forgiveness in history. Beginning in March 2021, the United States federal government ordered $132 billion in student loans cancelled, or 7.8% of the total $1.7 trillion in outstanding student debt. We estimate that forgiven borrowers’ predicted monthly earnings were $115 higher than borrowers who receive forgiveness and $193 more than the general population. We find that student loan forgiveness led to increases in mortgage, auto, and credit card debt by 9 cents for every dollar forgiven. Borrowers’ monthly earnings and employment fell, at increasing rates for each month post forgiveness. The implied Marginal Propensities for Consumption (MPC) and Earnings (MPE) are 0.27 and -0.49, respectively.

Despite policy aims to support income and employment, we show that U.S. households in counties more exposed to protective tariffs spend less over time. Spending declines coincide with falling wages and persist after accounting for exposure to pass-through and retaliatory tariffs. Reductions in both quantities and prices point to a demand-driven contraction. Effects are stronger when tariffs target capital rather than consumption goods, and are concentrated among working-class Americans, who subsequently cut discretionary spending. We underscore the vertical integration of U.S. and Chinese firms within tariff-targeted industries. Protectionism does not benefit domestic labor market and may risk local household welfare.