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STEU4: Steuervermeidung multinationaler Unternehmen
Donnerstag, 19.03.2020:
16:00 - 17:30

Chair der Sitzung: Reinald Koch, Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
Ort: Virtueller Raum 4

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Incentive Effects of R&D Tax Incentives - A Meta-Regression Analysis Focusing on R&D Tax Policy Designs

Carla Pöschel

Freie Universität Berlin, Deutschland

Despite the growing literature on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives, little is known about differing design aspects of the underlying R&D tax policies. In this paper, I apply sophisticated meta-regression methodology to separate the distinct provisions through which various R&D tax policies affect firms’ R&D expenditure. My results indicate on average larger input additionality effects of hybrid tax regimes compared to volume-based schemes, while incremental tax measures seem to provide the lowest incentives for firms. My findings are particularly important for policy makers who are continuously optimizing the design of an R&D tax policy.

Tax Knowledge Diffusion via Strategic Alliances

Jens Mueller, Arndt Weinrich

Universität Paderborn, Deutschland

This study examines strategic alliances as channels for tax knowledge diffusion between firms. Although strategic alliances are primarily expected to foster their main business purposes, we focus on whether tax knowledge potentially diffuses as a second order effect of peer-to-peer cooperation. To tease out diffusion of tax knowledge, we investigate changes in the tax planning behavior of high-tax firms in strategic alliances with low-tax firms in comparison to high-tax firms in strategic alliances with other high-tax firms. Our results suggest an economically meaningful decrease of high-tax firms’ cash effective tax rates when cooperating with low-tax firms. Additionally, we find that this adjustment occurs within two years of a strategic alliance’s initiation. We apply textual analysis to control for the strategic alliances’ main business purposes in our analyses. Because these activities do not appear to drive our findings, we argue to identify tax knowledge diffusion as a second order effect and conjecture that strategic alliances are not intended to be tax planning investments. Finally, we test whether partner characteristics intensify or mitigate the identified effects. Overall, our results provide robust evidence for tax knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances.

Tax avoidance and the use of joint managers within multinational enterprises

Reinald Koch, Markus Gamm, Henning Giese

Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Deutschland

This paper investigates to what extent multinational enterprises (MNE) strategically choose subsidiary managers in order to facilitate tax planning. Using a cross-section data set taken from the AMADEUS database, we show that managers that jointly work for a foreign subsidiary and the parent company are observed more frequently if the subsidiary is located in a high-tax country. Similarly, managers that have co-positions in different foreign subsidiaries are found, in particular, in subsidiaries with very high or very low tax rates. We argue that these subsidiaries are particularly relevant for the application of tax planning strategies and that the use of such a joint management structure reduces a potential conflict of interest between the MNE’s and the manager’s priorities. Lastly, we show that its application is successful in terms of lowering the effective tax rate of the MNE.

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