Veranstaltungsprogramm

In recent years, Eastern Europe has evolved into a remarkable experimental field for "democratic innovations" at the local level. Poland, for example, had the largest number of participatory budgets in Europe in 2021, with Ukraine following close behind in fourth place. While Steffen Mau (2024) suggests a 'laboratory of participation' for eastern Germany to counter the stated crisis of representation and trust in democracy, the culture of democratic participation he hopes for further east already seems to be in full swing. At the same time, political trust is significantly lower in Eastern Europen than in Western European countries.

The paper discusses how the largely overlooked boom of participatory programmes in Eastern Europe can inform the conceptualization of social and political trust in democracies. So far, political trust has been measured predominantly as the equivalent of political approval. However, this narrow approach does not allow for an adequate understanding of the social origins of the stated crisis of trust, nor does it consider civil society groups that point to political grievances and are, therefore, sceptical of the established parties but not of the democratic order as such. Instead, following on from John Dewey's pragmatist considerations, the article presents for discussion a socially contextualized understanding of democratic trust that encompasses both consent and legitimate criticism and resistance to political conditions. The paper argues that democratic trust is generated through everyday interactions between citizens and political representatives facilitated in local participatory programmes and mediated by mutual expectations and their (non-) fulfilment.

I draw on Ukraine's example to analyse how civic participation shapes social and political trust. The (Euro) Maidan protests of 2013-14, played a crucial role in shaping civic participation. On the one hand, political trust has been extremely precarious in Ukraine since its independence. On the other hand, participatory programmes were implemented post-protests to improve the relationship between citizens, local authorities, and politicians. Finally, the article delves into the transfer potential of the empirical and conceptual findings to other European countries, particularly on differences between Eastern and Western Europe.

Die Europäische Union ist massiv von Sicherheitsdiskursen geprägt. Diese nehmen vor allem die Form von Schutzdiskursen an, welche auch die Wahrnehmung der Rolle des östlichen Europa in der EU prägen, etwa Debatten über den Krieg Russlands in der Ukraine sowie über die potenzielle militärische und infrastrukturelle Gefährdung angrenzender NATO-Staaten. Zugleich werden soziale Minderheiten europaweit im politischen Diskurs vor allem von rechtsgerichteten, populistischen und zunehmend auch konservativen politischen Kräfte als Sicherheitsproblem gerahmt, vor allem Migrant:innen und LGBTQ*. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt der Beitrag die Frage, ob Reaktionen von Minderheiten im östlichen Europa auf ihre eigene Bedrohtheit paradigmatische Bedeutung für die Analyse entsprechender Prozesse in der gesamten EU haben könnten. Theoretischer Ausgangspunkt des Beitrags sind Debatten in der interdisziplinären kritischen Sicherheitsforschung. Der Wert dieser Ansätze für die soziologische, insbesondere politisch-soziologische, Theoriebildung liegt darin, dass Sicherheit eine zentrale Referenz und ein dynamisierender Faktor gesellschaftlicher ‚Transitionen‘ ist. In ihrer Anrufung, Einforderung und Verweigerung verbinden sich semantische Unterbestimmtheit und Ausdeutbarkeit mit Dringlichkeitseinforderung und Sinnverdichtung. Auf dieser Grundlage analysiert der Beitrag Taktiken von Minderheiten, deren Sicherheit und Schutz akut gefährdet ist. Er fokussiert auf mit der Kriegssituation in der Ukraine konfrontierte LGBTQ* in der Ukraine, Polen und Deutschland. Auf der Grundlage einer Analyse öffentlich zugänglicher Dokumente von LGBTQ*-Organisationen, -Netzwerken und dem internationalen Mediendiskurs werden deren Taktiken beschrieben und mit Blick auf ihre möglichen Effekte auf die Taktiken von LGBTQ* in der (zukünftigen) EU diskutiert und theoretisch an die kritische Sicherheitsforschung rückgebunden. Dabei werden Verbindungslinien gezogen: a) zur Möglichkeit der Reaktualisierung einer Semantik von Sicherheit, die nicht allen Schutz, sondern auch Emanzipation ins Zentrum stellt; b) zur Frage, ob es in Gewaltorganisationen wie dem Militär ‚safe spaces‘ für gesellschaftlich benachteiligte Gruppen geben kann; c) zur Beziehung zwischen marginalisierenden gesellschaftlichen Sicherheitsagenden und der Exklusivität von Schutzräumen für marginalisierte Gruppen.

