Using comprehensive auto loan data from Europe, we document a gap in financing terms between Electric Vehicles (EVs) and non-EVs. EVs, compared to non-electric models in the same car family or pair, are financed with higher interest rates, lower loan-to-value ratios, and shorter loan durations. We show that the primary driver of this EV financing gap is the technological risk associated with EVs. The rapid and uncertain evolution of EV technologies accelerates technology obsolescence, diminishing the resale value of EVs. In response, lenders charge higher interest rates on EV loans. Consumer demographics, lenders' market power, and macroeconomic factors contribute minimally to the EV financing gap. Overall our findings highlight that technological carbon-transition risk is priced in financing terms of green durable assets consumption.

Using establishment-level data, we show that firms operating in multiple counties in the United States respond to heat-related damages by reducing employment in the affected locations and increasing it in unaffected locations. Such employment reallocation increases with the severity of damages, is stronger among larger and financially stable firms with more ESG-oriented investors, and is aided by credit availability and competitive labor markets. Reallocation is observed also at the extensive margin of opening of establishments. In the cross-section of industries and the choice of reallocation counties, firm response appears to be aimed at preventing heat-related decline in productivity. In contrast, single-location firms simply downsize in response to heat-related damages. Overall, the mitigation response of multi-establishment firms acts as a "heat insulator" for the economy by reducing the impact of heat shocks on aggregate employment even as it redistributes activity spatially.

A common concern is that ambitious climate policy is---at least in parts---obstructed by corporate lobbying activities. We quantify corporate anti- and pro-climate lobbying expenses, identify the largest corporate lobbyists and their motives, establish how climate lobbying relates to corporate business models, and document whether and how climate lobbying is priced in financial markets. Firms spend on average $277k per year on anti-climate lobbying ($185k on pro-climate lobbying). Recently, firms have tried to camouflage their climate lobbying activities. Large anti-climate lobbyists have more carbon-intensive business models and face more climate-related incidents in the future. Firms that spend more on anti-climate lobbying earn higher returns, probably because of a risk premium. Their stock prices went up when the Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade Bill failed, and down when the Inflation Reduction Act was announced.