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Session Overview
FIIT-3: Dealers and market power
Friday, 23/Aug/2019:
13:30 - 15:00

Session Chair: Katrin Tinn, Imperial College Business School
Location: D -114

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Taking Orders and Taking Notes: Dealer Information Sharing in Treasury Auctions

Nina Boyarchenko2, David Lucca2, Laura Veldkamp1

1Columbia Business School, United States of America; 2Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Discussant: Christine Parlour (UC Berkeley)

The use of order flow information by financial firms has come to the forefront of the regulatory debate. A central question is: Should a dealer who acquires information by taking client orders be allowed to use or share that information? We explore how information sharing affects dealers, clients and issuer revenues in U.S. Treasury auctions. Because one cannot observe alternative information regimes, we build a model, calibrate it to auction results data, and use it to quantify counter-factuals. We estimate that yearly auction revenues would be \$2.4 billion higher with full-information sharing with clients and between dealers. When information sharing enables collusion, the collusion costs revenue; but if dealers share information with clients, prohibiting information sharing may cost more. For investors, the welfare effects of information sharing depend on how information is shared. The model shows that investors can benefit when dealers share information with each other, not when they share more with clients.

efa2019-FIIT-3-140-Taking Orders and Taking Notes.pdf

Prime Broker Exposures, Collateral, and Resilience in Hedge Fund Credit Networks

Mathias S Kruttli2,4, Phillip J Monin3, Sumudu W Watugala1,4

1Cornell University; 2Federal Reserve Board of Governors; 3Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury; 4Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance, University of Oxford

Discussant: Lingling Zheng (Renmin University of China)

The collapse of Lehman Brothers illustrated the importance of managing prime broker counterparty risks for hedge funds. The central role of prime brokers and hedge funds in financial intermediation also makes understanding their credit dynamics a financial stability concern. While the hedge fund-prime broker credit network is highly concentrated, the average hedge fund in our sample borrows from three prime brokers and has a total credit exposure of $2.15 billion. We show that hedge fund borrowing tends to be overcollateralized and most of the collateral is allowed to be rehypothecated. Using a within fund-quarter empirical strategy, we identify the effects of an idiosyncratic liquidity shock to a major creditor. Such a shock results in significantly reduced borrowing due to the prime broker reducing credit supply instead of a precautionary reduction in credit demand from connected hedge funds. Borrowing by funds with more rehypothecable collateral is less affected because such collateral improves the constrained creditor's liquidity situation. Even large hedge funds simultaneously borrowing from multiple creditors see a significant reduction in their aggregate borrowing following the shock. Larger, more connected and better-performing hedge funds and those that do less OTC trading are better able to compensate for this loss.

efa2019-FIIT-3-1646-Prime Broker Exposures, Collateral, and Resilience.pdf

Risk-Sharing and Investment in Concentrated Markets

Daniel Neuhann, Michael Sockin

University of Texas at Austin, United States of America

Discussant: Nuno Coimbra (Paris School of Economics)

We study investment and risk sharing in complete markets when agents internalize their impact on asset prices. Quantity shading of state-contingent claims by buyers and sellers generates excess exposure to idiosyncratic risk and low asset pledgeability. This depresses investment, the risk-free rate, and aggregate productivity. Rents from market power distort and misalign agents' marginal valuations of state-contingent returns, rendering risk-sharing constrained inefficient and as if markets were competitive but incomplete. When there is limited commitment, sellers face borrowing constraints that limit their ability to strategically restrict supply, thereby reallocating market power to buyers. When markets are decentralized, agents distort investment to capture arbitrage profits by acting as pass-through intermediaries.

efa2019-FIIT-3-1121-Risk-Sharing and Investment in Concentrated Markets.pdf

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