17. - 20. März 2020 in Frankfurt am Main | 18. März Digital Day
Eine Übersicht aller Sessions/Sitzungen dieser Tagung. Bitte wählen Sie einen Ort oder ein Datum aus, um nur die betreffenden Sitzungen anzuzeigen. Wählen Sie eine Sitzung aus, um zur Detailanzeige zu gelangen.
Chair der Sitzung: Dennis Hilgers, Johannes Kepler Universität Linz
Ort:Virtueller Raum 4
David Lindermüller (Universität der Bundeswehr, München): Negative media reporting and its effects on performance-based budgeting: A processand outcome-based investigation Christian Schmidt, Ulf Papenfuß (Zeppelin Universität Friedrichshafen): Do Politicization and Professional Background Affect Executive Director Pay in State-Owned Enterprises? –A Human Capital Theory Perspective Irina Lindermüller (Universität der Bundeswehr, München): Influences of Formalization, Role Conflict, and Role Ambiguity on Public Auditors’ Business Partner Role and Economic Error Management Dr. Hannes Lampe (TUHH Hamburg): Citizensourcing and public service quality: the case of patent examination
Negative media reporting and its effects on performance-based budgeting: A processand outcome-based investigation
David Lindermüller1, Matthias Sohn2, Bernhard Hirsch1
1Universität der Bundeswehr München, Deutschland; 2European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Deutschland
In performance-based budgeting (PBB), performance information can be used for the allocation of resources. However, the public administration/management literature indicates that it is difficult to devise an automatism for directly translating performance information into a budget allocation. Drawing on blame avoidance theory, we conduct a process-tracing laboratory experiment, which allows us to capture participants’ information search processes in performance reports to test the effect of negative media reporting on PBB in the context of the provision of public healthcare. We ask participants with several years of work experience in the German public sector to indicate how financial resources should be allocated among two hospitals based on performance reports. In line with blame avoidance theory, the results show that negative media reporting increases the willingness to spend more money, especially on relatively low-performing hospitals. Furthermore, we find that negative media reporting shifts participants’ attention in the predecisional information search process towards performance information about the relatively low-performing hospital. By considering process and outcome data, our study provides robust evidence that negative media reporting triggers blame avoidance in the context of PBB.
Do Politicization and Professional Background Affect Executive Director Pay in State-Owned Enterprises? – A Human Capital Theory Perspective
Ulf Papenfuß, Christian Schmidt
Zeppelin-Universität Friedrichshafen am Bodensee, Deutschland
This article links the human capital theory and politicization debates and broadens the understanding on human capital effects on executive director pay (EDP) by assessing the specific organizational context of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The study examines 336 executive directors (EDs) employed in 253 German SOEs between 2014 and 2016. Results show that politicized EDs—in contrast to often-stressed claims—receive significantly lower pay than non-politicized EDs. Moreover, SOEs spend significantly higher EDPs for external hired EDs than for internal successors with firm-specific human capital. Counterintuitively regarding public sector reforms, private sector experience does not significantly influence EDP. However, EDs’ industry experience increases the likelihood for a higher EDP. These findings provide new empirical insights and have important theoretical and managerial implications.
Influences of Formalization, Role Conflict, and Role Ambiguity on Public Auditors’ Business Partner Role and Economic Error Management
Irina Lindermüller, Bernhard Hirsch, Christian Nitzl, David Lindermüller
Universität der Bundeswehr München, Österreich
Public auditors are currently expected to conduct ‘value for money audits’ to ensure that public institutions do not waste tax money due to incorrect economic decisions. Thus, the auditor role has been expanded from a supervisor to a business partner approach. Role changes are often accompanied by role conflicts and role ambiguity. This study explores whether role conflict or role ambiguity among public auditors have negative effects on their economic error management. Our results show that auditors who work in more formalized public audit organizations are less likely to experience role ambiguity and role conflict and manage auditees’ economic errors in a more positive way. Furthermore, we find that auditors who do not experience role ambiguity see themselves as a business partner of the auditee and show more intensive economic error management.