Conference Agenda

Tips to navigate the program:

  • Overview of all papers on a specific day: click on the day (e.g. Date: Thursday, 24/Aug/2019). To download papers, you will need to access the session by clicking on its title first.
  • Program index: click on the Authors tab below.
  • Location name: to display all sessions taking place in that room
  • Search box: to search for authors, papers and sessions.

Please notes that changes in the program might occur.

If your name is not displayed in the program, please register in our conference system.

If your paper information is not up to date, please send us an email at

Registration to the conference closes on August 1st, 2019:

Session Overview
ECB-1: Interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies, impact of regulations and spillover across the financial sector
Friday, 23/Aug/2019:
10:30 - 12:00

Session Chair: Angela Maria Maddaloni, European Central Bank
Location: D -112

Show help for 'Increase or decrease the abstract text size'

Bank Market Power and Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence from a Structural Estimation

Yufeng Wu1, Yifei Wang2, Toni Whited2, Kairong Xiao3

1University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; 2University of Michigan; 3Columbia University

Discussant: Frank de Jong (Tilburg University)

We quantify the impact of bank market power on the pass-through of monetary policy to borrowers. To this end, we estimate a dynamic banking model in which monetary tightening increases banks' funding costs. Given their market power, banks optimally choose how much of a rate increase to pass on to borrowers. In the model, banks are subject to capital and reserve regulations, which also influence the degree of pass-through. Compared with the conventional regulation-based channels, we find that in the two most recent decades, bank market power explains a significant portion of monetary transmission. The quantitative effect is comparable in magnitude to the bank capital channel. In addition, the market power channel interacts with the bank capital channel, and this interaction can reverse the effect of monetary policy when the Federal Funds rate is low.

efa2019-ECB-1-679-Bank Market Power and Monetary Policy Transmission.pdf

Inspecting the Mechanism of Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area

Francois Koulischer1, Ralph Koijen2, Motohiro Yogo3, Benoit Nguyen4

1Universite du Luxembourg, Luxembourg; 2Chicago Booth Business School; 3Princeton University; 4Banque de France

Discussant: Catherine Koch (Bank for International Settlements)

Using new security-level portfolio holdings data in the euro area by country and investor type, we study how investors rebalance in response to the European Central Bank’s (ECB) purchase programme that started in March 2015. To quantify changes in risk concentration, we estimate the evolution of the distribution of duration, sovereign, and corporate credit risk exposures across investors and geographies. We find that 70% of ECB purchases are sold by the foreign sector and that risk mismatch, if anything, reduces. We use an instrumental variables estimator to show that the average impact on yields was -13bp. We connect the portfolio rebalancing and price effects by estimating a sector-level asset demand system for government debt.

efa2019-ECB-1-597-Inspecting the Mechanism of Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area.pdf

Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers

Carlo Altavilla1, Miguel Boucinha1, José-Luis Peydró2,3,4,5,6, Frank Smets1

1ECB; 2ICREA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra; 3CREI; 4Barcelona GSE; 5Imperial College London; 6CEPR

Discussant: Natalya Martynova (Deutsche Bundesbank)

We analyse the role of banking supervision for banks’ risk-taking behaviour, and its interactions with monetary policy. We exploit a new, proprietary dataset based on 15 European credit registers, in conjunction with the centralization of bank supervision for some banks at the supranational level, over a period of unprecedented monetary policy action. We find that: (1) banks with higher ex-ante non-performing loans (NPL) supply more credit toward riskier firms, with identical effects for banks headquartered in stressed and non-stressed countries. Results are identical to considering a measure of NPL that excludes the borrower’s industry, and also to the inclusion of a large set of controls, such as borrower-lending matching and time-varying unobserved borrower and lender fundamentals that explain 70 p.p. of the R-squared, thereby suggesting strong exogeneity of our results to credit demand and other bank characteristics; (2) For banks operating in stressed countries only, centralized supervision compresses lending to riskier firms, although by a smaller extent for banks with higher NPL. Effects are similar if we include only banks around the threshold of eligibility for centralized supervision, and effects are only significant after the centralization of supervision; (3) Monetary policy easing increases bank risk-taking, but– only in stressed countries– this is partly offset by centralized supervision, with weaker effects for banks with higher NPLs. Overall, results show that leveraging on multiple credit registers –as done in this paper for the first time– is crucial for analysing heterogeneous effects and for the external validity.

efa2019-ECB-1-1806-Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking.pdf

Contact and Legal Notice · Contact Address:
Conference: EFA 2019
Conference Software - ConfTool Pro 2.6.129+TC
© 2001 - 2019 by Dr. H. Weinreich, Hamburg, Germany