We document that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision, which increased in the ability of the wealthy to finance political campaigns, the share of total electoral giving attributable to top 1% donors increased by 2.7 times. Further, we find that the voting by U.S. legislators became more responsive to the preferences of the wealthy post-Citizens United and less responsive to the preferences of the less affluent. The increase in legislators’ alignment with the wealthy is most pronounced for the bills that deal with fiscal matters and for those bills on which the preferences of higher- and lower-income individuals diverge. Finally, it is the politicians who receive a larger share of their campaign funding from the top 1% donors that are more likely to shift their voting toward the preferences of the wealthy. Overall, our results highlight the importance of campaign finance in changing the nature of political representation in the United States.

China's Five-Year Plans (industrial policies targeting specificc industries) displace US production/employment and heighten plant closures in the same industries. The shocks were not anticipated by the US stock market, but firms in the treated industries suffer valuation loss afterwards. Firms adjust by shifting production to upstream or downstream industries beneting from the boost, or offshoring to government-endorsed industries in China. Such within-firm adjustments offset negative shocks among firms with preexisting toeholds in the "beneficiary" industries or production overseas, suggesting a novel role of diversification. Financial access and labor fluidity are essential for firms to withstand global economic shocks.

Using detailed public procurement data from 15 million item purchases in Brazil spanning 2005-2021, our analysis uncovers a prevalent bid-rigging pattern: the lowest bidder, referred to as 'kamikaze,' typically withdraws after the auction concludes, paving the way for the second-lowest bid to emerge as the winner. This pattern is observed in 15-20% of procurement auctions and results in 15-17% higher procurement prices. Kamikaze and winning firms are more likely to share owners, suggesting collusion. This bid-rigging behavior correlates with negative outcomes, such as increased mortality rates in public hospitals and more road accidents following road service contracts.