Conference Agenda

In this paper we present reflections from our philosophical and experimental investigation of Improv as a method for collaborative philosophical inquiry and begin to explore its implication for educational practice.

Academic conferences create opportunities for a variety of different actions and interactions – some individualistic, others collaborative; some combative, others marked by openness and curiosity. At the same time, how we ‘do philosophy’ with others in institutionalised contexts is also limited by many factors, such as the cultural norms of academia and deeply established, habitual forms of interaction. These norms lay out an implicit curriculum (in Eisner’s 1979 sense) that enables and constrains particular kinds of knowing, interacting and learning. For example, typically, ‘doing philosophy’ together often implies debate, and tends to be competitive; we seek flaws in our opponent’s arguments and focus on defending rather than changing our own points of view.

We believe that philosophy understood as a “a game of wits” (147) and “epideixis - an exhibition” made up of an audience, strategy and clear goals for demonstration, as described by Huizinga in Homo Ludens (1949), is educationally and philosophically disabling. It sets certain limitations on our ability to learn from and with each other, and generate new ideas in the pursuit of philosophy understood as the “love of wisdom". While forming nuanced arguments in favour of one’s position can deepen an idea, it can also close off potential symbioses, disruptions, and cross-pollination. Similarly, through years of cultivating certain ways of thinking, we can get straightjacketed by our cherished concepts, either through force of habit, attachment to professional capital we believe they bring, a simple fear of change, or some other limitation.

Our premise is that when overemphasised, this way of doing philosophy, runs counter to playful and exploratory approaches to philosophising that have occurred historically, and continues to occur in informal contexts, other cultures, and in children (Huizinga 1949; Kline Hunnicutt 2009). Importantly, we believe it also runs counter to philosophy in its original meaning. Philosophy, as we all know, has as its etymology the “love of wisdom.” If loving wisdom is worth pursuing, and indeed loving the very pursuit, are our current practices optimised for such aims? Or do we foreground values, practices and relationships that divert personal and collective attention from such pursuits? We investigate Improv as a complementary kind of ‘game’ that foregrounds an understanding of philosophy as the collective pursuit of wisdom, and prioritises this aim.

Improv, as we understand it here, is a particular kind of playful transactional relationship that is both productively disruptive and generative. Its guiding principle is ‘yes, and…,’ which means participants have to respond affirmatively to what their fellow collaborators do. They are challenged to find a way to take on board whatever is offered, and to contribute an offering in turn as a new point of departure for subsequent responses. Through their contribution, each participant sets the possibilities of what will follow, and yet the process remains open-ended and capable of evolving in indeterminate ways. Improv asks us to set fixed habits, concepts of self, other beliefs and epistemological commitments aside, and adopt a more open orientation towards others and their experiences and ideas.

The introduction of philosophy into schools has taken a particular tradition of philosophy as its only model. A.C. Grayling in his forward to a justly influential book looking at aspects of this movement contrasts philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ with ‘reflective and critical enquiry’ and dismisses the first as inspiring but unhelpful and that latter as the way to go (Hand et al, 2009: xviii). Much philosophy in schools has followed this approach. This paper does not seek to challenge the benefits of understanding philosophy as Grayling and his fellow travellers, but rather proposes that in the context of the increased interest on ‘well-being’ and mental health in schools other traditions of philosophy, including those dismissed as ‘wisdom loving’ might actually be beneficial. An example of an alternative is Hellenistic therapeutic philosophy. I contrast two approaches to understanding this tradition to show that Grayling’s contrast is ill-informed because ‘wisdom’ traditions include critical thinking.