Unlike labor income, human capital is inseparable from individuals and does not completely accrue to creditors, even at default. As a consequence, human capital investment should be more resilient to “debt overhang” than labor supply. We develop a dynamic model displaying this important difference. We find that while both labor supply and human capital investment are hump-shaped in leverage, human capital investment tails off less aggressively as leverage builds up. This is especially the case when human capital depreciation rates are lower. Importantly, because skills acquisition is only valuable when households expect to supply labor in the future, the anticipated greater reduction in labor supply due to debt overhang back-propagates into a reduction in skills acquisition ex ante. Using longitudinal data, we provide empirical support for the model.

We combine the Decennial Census, credit reports, and administrative earnings to create the first panel dataset linking parent's credit access to the labor market outcomes of children in the U.S. We find that a 10\% increase in parent's unused revolving credit during their children's adolescence (13 to 18 years old) is associated with 0.28\% to 0.37\% greater labor earnings of their children during early adulthood (25 to 30 years old). Using these empirical elasticities, we estimate a dynastic, defaultable debt model to examine how the democratization of credit since the 1970s -- modeled as both greater credit limits and more lenient bankruptcy -- affected intergenerational mobility. Surprisingly, we find that the democratization of credit led to less intergenerational mobility and greater inequality. Two offsetting forces underlie this result: (1) greater credit limits raise mobility by facilitating borrowing and investment among low-income households; (2) however, more lenient bankruptcy policy lowers mobility since low-income households dissave, hit their constraints more often, and reduce investments in their children. Quantitatively, the democratization of credit is dominated by more lenient bankruptcy policy and so mobility declines between the 1970s and 2000s.

How does the design of debt repayment schedules affect household borrowing? To answer this question, we exploit a Swedish policy reform that eliminated interest-only mortgages for loan-to-value ratios above 50%. We document substantial bunching at the threshold, leading to 5\% less borrowing. Wealthy borrowers drive the results, challenging credit constraints as the primary explanation. We develop a model to evaluate the mechanisms driving household behavior and find that much of the effect comes from households experiencing ongoing flow disutility to amortization payments. Our results indicate that mortgage contracts with low initial payments substantially increase household borrowing and lifetime interest costs.