Eine Übersicht aller Sessions/Sitzungen dieser Tagung. Bitte wählen Sie einen Ort oder ein Datum aus, um nur die betreffenden Sitzungen anzuzeigen. Wählen Sie eine Sitzung aus, um zur Detailanzeige zu gelangen.
Chair der Sitzung: Christian A. Mahringer, Universität Stuttgart
Ort:Virtueller Raum 2
Framing a Contest in Terms of Ego Competition Increases Cheating via Ego State Competitiveness
Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Deutschland
Diskutant: Hendrik Wilhelm (Uni Witten/Herdecke)
Contests are widely used in organizations to motivate employees and promote performance. However, an undesired side effect of contests is that employee cheat more. I argue that they cheat when their primary focus during a contest is on winning. This focus is reflected by a concept called ego state competitiveness. Ego state competitiveness in turn can be manipulated by means of framing. In that way, contest framing can be used to reduce cheating in contests. To test this, I conduct an online experiment. Participants read a text which emphasizes either the opportunity to beat the opponent and demonstrate superiority (ego framing) or the opportunity to develop one’s skills and enjoy the task (task framing). Participants are then set up in dyads and compete on a problem-solving task. It is possible for participants to cheat (overstate their performance). Results suggest that ego framing indeed increases ego state competitiveness, which in turn predicts cheating. At the same time, framing does not affect task performance. Taken together, the results imply that contest organizers may frame their contests in terms of task competition to reduce ego state competitiveness and cheating without compromising employee performance.
Problematizing the ‘Transparency-fix’ in the Fight Against Corruption: the Example of Transparency International
Richard Weiskopf, Paul Zimmermann
Universität Innsbruck, Österreich
Increasingly, ‘transparency’ is seen as a universal panacea in the fight against the ‘cancer of corruption’ and as a solution that ‘fixes’ problems associated with all sorts of organizational misbehaviour. In this paper, we turn the given into a question and study this approach not as a ‘solution’ to the problem of corruption, but rather as a historically contingent form of ‘problematisation’ that links specific problem constructions with specific technologies for governing behaviour. Drawing on the Foucauldian concept of ‘problematisation’ we analyse the NGO Transparency International as a critical case with strategic importance for a more general problem of disentangling the ‘transparency-power nexus’ and of understanding effects of regulation in the name of transparency.
The Google Memo Gate: Negotiating organizational exclusion under the banner of inclusion
Milena Leybold1, Laura Dobusch2, Leonhard Dobusch3
1Universität Innsbruck, Österreich; 2Radboud University, Niederlanden; 3Universität Innsbruck, Österreich
While many large and well-known companies publicly advertise their commitment to values of diversity and inclusion, their sheer number of applicants forces them to continuously negotiate both premises for and actual exclusion decisions. By looking at a particularly public membership negotiation process at the company Google, we thus investigate the question how organizational exclusion is negotiated in the context of ideals of inclusion. Applying a ‘communicative constitution of organizations’ perspective, we find that de-/legitimization struggles of exclusion revolve around references to different inclusion ideals that are part of an overarching ‘inclusion paradigm’. At the same time, our study highlights the relevance of inclusion ideals constituted outside and with only marginal contribution by individual organizations publicly committing to ideals of diversity and inclusion for their membership-related decision-making.