This paper uses textual analysis and plausibly exogenous instruments based on out-of-industry geographic connections and director networks to assess the role of trade associations in forming corporate strategies. Companies are most likely to join trade associations when they are older and larger, and when risk is lower and sales are declining. Joining associations then induces members to increase profits and markups, improve risk management, find acquisition partners and improve efficiency. To assess mechanisms regarding higher profits, we consider product pricing strategies and high dimensional analysis of market-exclusivity in how firms expand geographically across U.S. states. Overall, we find strong support for the conclusion that associations bring mutually beneficial gains to their members and their industries, and some evidence of an externality in the form of anti-competitive market-exclusion strategies.

We develop a measure of managers’ negotiation skill based on their vehicle purchase price and connect it to observed price dispersion in business-to-business contracting. Using proprietary data on insurance claims between hospitals and private insurers, we find that hospital managers with higher negotiation skill achieve better outcomes, both for the average price per service and for identical procedures at the same hospital. Evidence from both management turnovers for natural causes as well as shocks to insurer bargaining position supports a causal interpretation. Lastly, we structurally estimate a model to quantify the impact of managers’ personal negotiation skill on hospital bargaining power. Counterfactual simulations imply that heterogeneity in managers’ negotiation skills account for over 5% of the price dispersion observed in the data.

Poor product market conditions can drive firms into distress, but a public signal of insolvency, such as filing for bankruptcy, further affects performance via operational adjustments and actions of competitors. Leveraging big data on millions of retail transactions, we estimate the multifaceted consequences of bankruptcy, disentangling the role of prices and quantities in the performance of bankrupt firms and their competitors. Firms that file for bankruptcy discontinue their supply to entire geographies, especially economically disadvantaged, underserved locations. While these firms also withdraw products, they tend to retain products with higher beta---our novel measure of a product's riskiness based on the sensitivity of its sales to aggregate consumption---suggesting a growth-option strategy that bets on upside potential during economic expansions. Rivals engage in price wars at the locations where they directly compete with similar products of firms in bankruptcy. Only firms undergoing liquidation engage in ``fire sales,'' while firms that eventually emerge from bankruptcy maintain their prices on par with competitors.