Following the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the narrative of a "Return to Europe" emerged alongside systemic transformations. Accession to the European Union was perceived as an opportunity for an improved standard of living and a shift towards democracy, peace, and freedom of movement. Initially, the integration of CEE countries into the EU appeared to follow a one-sided process of harmonization with Western Europe. The emergence of new international and societal conflicts led to the end of limitation. Countries such as Poland and Hungary shift their political discourse towards opposition to European integration. Yet, these narratives do not reject the idea of Europe. On the contrary, they emphasize the significance of the European community of nations, European civilization, and Christianity as fundament for European values.

This shift raises the question of whether contemporary political narratives are shaping a new European identity that contrasts with the euro-enthusiastic archetype. Four countries—Poland, Hungary, Germany, and Spain— are analysed in the study with a goal of comparing European identity across member states and regions. The quantitative analysis, based on Eurobarometer data, explores how Europeans perceive the EU, while the qualitative analysis, drawing on the MANIFESTO database, investigates political discourse and its role in shaping European identity in times of Euroscepticism.

The findings indicate that European citizens do not necessarily align with national political discourses on the EU and are only partially influenced by Eurosceptic narratives. In Poland, despite political critiques of the EU, European identity remains largely Euro-enthusiastic. In Germany, where mainstream political parties continue to emphasize the historical necessity of European integration, Europeans are likely to express Eurosceptic views. European identities and political discourses in Hungary and Spain exhibit significant diversity, suggesting ongoing transformations within both societies and political elites.

Results highlight broader processes occurring across Europe and the existence of a complex contestation between three key actors: the EU, nation-states, and societies. The European sphere has become a battleground for competing political ideologies— both pro- and anti-European, liberal and conservative, democratic and authoritarian.

Populist leaders mobilize voters with historical narratives. Regimes in Poland and Hungary are good examples, however, also in East Germany, higher support for AfD indicates that appeals of this party resonate better with transformation experience. However, we still know very little about how the change of political regime influences on societal emotional climate and individual experiences. The objective of this contribution is therefore to theoretically frame and to empirically investigate their these processes.

First, I will provide theoretical opportunity to define these emotional transformations through the concept of emotion regime (Verbalyte & Ulinskaitė 2024, Reddy 2001) and its change from totalitarian to democratic (de Rivera 1992). Adjustment to this new regime and feeling rules (Hochschild 1979) could fall easy for some (della Porta, 2016), but could also bring insecurity (Berezin 2002), stress, anxiety (Maor 2022), resentment, resignation, grief and trauma (Demertzis 2020). These differences in adaptation could also become causes for new cleavages in affective polarization. It is not only because previously suppressed (e.g. ethnic) conflicts re-emerge (Lake, 1996) or due to the different stance and level of support for the previous regime people have (Rimé 2007), but also because they are more or less satisfied or disappointed with the changes (Steinberg 2014).

To better substantiate these theoretical considerations, I then turn to empirical material: interviews collected in Lithuania in the summer of 2021 on their remembrance of the 90ties and in the summer 2024 on the affective polarization in the current society. I conclude with the mapping of emotions present in Lithuania in these two time periods. We see that there is a strong polarization between people in terms of their evaluation of transition, but that more nuanced emotional shades also reveal differences in their interpretation of who are the ones to blame for harshness of the transformation period.